Chapter 7 A deeper look

Introduction

Traditionally, general elections take place in the UK were brought about under the Royal Prerogative (see: chapter 3). The maximum period of time between one General Election and another – that is the length of a Parliament – is, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, five years (see: chapter 4). Prior to 2011, PMs could bring about a General Election in advance of this five year limit by requesting a dissolution from the monarch. In theory, a monarch could refuse to grant this request, but it is hard to conceive of circumstances in which they would do so. The UK is a constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch avoids becoming involved in decisions of a party political nature, and is therefore strongly inclined to take the advice of ministers and in particular the PM (see: chapter 1).

In 2010 a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition that took office. It was part of the agreement that the two parties reached that they would introduce legislation for fixed-term parliament. The motive for this plan seems to have been a desire to provide this coalition – an unusual form of government in the UK – with stability, and avoid its early collapse. Lessening to possibility of a General Election before 2015, it was hoped, would lessen the likelihood of the government breaking up. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, therefore, ended the Royal Prerogative power for the dissolution of Parliament. General elections would take place every five years. The Act created mechanisms by which the House of Commons – rather than the PM – could bring about an early election, if it was sufficiently determined to do so. By 2019, however, two early general elections had taken place (in 2017 and 2019). The second such election took place after a period of pronounced parliamentary instability. The Conservative government, having lost its majority in the Commons, could not secure the Commons approval it needed in the autumn of 2019 for an early election under the 2011 Act. Eventually, an election was achieved not through the 2011 Act, but through the passing of another law, the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019. At that General Election of December 2019, the Conservative Party won with a manifesto that included a commitment to abolishing the Act. Late in 2020 it brought forward proposals to repeal the 2011 Act outright and restore the arrangement as it prevailed before this Act had been passed.

Diving Deeper

Justifications for the 2011 Act

The political objective of the 2011 Act seems to have been to make possible the formation and sustained operation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition formed in 2010. But there had been arguments of principle offered in favour of fixed-term parliaments over time. Critics of the traditional system argued that it gave the PM and governing party an unfair advantage over their political opponents by allowing them to hold elections at short notice, and at times that favoured them. As two experts have put it: ‘When it came to election timing, the incumbent prime minister was firmly in control and able to exploit positive public opinion shocks, favourable economic conditions and opposition unpreparedness.’ (Fleming and Schleiter, 2020) Advocates of change also held that doubts about when elections might take place were a source of problematic confusion and instability.

Objections to the 2011 Act

The 2011 Act was controversial. Objections included that one of the procedures it introduced for calling early general elections involved 66 per cent of the members of the House of Commons (including vacant seats) voting for it. Those who opposed this rule held that a majority of one should always be enough in the Commons. Another criticism of the 2011 Act at the time of its introduction was that it set the standard parliamentary term at 5 years. Those who objected to this feature of the Act held that it would mean elections taking place less often than before; with a gap of four years a frequent occurrence under the old arrangements. This important occasion of democratic participation would therefore take place less often. Another complain was that the Act amounted to a major change to the constitution rushed through to serve the needs of the coalition government of 2010.

A further criticism of the Act was that it failed to establish a more stable parliamentary cycle, with early elections in 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, opponents claimed, in 2019 it led to a position in which the House of Commons was no longer willing to support the government on crucial policy matters relating to Brexit, but would not support a General Election either, creating political paralysis.

The Royal Prerogative

In 2020, the UK government proposed abolishing the 2011 Act and restoring the old Royal Prerogative in full. This decision was unusual, since the long-term historic tendency was for reductions in the extent of the Royal Prerogative. Some experts doubted whether, once a Royal Prerogative power was abolished, it was even possible to recreate the Royal Prerogative by an Act of Parliament. The use of the Royal Prerogative tends to be conditioned by a series of conventions – that is, understandings about the way in which the constitution should function (see: chapter 1). Even if the Royal Prerogative were restored, there were doubts about how conventions surrounding it might operate in future, what they were, and what they should be.

Summary

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government formed in 2010 agreed to introduced fixed-term Parliaments, and did so through an Act of the following year.

There had been criticism of the old arrangement, whereby PMs requested dissolutions of Parliament from the monarch under the Royal Prerogative. But the 2011 Act proved to be controversial also.

Early general elections took place in 2017 and 2019, and there was a period in autumn 2019 when a government that had lost a majority in the House of Commons could not secure a general election, forcing it to bypass the Act with fresh legislation.

In 2020, the Conservative government that had secured a comfortable House of Commons majority in December 2019 announced proposals to repeal the 2011 Act and restore the old arrangements.

Test your knowledge


Will repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act strengthen the UK government at the cost of the UK Parliament?

  • Under Fixed-term Parliaments Act, elections took place according to a set five year timetable. The cooperation of the Commons was essential were an early General Election to take place.
  • The repeal of the 2011 Act will mean a return to an arrangement under which the government, and within it the PM, will have the power to bring about a General Election.
  • It is not necessarily a question of government as against Parliament, but of the party government, which normally has a majority in the Commons, gaining power at the expense of the opposition parties in Parliament.
  • As a power the ability to call an election brings pressure with it, and if it is used mistakenly can end in electoral defeat.

Is it fair to judge the Fixed-term Parliaments Act as failing to achieve its objectives?

  • The agreement to introduce the Act helped the coalition to form, and may have assisted it in continuing to function for five years.
  • At first, it led to a full five year term for Parliament. But in 2017 and 2019, it did not stop an early General Election from taking place.
  • In 2019, even when a government had seemingly lost crucial support in the Commons, the Act created a blockage to an early election.
  • However, to criticise it both for failing to prevent and for preventing a General Election from taking place is contradictory.
  • The particular circumstances of 2019 arose not solely because of the 2011 Act, but because of the particular issue of Brexit, and the lack of a majority for the government party in the Commons.

References

Fleming T. and Schleiter, P. 2020. ‘How could the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 be improved’, Constitution Society: London https://consoc.org.uk/how-could-the-fixed-term-parliaments-act-2011-be-improved/

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