Topic

Author/Academic

Viewpoint

Source

 Human dignity in bioethics and biolaw.

 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword.

 The tension between the concepts of ‘dignity as constraint’ and ‘dignity as empowerment’ in assisted reproductive techniques is considered. The ‘dignity as constraint’ position rejects practices that are contrary to human dignity (irrespective of possible beneficial outcomes) and opposes the use of gametes, surrogacy, and techniques that permit the selection of children. The concept of ‘dignity as empowerment’ is based on autonomy and includes rights-based arguments. This supports the exercise of informed choice and from this position, assisted reproductive techniques and genetic technology are all morally permissible.

 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)

Reproductive autonomy and new technologies in Autonomy and Trust in

Bioethics

O O'Neil

Conservative, though persuasive arguments are given in support of legitimate regulation of treatment of infertility and incorporation of the welfare of the child considerations. She asserts that appeals to reproductive autonomy, by themselves, are insufficient to establish positive rights to use specific reproductive technologies. Factors

such as the long-term dependency of children born and the parental capabilities of prospective parents need to be fully considered by those who provide treatment.

O O'Neil, Reproductive autonomy and new technologies in Autonomy and Trust in

Bioethics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Rights and reproductive choice

J Harris

Harris argues that interference with access to infertility treatment is a violation of reproductive autonomy and that the dangers of potential harm are insufficient to justify constraints. Failure to offer access to infertility treatment is considered to be unjustifiable discrimination.

J Harris, 'Rights and Reproductive Choice' in Harris J and Holm S (eds), The Future of

Human Reproduction(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 34-36

Pre-implantation HLA typing: having children to save our loved ones

K Devolder

An extreme view may suggest that a saviour sibling is not born in its own right but as a mere commodity and created as a spare part for the existing child. This would violate the Kantian principle of never using people as a means but always treating them as an end in itself.

Journal of Medical Ethics 2005; 31: 582-586

Hashmi and Whitaker, 'an unjustifiable and misguided distinction'

S Sheldon and S Wilkinson

The authors argue that banning the use of PGD and tissue typing to select saviour siblings would lead to the avoidable death of existing children. They go on to argue that those who prohibit such activity should demonstrate that these consequences are less terrible than the results of allowing the use of PGD. Furthermore, a saviour sibling would

not be a commodity because it would be a playmate for the existing child, and benefit from the older sibling's company and derive pleasure from the knowledge that he or she had been instrumental in saving the older sibling's life.

Med L Rev 2004; 12: 137-163