Privity meant that the groom was not party to that contract and he had not provided any consideration to support the promise.

Dunlop sold tyres to Dew & Co. and Dew & Co. promised (in return for a discount) not to sell the tyres at less than list price and to obtain a similar undertaking from trade buyers. Dew & Co. sold some tyres to Selfridge (contract 2) and Selfridge promised Dew & Co. to abide by the list price but broke it. Dunlop sued Selfridge for breach of its undertaking but failed because it was not a party to contract 2 containing Selfridge’s promise.

Privity means that only a party to a contract can enforce its promises. Dunlop had also not provided any consideration to support Selfridge’s promise (and an argument that Dew & Co. were acting as its agents also failed).

Contracts between owners and charterers contained commission clause providing for payment to named broker. The 1999 Act applied and clause purported to confer a benefit on broker so the broker could enforce it directly.

Section 1(2) proviso to s. 1(1)(b) of the 1999 Act will only operate to deny enforceability by a third party if the contracting party denying this is able to satisfy the court that the parties’ contract indicates that the parties were denying any right of enforcement or protection to the third party. The third party does not need to prove a negative.

Stevedores could rely on exemption clause in contract between shipowners and carriers since carriers contracted as their agents for that clause and contract was clear that they were intended to be protected and they had provided consideration for the shipowners’ exemption promise by unloading the goods (performance of contractual duty owed to third party).

Agency device to establish a binding promise of exemption between a contracting party and third party to the clause.

Nephew had promised uncle that he would pay weekly sum to uncle’s widow on uncle’s death. The widow could not enforce this in her personal capacity because of privity but acting as her late husband’s representative she could. Since the estate had not suffered loss and could not recover substantial damages, specific performance was awarded.

Promisee remedies and the difficulties of the promisee seeking to enforce a promise in favour of a third party beneficiary. Specific performance was available because the promisee could not recover substantial damages if it had no loss.

McAlpine had been employed by Panatown to construct an office building on land belonging to UIPL, an associate company of Panatown. Defects arose with the building and Panatown sought damages. McAlpine claimed that Panatown had suffered no loss as a result of its breaches of contract because Panatown neither owned the land nor occupied the building. HL refused the recovery but the decision was based on the fact that McAlpine had entered into a separate duty of care deed directly with UIPL, giving UIPL remedies for defective work and that deed had to prevail.

HL held that normally (absent the duty of care deed) the narrow ground in the St Martins Property appeal would have enabled a party in the position of Panatown to recover substantial damages. Where a contract between a builder and an employer was for the construction of a building on the land of a third party who would own that building, the employer could seek substantial damages from the builder for defects where the third party had no direct remedy against that builder.