The Court of Appeal held that the judge had erred in refusing to allow the cross examination. It stated [at para 22] that ‘It does not seem to us that the words “substantial probative value” in their s100(1)(b) context require the applicant to establish that the bad character relied on amounts to proof of a lack of credibility of the witness when credibility is an issue of substantive importance, or that the convictions demonstrated a tendency towards untruthfulness. The question is whether the evidence of the previous convictions or bad behaviour is sufficiently persuasive to be worthy of consideration by a fair minded tribunal upon the issue of the witness’s creditworthiness.’ The convictions were unsafe. The case demonstrates that the Court of Appeal did not consider the Hanson distinction between dishonesty and untruthfulness did not apply to s 100 (1) (b). See also R v Moody (2018) where, although the conviction for sexual assault on a 15-year-old was safe, the Court found it ‘troubling’ that cross examination on that an instance of racism (which did not lead to a conviction) on the complainant’s school record was not permitted at trial where the defence had alleged fabrication.

The appellant had been convicted on circumstantial evidence of the theft of cash from a public house where he had been drinking. His previous convictions for dishonesty included offences for handling stolen goods and aggravated taking and driving away a vehicle. They were admitted as evidence of propensity to commit offences of the kind charged. His appeal failed.

The court set out guidelines for the admissibility of propensity evidence. Merely establishing the offences were of the same description or the same category (according to Home Office prescriptions) was not sufficient. The court should ask if the history of convictions established propensity to commit offences of the kind charged and if yes, whether such propensity made it more likely that the defendant had committed the offence. Finally, it should consider if it would be unjust to rely on the convictions and if admitting the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that it ought not to be admitted.

The defendant admitted killing her partner with a knife but claimed self-defence. Evidence was admitted of other incidents involving threats to individuals with knives. These had not involved self-defence or led to criminal convictions. The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal on the grounds that the jury ought to have been directed that before they could take the disputed bad character evidence into account they had to be sure of its truth. The Crown’s appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal was wrong in suggesting that each incident should be proved to the criminal standard. The previous incidents should be viewed in the round and not in isolation. Overall propensity to be admissible had to be proved to the criminal standard. The trial judge had not given adequate directions on propensity. The conviction was properly quashed.

In a trial for defrauding the Revenue the applicant was not permitted to adduce evidence of his co-defendant’s bad character. The Court of Appeal held the evidence was wrongly excluded but the conviction was safe.

The threshold for admissibility under s101(1)(e) was much higher than under the CEA 1898. If applied correctly, the risk of unfairness was lessened.

R was convicted of attempted robbery. He had claimed that he had been injured while serving in the British Army and that he worked regularly as a security guard. Both were false claims. The Court of Appeal held he was rightly cross examined under s101(1)(f) on his ‘reprehensible behaviour’, which included a violent attack not leading to a conviction.

The decision may be contrasted with that in R v Weir (2006), where the court referred to s105(6) in that the accused should only be cross examined on previous bad character necessary to correct the false impression he had given. In general, the Court of Appeal will defer to what it referred to (at p2950) as the trial judge’s ‘feel for the case’.

A teacher charged with indecently assaulting a pupil called a number of character witnesses to attest that he had a good general reputation in the community. The prosecution’s evidence of a contrary individual opinion was not admissible since evidence of character should be that of general reputation, not isolated acts.

This case is still authority for the definition of good character, which is governed by the common law. The principle in many ways reflects nineteenth century society with its more static population. It was, however, confirmed in the case of R v Redgrave (1982), where a defendant charged with importuning for immoral purposes was not permitted to produce good character evidence that he had a loving heterosexual relationship.

S was convicted of robbery. He had made an attack on a prosecution witness claiming he took drugs and had lied in his evidence. S’s previous convictions were admitted under s101(1)(g). The appeal was dismissed.

In reviewing the exercise of the discretion to exclude under this section, the court referred to the continuation of the practice which had been evidenced under the old law. The fact that an attack on a witness was necessary in the case the accused chose to make, was not a reason to refuse to allow the jury to assess the reliability of the defendant by seeing ‘the full nature of the source from which the allegation comes’.

A man with no criminal record was convicted of rape. His defence was consent. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong not to direct that his good character was relevant to both his lack of guilt or propensity and his credibility.

It set out general guidelines on the correct judicial directions. If the defendant does not testify but makes an exculpatory statement to the police, then a direction on credibility should still be given. If he neither testifies nor makes an out of court exculpatory statement, then only the direction on propensity should be given. A defendant with good character is entitled to a good character direction even if tried with a defendant with a record. Failure to give such a direction could lead to the conviction being overturned.