Chapter 3 Self-test questions

Which of the following statements most accurately describes personal rights and property rights?

Property rights are crucial in land law, but personal rights are irrelevant in land law.

Property rights always bind third parties, whereas personal rights never do.

Property rights bind third parties, unless the third party has a defence, whereas personal rights never bind third parties.

Property rights bind third parties, unless the third party has a defence, whereas personal rights bind third parties only rarely.

In Hill v Tupper, why was Mr Hill unsuccessful in his action to prevent Mr Tupper from hiring boats out on the canal?

Mr Hill had not properly acquired the right that he claimed, and therefore he had no cause of action against Mr Tupper.

The content of the right Mr Hill acquired against the canal company meant that his right did not count as a property right in land. As a result, that right could not bind a third party, such as Mr Tupper.

Mr Tupper had a defence to the action by Mr Hill, as, at the time of his actions, Mr Tupper had no knowledge of the agreement between Mr Hill and the canal company.

The canal did not count as land, and therefore the right Mr Hill acquired from the canal company could not count as a property right.

Which of these statements is the most accurate summary of the effect of the numerus clausus principle?

The numerus clausus principle limits the content of legal property rights, but there are no limits on the content of equitable interests in land.

The numerus clausus principle prevents judges from making any changes to the content of property rights in land.

The numerus clausus principle does not prevent an owner of land from creating a new type of property right.

The numerus clausus principle limits the content of property rights in land.

According to Lord Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth, what qualities must a right have to be capable of being recognized as an equitable property right?

The right must be one which was recognized as an equitable property right before 1926. If it was not, then the Law of Property Act 1925 prevents the right from counting as an equitable property right in land.

The right must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and, to some degree, permanent and stable.

The right must be one which is listed in the Law of Property Act 1925, section 1(2).

Permitting the right to count as an equitable property right in land must not contradict the common law.

Which of these statements is false?

The freehold, lease, charge, easement and restrictive covenant can all be either legal or equitable property rights in land.

The lease, charge and easement can all be either legal or equitable property rights in land.

The mere equity, equity of redemption, option to purchase, right of pre-emption and estate contract are all examples of equitable interests in land.

The freehold and lease are the only permitted forms of legal estate in land.

A, who has a legal freehold, enters a contract with B under which B is given a licence to use A's land for five years. Two years later, A sells his legal freehold to C. In the light of the Court of Appeal's approach in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold, which of the following statements best describe B's position?

B's contractual licence counts as a property right in A's land. As a result, B will be able to continue to use the land, even after the sale to C.

B's contractual licence counts as a property right in A's land. If C has no defence to that pre-existing property right of B, B will be able to continue to use the land, even after the sale to C. However, if C does have a defence to B's pre-existing property right, C will be able to stop B using the land.

B cannot assert a pre-existing property right against C, as a contractual licence does not count as a legal or equitable property right in land. As a result, B has no means of asserting a right against C and so C will be able to stop B using the land.

B cannot assert a pre-existing property right against C, as a contractual licence does not count as a legal or equitable property right in land. B may be able to assert a new, direct right against C, but only if B can show that C's conduct justifies the recognition of such a right. If B has no such right, C will be able to stop B using the land.

In considering whether a contractual licence does or should count as an equitable property right, does it matter whether the courts will protect such a licence through the remedy of specific performance?

Yes. If a contractual licence is protected through specific performance, this shows that, during the period of the licence, B cannot be prevented from using the land. This means that B has an equitable property right in that land.

Yes. If a contractual licence is protected through specific performance, this does not, by itself, show that a contractual licence counts as an equitable property right. However, the availability of specific performance may be a necessary condition that must be met before it can be argued that any contractual licence should count as an equitable property right.

No. If a contractual licence is protected through specific performance, this simply shows that a particular remedy is available against the licensor. It has no bearing on the question of whether a contractual licence should count as an equitable property right and so have an effect on third parties.

No. Specific performance is a discretionary remedy. There may be cases where a court, in its discretion, decides not to grant specific performance of a contractual licence. However, by itself, this fact should not prevent such a licence from being seen as an equitable property right.

Which of the following is the most accurate description of the difference between a contractual licence and an estoppel licence?

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land and A is under a duty to B not to revoke that permission. Where B has a contractual licence, A's duty arises due to a contract between A and B. Where B has an estoppel licence, A's duty arises because of an estoppel.

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land and A is under a duty to B not to revoke that permission. A contractual licence does not count as an equitable property right and so cannot bind a party other than A. In contrast, an estoppel licence does count as an equitable property right and so can bind a third party, later acquiring a right from A.

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land. Where B has a contractual licence, A can revoke that permission and prevent B continuing to use the land. Where B has an estoppel licence, A is prevented (estopped) from revoking the permission.

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land. Where B has a contractual licence, A is under a duty to B not to revoke that permission and a court will order specific performance of the contract between A and B. Where B has an estoppel licence, the court has a discretion to permit A to revoke B's licence.

Quiz Content