Introduction

A UK General Election took place on 12 December 2019. Of a total of 47.6 million people who were allowed to take part, 67.3 per cent actually voted – down marginally from a turnout of 68.8 per cent at the previous General Election of 2017. The central outcome of the election was that the Conservatives, who had needed to govern as a minority since 2017, won with a majority of 80 over all other parties (excluding seats not taken up by successful Sinn Fein candidates). This majority in the House of Commons was the largest that the Conservatives had won since 1987. With 43.6 per cent of the vote (up on 42.3 per cent), the Conservatives secured 365 seats out of 650 – 56 per cent - in the House of Commons, making 48 net gains. The Conservatives, having been in power alone in or coalition since 2010, had secured another term of office (see: chapter 7). The Labour Party, in second place, saw its vote share drop substantially from 40 per cent to 32.1 per cent. The Party suffered a net loss of 60 seats, slipping from 262 to 202. Its exclusion from power since 2010, when the electorally most successful period for the party in its history came to an end, was set to continue.

The two parties jointly secured 76 per cent of votes cast in total. While this figure suggested that they were a significant part of UK politics, it also showed they were not the whole of the story. Other parties were involved. There were considerable variations in voting patterns, pointing to a differential party system across the UK. Furthermore, behind the headline figures, some complex and significant tendencies were at work among supporters of the Conservatives and Labour, as well as other parties.

Diving Deeper

Diversity of party presence in the House of Commons

The personal profile of party representation at parliamentary level was changing. More women than ever before became MPs – 220, that is 34 per cent of all members. 51 per cent of Labour MPs were women. The figure for the Conservatives was lower, at 24 per cent; for the Scottish National Party 33 per cent; and for the Liberal Democrats 64 per cent (7 out of 11 Mps). MPs classified as from an ethnic minority also reached a new high, at 10 per cent of the total (65 MPs). Again, the distribution across parties varied. For instance, while 20 per cent of Labour MPs were classed as from an ethnic minority, the level for the Conservatives was 6 per cent. The parliamentary profile of some parties might not yet match that of the general population. But descriptive representation was closer to that of society as a whole than it had been before. Arguably – by extension – greater substantive representation might be achieved, meaning the interests of those previously more excluded groups could be advanced in a way they had not before (see: chapter 11).

The electoral system and the parties

The single member plurality or ‘First-Past-the-Post’ electoral system continued to benefit some parties and disadvantage others (see: chapter 7). As we have seen, the Conservatives were able to win 56 per cent of the seats on 43.6 per cent of votes cast. Territorial concentrations of votes benefited some parties. The SNP was the third largest party in the House of Commons, with 48 seats or 7.4 per cent of the total, on 3.88 per cent of the popular vote. The Liberal Democrats, by contrast, won 11 seats – less than 2 per cent – on 11.55 per cent of votes cast. The party had gained a lower vote share in 2017 – 7.4 per cent – but while its total support rose in 2019, its seat share fell – from 12 to 11. The Labour vote share – 32.1 per cent – was closely commensurate with its portion of seats in the House of Commons – 202 and 31 per cent. But this proportionality was not an inevitable outcome of the electoral system, and there was no guarantee it would be repeated.

Territorial politics

The 2019 General Election confirmed – and even accentuated – territorial divergence in the party system (see: chapter 12). Both voting patterns and results (though under single member plurality they did not correlate directly) varied greatly across the country. In Wales, Labour won the most seats. Also in Wales, Plaid Cymru broadly maintained its vote share (down slightly from 10.4 per cent in 2017 to 9.9 per cent), and remained static with 4 out of 40 seats. In Scotland, the SNP was – as we have seen – a beneficiary of the electoral system. It came first on the popular vote, with 45 per cent (an increase on 2017 from 36.9 per cent). This plurality of votes translated into an overwhelming majority of seats: from 35 (in 2017) to 48 out of 59. Northern Ireland has its own party system, with none of the parties from Great Britain having a significant presence. A notable shift in this territory saw the Democratic Unionist Party, though still winning the most seats, declining from 10 to 8 out of a total of 18; while Sinn Fein remained at the same level (losing and gaining one). The Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Alliance Party, both of which won no seats in 2017, respectively secured 2 and 1 seats. The Alliance Party vote share increased from 7.9 per cent to 16.8 per cent.

Within England, there were notable variations: Labour, for instance, secured 48.1 per cent of votes (coming first) and 49 out of 73 seats in London. In the neighbouring South East of England, it received only 22.1 per cent of votes and 8 out of 84 seats. The Conservatives made gains in parts of England where previously they had performed poorly. In the North East of England, for example, the party won 7 seven seats from Labour, increasing its share of the total (29) from 3 to 10 (Labour now held 19 in the North East of England, where previously it had held 26).

Profile of party supporters

The election revealed various tendencies regarding the types of voters to which the parties appealed; as is illustrated by a comparison between Conservative and Labour voters. In line with a trend that had developed from 2010 onwards, social class was no longer clearly associated with voting patterns in the way it had once been. The Conservatives led Labour across all social grades. Traditionally, the Conservatives appealed more to managers and professionals (AB grade); while Labour traditionally appealed more to skilled (C) and unskilled (DE, also including the inactive) manual workers. In 2019, the only group in which the Conservatives did not increase their support was AB. A group in which Labour outperformed the Conservatives was graduates, with a lead of 39 per cent to 34 per cent among people with degrees. Labour also led among those aged 34 and below; and among those classified as from the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) group. Gender differentiation interacted with age. For instance, among younger voters (18-24), women were more likely to be Labour voters and less likely to be Conservative voters than men. A source of Conservative success, with its firm commitment to Brexit, was in securing the votes of 74 per cent of people who voted ‘leave’ at the 2016 referendum. Labour – appearing to offer the opportunity to prevent departure via a second referendum – managed only to attract 14 per cent of this group. At the same time, it failed to achieve the same degree of popularity among ‘remain’ supporters that the Conservative did on the ‘leave’ side. Labour only secured the support of 49 per cent of ‘remain’ voters; with the Liberal Democrats – far firmer in their opposition to Brexit – gaining 21 per cent.

Generalisations about and simple interpretations of these various data were difficult to make. But they pointed to a relationship between social tendencies and political behaviour that parties needed to take into account, and which therefore had implications for their orientation and for the operation of the party system. The Conservative government, for instance, began to display increased interest in advancing the cause of socially less privileged groups, including those concentrated in parts of the country such as North East England, under the general label of ‘levelling up’ (see: chapter 10). Labour faced a dilemma involving how to appeal to supporters of ‘leave’ that it had lost between 2017 and 2019, and the connected issue of how to rebuild support in areas such as the North East of England.

Summary

The 2019 UK General Election saw a decisive victory for the Conservative Party, its most significant success since 1987, and losses for Labour.

The disproportionality of the ‘First-Past-the-Post’, single member plurality system, was demonstrated. Beneficiaries included the Conservatives and the SNP; those who lost out included the Liberal Democrats.

The results demonstrated significant territorial divergence in patterns of voting and seats won. Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland all had differently structured party systems. Within England there were notable territorial divergences. Labour performed better in London than elsewhere. The Conservatives made gains at its expense in regions of England including the North East.

Social grade became less of an indicator of voting behaviour, with the Conservatives leading Labour across all groups. Areas of success for Labour included graduates and younger people, especially younger women. The Conservatives were more effective at securing the support of ‘leave’ voters than Labour was on the ‘remain’ side.

The patterns of voting had implications for the future political strategy of the parties.

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