Document – Tokugawa Nariaki, "Memorandum to the Bakufu" (1853)

Abstract and Keywords

Tokugawa Nariaki (1800–1860) was one of the leading Japanese political and military leaders of the nineteenth century. As possessor of the Mito territories, he was one of the most powerful and influential daimyo, or feudal lords, and a member of a collateral branch of the Tokugawa family. Nariaki was a very forceful and polarizing personality. Although a confirmed believer in the superiority of the Japanese way of life and of the imperial tradition, he was not an unreflective or “knee-jerk” conservative. Already in 1841 he had established an academy in his feudal domain for the study of useful Western knowledge, and it was there that the phrase “revere the emperor, expel the barbarians” was first used publicly. He was an adviser on maritime defense, and, when Commodore Perry and the Americans demanded change, he penned an aggressive and sharply defined response, which urged resistance.

G. Beasley, trans. and ed., Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–1868 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 102–06.

Document

It is my belief that the first and most urgent of our tasks is for the Bakufu to make its choice between peace and war, and having determined its policy to pursue it unwaveringly thereafter. When we consider the respective advantages and disadvantages of war and peace, we find that if we put our trust in war the whole country’s morale will be increased and even if we sustain an initial defeat we will in the end expel the foreigner; while if we put our trust in peace, even though things may seem tranquil for a time, the morale of the country will be greatly lowered and we will come in the end to complete collapse. This has been amply demonstrated in the history of China. . . . [I]n my view we must never choose the policy of peace.

Although our country’s territory is not extensive, foreigners both fear and respect us. . . . Despite this, the Americans who arrived recently, though fully aware of the Bakufu’s prohibition, . . . insisted on presenting their written requests. Moreover they entered Edo Bay,ⁱ fired heavy guns in salute and even went so far as to conduct surveys without permission. They were arrogant and discourteous, their actions an outrage. Indeed, this was the greatest disgrace we have suffered since the dawn of our history. . . . [S]hould it happen that the Bakufu fails to expel them but also that it concludes an agreement in accordance with their requests, then I fear it would be impossible to maintain our national prestige. . . .

The prohibition of Christianity is the first rule of the Tokugawa house. . . . The Bakufu can never ignore or overlook the evils of Christianity. Yet if the Americans are allowed to come again this religion will inevitably raise its head once more, however strict the prohibition; and this, I fear, is something we could never justify to the spirits of our ancestors. . . .

To exchange our valuable articles like gold, silver, copper, and iron for useless foreign goods like woollens and satin is to incur great loss while acquiring not the smallest benefit. The best course of all would be for the Bakufu to put a stop to the trade with Holland. By contrast, to open such valueless trade with others besides the Dutch would . . . inflict the greatest possible harm on our country. . . .

For some years Russia, England, and others have sought trade with us, but the Bakufu has not permitted it. Should permission be granted to the Americans, on what grounds would it be possible to refuse if Russia and the others [again] request it? . . .

It is widely stated that [apart from trade] the foreigners have no other evil designs and that if only the Bakufu will permit trade there will be no further difficulty. However, it is their practice first to seek a foothold by means of trade and then go on to propagate Christianity and make other unreasonable demands. . . . Thus we would be repeating the blunders of others, seen . . . recently in the Opium War in China. . . .

Though the Rangakushaⁱⁱ group may argue secretly that world conditions are

much changed from what they were, . . . seclusion in isolation amidst the seas . . . is a constant source of danger to us and that our best course would therefore be to communicate with foreign countries and open an extensive trade; yet, to my mind, if the people of Japan stand firmly united, if we complete our military preparations and return to the state of society that existed before the middle ages, then we will even be able to go out against foreign countries and spread abroad our fame and prestige. But if we open trade at the demand of the foreigners, for no better reason than that . . . men have shown fear merely at the coming of a handful of foreign warships, then it would truly be a vain illusion to think of evolving any long-range plan for going out against foreign countries. . . .

I hear that all, even though they be commoners, who have witnessed the recent actions of the foreigners, think them abominable; and if the Bakufu does not expel these insolent foreigners root and branch there may be some who will complain in secret, asking to what purpose have been all the preparations of gun-emplacements. It is inevitable that men should think in this way when they have seen how arrogantly the foreigners acted at Uraga. That, I believe, is because even the humblest are conscious of the debt they owe their country, and it is indeed a promising sign. Since even ignorant commoners are talking in this way, I fear that if the Bakufu does not decide to carry out expulsion, . . . then the lower orders may fail to understand its ideas and hence opposition might arise from evil men who had lost their respect for Bakufu authority. It might even be that Bakufu control . . . would itself be endangered. . . .

[It is argued], the Bakufu should show itself compliant at this time and should placate the foreigners, meanwhile exerting all its efforts in military preparations, so that when these preparations have been completed it can more strictly enforce the ancient laws. However . . . there is not the slightest chance that the feudal lords will complete military preparations . . . unless they are set an example in military matters by the Bakufu. . . . I therefore believe that if there be any sign of the Bakufu pursuing a policy of peace, morale will never rise. . . . But if the Bakufu . . . shows itself resolute for expulsion, the immediate effect will be to increase ten-fold the morale of the country. . . . Hesitant as I am to say so, only by so doing will the Shogun be able to fulfill his “barbarian-expelling” duty. . . .

Notes

Review

1. What are Nariaki’s main recommendations? What kinds of arguments does he use to support his recommendations?
2. What understanding of Japanese national identity does Nariaki provide here? What are the main bases of national identity implied or stated in Nariaki’s argument?
3. What is the relationship between the state and nationalism in Nariaki’s presentation? Does it surprise you that Nariaki favored ending the bakufu and restoring the emperor?
4. How do issues of power figure in Nariaki’s calculations? What role does Nariaki think Christianity plays in Western diplomacy?

Notes:

(ⁱ) Uraga harbor near Yokohama. The Japanese wanted negotiations to take place there, not in Edo (Tokyo).

(ⁱⁱ) Rangaku or “Dutch knowledge”; Rangakusha are the scholars of western knowledge.