Topic

Author/Academic

Viewpoint

Source

My body, my body parts, my property?

D Beyleveld and R Brownsword.

Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that property rights give ‘rule-preclusionary’ control to individuals in possession. This means that owners of property have certain prima facie rights and are therefore justified in dealing with that property.

Since one’s legitimate interests extend over one’s own body, the authors argue that such rule-preclusionary control should apply to the body and its parts, and justification for how one chooses to deal with one’s own body should not be required.

Healthcare Analysis2000; 8: 87–99

Brain death—too flawed to endure, too ingrained to abandon.

R D Truog.

The author suggests that brainstem death is insufficient to guarantee permanent unconsciousness. Furthermore, if organ retrieval is available by other means, then it is likely that the definition of death will revert to what is seen as a more ‘natural’ state of death.

Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics2007: 273–281

Doing harm: living donors, clinical research and the Tenth Man.

C Elliott.

The author argues that although living donors may be motivated by altruism, this does not absolve the recipient and the doctor from their moral obligations. The latter, as agents, have independent ethical and moral responsibilities. The recipient encourages the donor’s self-sacrifice for personal gain and the doctor performing the transplant can inflict harm for the benefit of another. This raises ethical questions.

Journal of Medical Ethics 1995; 21: 91–96

Non-standard kidneys for transplants: clinical margins, medical morality and the law.

A Cronin and J Douglas.

Looks at donor organ quality and possible associated infections leading to less good outcomes. Considers the legal status of claims in this area which is largely unexplored.

Medical Law Review2013; 21(3): 448–473