Mr Pagarani set up a trust foundation, of which he was one of the trustees. He made an oral declaration that he intended the bulk of his remaining wealth to go to the trust foundation. There was both oral and written evidence of the intention to transfer the property to the trust foundation companies. Mr Pagarani died before title was transferred to the trust foundation. He was one of the trustees of the foundation.

The Privy Council said that as Mr Pagarani intended to make an immediate unconditional gift to the foundation and was one of the trustees of the foundation, he had legal title in the property, and that although the court will not perfect an imperfect gift, neither will it ‘strive officiously’ to deny the intention of the transferor. The legal title in the property would be transferred to the trust foundation (see ‘Key debates’ in the following section).

The claimant had worked for the defendant since he was 16. The claimant had rejected opportunities to work elsewhere and better himself on assurances from the defendant that he would leave the farm to the claimant. Over 40 years later they fell out and the defendant made a new will leaving the farm to another person.

Where there was a clear, unequivocal promise, express or by acquiescence, made by the transferor, and this was followed by reliance by the transferee, which meant it was inequitable to allow the transferor to go back on the promise, the court would carry out the minimum equity to do justice. The facts had created an estoppel for the claimant, which in proprietary estoppel can found a cause of action (ie used as a sword).

A father wanted to transfer the interest in a cheque, which was made out to him, to his infant son. He had made an oral declaration to that effect but had failed to endorse the cheque.

The transfer as a gift had failed as it required endorsement and the court would not create a trust out of an imperfect gift.

An attempt was made to transfer property to be held on trust. Although the transferor had made the transfer by deed and delivered it to the respondent, the failure of the transfer to be registered in the bank’s books meant that the transfer was imperfect.

Where the transfer had failed because the transferor had failed to do all he could to perfect title, the courts would not complete the transferor’s actions.

The owner of shares wanted to transfer them to her nephew. The relevant forms were completed but not registered, being on file at her solicitors. Her nephew took on some responsibility for the running of the company, which the transfer gave him. All parties acted as if he had the shares. On her death the court was asked to perfect the transfer.

Based on principles of unconscionability, the court would perfect the transfer to the nephew (see ‘Key debates’ in the following section).

A husband took his wife through the home and said ‘Look, it is all yours’. On his bankruptcy she claimed legal ownership of the furniture.

A transfer of chattels not by deed requires a delivery of the chattel with unequivocal words of transfer to be valid.

The transferor wanted to transfer shares but to do this he needed permission from the Treasury. He had not obtained this.

The transferor had not done all that was required of him to make good the transfer. Equity would not perfect the transaction.

A mother had promised her daughter that she would have her house. But the mother believed that she would not be able to leave the house to the daughter, as her daughter was illegitimate. She then wrote a cheque to her daughter.

The writing of the cheque was evidence that the intention did not remain unchanged until death.

A testator promised to establish a trust, which he never did. On death the promisee was appointed executor.

The trust was constituted. However, this decision is doubtful as an extension to Strong v Bird [1874] as there was no failed attempt.

Rose transferred shares to his wife and trustees on 30 March. To complete the transfer, it had to be registered with the company. The transfer was registered on 30 June.

Where the transferor has done all in his power to make the transfer, and the only fault is a third-party inaction, over which the transferor has no control, equity will perfect the transfer.

A grandfather wanted his leasehold interest in land to be held for the benefit of his grandson. He assigned the lease to the boy’s mother but did not make the transfer by deed as required under s 52 Law of Property Act 1925.

Failure to complete the necessary legal requirements will mean the transfer fails.

The transferor was terminally ill with cancer; he told the transferee, with whom he had had a long-term close relationship, that he wanted her to have his house, saying, ‘You have the keys. They are in your bag. The deeds are in the steel box’.

Confirming that land could be the subject of a DMC, the Court of Appeal confirmed the decision in Cain v Moon [1896] that a valid DMC required transfers made: 1. in contemplation of death; 2. conditional on death; 3. with actual or some indicia of the transferor giving ‘dominion’ (control) of the property to the transferee (sometimes called symbolic delivery).

A promise to forgo the payment of a debt was unenforceable at law for want of consideration. The promisee was appointed as the executor of the will of the promisor.

Where there has been a failure of the legal requirements of a valid transfer, but the transferee is appointed as executor or administrator of the transferor’s estate, equity will perfect if there has been a continuing intention to give during the transferor’s lifetime.

A young farmer, David, worked for an elderly relative, Peter, for many years on a farm. There were several comments by Peter that David would inherit the farm. The statements were vague and imprecise. Peter was a ‘man of few words’ and little formal education. Peter died intestate and David claimed that the estate was estopped from denying him an interest in the farm.

Although the extent of the farm was imprecise, the property itself (the farm) was clear. Although the evidence was imprecise as to the assurance, it was clear on the first-instance evidence that David and Peter had proceeded on the understanding that David would inherit the farm. The estate was estopped from denying this. Per Lord Scott, the decision is better decided as one of remedial constructive trust rather than estoppel as the property was of a future interest under a will rather than a present property.

A property owner entered into a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ to sell property to Cobbe when he had obtained planning permission, sharing the proceeds by an agreement they would draw up legally at a later date. After expending a great deal of money on the planning application, the property owner refused to complete the agreement. Cobbe claimed that the property owner was estopped from doing this.

There was no clear property over which the estoppel could be raised. The agreement was not a valid contract, which could form the basis of an estoppel. Both were commercially experienced people who took the risks in the ‘gentleman’s agreement’.