Chapter 7 Self-test questions

. A, who has a legal freehold, invites B to dinner at A's house. Following Hohfeld's analysis, which of the following is the most accurate description of the effect of A's invitation on the parties' rights?

Before A's invitation, B is under a duty to A not to enter A's land. A's invitation gives B a right against A as A comes under a duty to B to allow B to use A's land. A's invitation does not give B any new rights against third parties.

Before A's invitation, B is under a duty to A not to enter A's land. A's invitation removes B's duty to A, and so gives B a privilege to enter A's land. A's invitation does not give B any new rights against third parties. If A revokes the permission, B will again come under a duty not to enter or be on A's land.

Before A's invitation, B is under a duty to A not to enter A's land. A's invitation removes B's duty to A, and so gives B a privilege to enter A's land. A's invitation also means that the rest of the world comes under a duty to B not to prevent B entering A's land.

Before A's invitation, B is under a duty to A not to enter A's land. That duty continues even after A invites B to dinner. However, once A has issued the invitation, A is prevented from enforcing B's duty not to enter A's land.

. A, who has a legal freehold, invites B to dinner at A's house. B arrives for dinner, but, during the meal she makes a comment that A finds offensive and A asks her to leave. Following Hill's analysis as discussed in section 7.2.1, which of the following best describes B's position?

B must leave A's land immediately. If she fails to do so, B commits the wrong of trespass against A. However, as A invited B onto the land, A is not permitted to use reasonable force to remove B from the land.

B must leave A's land, but has a reasonable period in which to do so. This means that, if B leaves reasonably promptly, B is not in breach of any duties to A. This is because A can only revoke a licence if A gives B reasonable notice of his intention to do so.

B must leave A's land immediately. If she fails to do so, B commits the wrong of trespass against A and A can use reasonable force to remove B from the land.

B must leave A's land, but has a reasonable period in which to do so. This means that, if B leaves reasonably promptly, B is not in breach of any duties to B. In this way, the law allows B a 'packing up' period during which, despite A's revocation of the licence, B is not a trespasser on A's land.

. B buys a ticket, from A, to watch a sporting event held on A's land. Due to a dispute between A and B, A insists that B leave before the event is finished. However, B has not breached the terms contained in his agreement with A, and that agreement does not give A the power to remove B before the event is finished. Which of the following statements best describes B's position?

The contractual agreement between A and B means that A has a duty to B to allow B to remain on the land until the event is finished. This means that, even though A has attempted to revoke his permission for B to be on the land, B does not become a trespasser.

B's position depends on whether a court would be willing to grant specific performance of the contractual agreement between A and B. If specific performance would be granted, then B has a right to remain on A's land until the event is finished. In such a case, even if A attempts to revoke his permission for B to be on the land, B does not become a trespasser. If specific performance would not be granted, A can revoke his permission for B to be on the land. In such a case, B becomes a trespasser and must leave within a reasonable period.

The contractual agreement between A and B gives B a property right in A's land. This means that B is not a trespasser on A's land, even if A attempts to revoke his permission for B to be on the land.

The contractual agreement between A and B does not give B a property right in A's land. This means that, if A revokes his permission for B to be on the land, B becomes a trespasser and must leave within a reasonable period.

. A, who has a legal freehold, enters a contract with B under which B is allowed to share occupation of A's land for five years. Two years later, A sells his legal freehold to C. In the light of the Court of Appeal's approach in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold, which of the following statements best describe B's position?

B's contractual licence counts as a property right in A's land. As a result, B will be able to remain in occupation of the land, even after the sale to C.

B's contractual licence counts as a property right in A's land. If C has no defence to that pre-existing property right of B, B will be able to remain in occupation of the land, even after the sale to C. However, if C does have a defence to B's pre-existing property right, C will be able to remove B from the land.

B cannot assert a pre-existing property right against C, as a contractual licence does not count as a legal or equitable property right in land. As a result, B has no means of asserting a right against C and so C will be able to remove B from the land.

B cannot assert a pre-existing property right against C, as a contractual licence does not count as a legal or equitable property right in land. B may be able to assert a new, direct right against C, but only if B can show that C's conduct justifies the recognition of such a right. If B has no such right, C will be able to remove B from the land.

. In considering whether a contractual licence does or should count as an equitable property right, does it matter whether the courts will protect such a licence through the remedy of specific performance?

Yes. If a contractual licence is protected through specific performance, this shows that, during the period of the licence, B cannot be prevented from using the land. This means that B has an equitable property right in that land.

Yes. If a contractual licence is protected through specific performance, this does not, by itself, show that a contractual licence counts as an equitable property right. However, the availability of specific performance may be a necessary condition that must be met before it can be argued that any contractual licence should count as an equitable property right.

No. If a contractual licence is protected through specific performance, this simply shows that a particular remedy is available against the licensor. It has no bearing on the question of whether a contractual licence can count as an equitable property right and so have an effect on third parties.

No. Specific performance is a discretionary remedy. There may be cases where a court, in its discretion, decides not to grant specific performance of a contractual licence. However, by itself, this fact should not prevent such a licence from being seen as an equitable property right.

. Which of the following is not an argument in favour of the view that at least some contractual licences should count as equitable property rights in land?

The importance of ensuring that 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life' (as set out by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights) means that, where B occupies his home under a contractual licence, B's licence should be capable of binding third parties.

Moriarty's argument that the contractual licence, in many cases, is simply a 'mechanism by which the law sanctions the informal creation of proprietary rights in land'.

Maudsley's argument that a contractual licence may arise in cases where B pays for exclusive possession of land and so has a right which is, in substance, identical to a lease.

Cheshire's argument that, as shown by the development of the restrictive covenant, rights that arise through a contract may be allowed to bind third parties.

. Which of the following is the most accurate description of the difference between a contractual licence and an estoppel licence?

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land and A is under a duty to B not to revoke that permission. Where B has a contractual licence, A's duty arises due to a contract between A and B. Where B has an estoppel licence, A's duty arises because of an estoppel.

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land and A is under a duty to B not to revoke that permission. A contractual licence does not count as an equitable property right and so cannot bind a party other than A. In contrast, an estoppel licence does count as an equitable property right and so can bind a third party, later acquiring a right from A.

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land. Where B has a contractual licence, A can revoke that permission and prevent B continuing to use the land. Where B has an estoppel licence, A is prevented (estopped) from revoking the permission.

In each case, B has permission to make some use of A's land. Where B has a contractual licence, A is under a duty to B not to revoke that permission and a court will order specific performance of the contract between A and B. Where B has an estoppel licence, the court has a discretion to permit A to revoke B's licence.

. Why is section 116(a) of the Land Registration Act 2002 relevant to the question of whether a licence to use registered land can bind a third party (C)?

Section 116(a) means that, where B's licence arises through proprietary estoppel, it will bind any third party who acquires a right from A before a court order in B's favour.

Section 116(a) suggests that, where B's licence arises through proprietary estoppel, it can bind a third party who acquires a right from A. Both if the third party acquires the right before a court order in B's favour and if the third party acquires the right after a court in B's favour.

Section 116(a) means that, whenever B's licence is protected through specific performance, it counts as an 'equity' and so is capable of binding a third party.

Section 116(a) suggests that, where B's licence arises through proprietary estoppel, it can bind a third party who acquires a right from A before a court order in B's favour.

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