The House of Lords held that the allocation of a proof burden to the accused did not violate Article 6. It was directed to a legitimate objective (the prevention of death, injury, and damage caused by unfit drivers); and the likelihood of the defendant driving was a matter so closely conditioned by his own knowledge as to make it much more appropriate for him to prove on a balance of probabilities that he would not have been likely to drive than for the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that he would. In addition, the imposition of a legal burden on D did not go beyond what was necessary and reasonable, and was not in any way arbitrary. The House held that if there was a reverse proof burden, there was a real risk that a person who was innocent of any blameworthy or properly criminal conduct, but who was unable to establish a defence to one of these charges, might nevertheless be convicted. The provisions in question therefore breached the presumption of innocence.

Viscount Sankey held that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, and that includes proof of each element of the crime, and the elements of any defence, other than the defence of insanity and other ‘statutory provisions’.