Chapter 6 Interactive key cases
A similar application by Mrs Axon in respect of the same advice that Mrs Gillick had objected to. Mrs Axon objected to sections in the leaflet about abortion. She asserted that the Gillick case should be decided differently in the light of the Human Rights Act and the court’s duty to have regard to Article 8 ECHR.
The Gillick principle extends the minor’s right to have an abortion. The advice might interfere with the parents’ Article 8 right to respect for private and family life, but any such interference was necessary and proportionate; if confidentiality were not available, young people would be deterred from seeking advice and treatment ‘with undesirable and troubled consequences’.
Mrs Gillick failed in her attempt to have declared unlawful Government advice that doctors might prescribe contraception for girls under 16.
A girl under 16 can consent to treatment, including contraception, if they are of sufficient understanding and intelligence to comprehend advice given to them and sufficiently mature to appreciate the implications. Health providers are not required to notify parents nor seek their consent.
The husband and wife underwent fertility treatment together. In error her eggs were fertilised with the sperm of another. Was the husband the legal father of the resulting twins? It was held that he was not, as he had consented to his own sperm being used and not the sperm of another. The genetic father was the legal father.
The husband or partner of a woman undergoing fertility treatment will be regarded as the legal father of a child born only if he consents to the actual treatment received.
A four-year-old boy had been raised by his grandmother. He had regular contact with his parents, who were separated. The father remarried and applied for a residence order. The magistrates refused this. There were no compelling reasons to disrupt the child’s status quo. A residence order was made in favour of the grandmother (with a contact order in favour of both parents). The Supreme Court upheld this decision.
The natural parent presumption does not outweigh the welfare principle. The best interests of the child must be paramount, even though care given by the natural parent may be ‘good enough’.
CG and CW lived together in a lesbian relationship and had two children. CG was their biological mother. After they separated there was a shared residence order in place. CG relocated to Cornwall with the children in secret. CW applied for the children to live with her. She was successful at first instance.
Whilst there is no presumption in favour of biological parents, the fact of parentage is not irrelevant. Baroness Hale outlined three types of parenthood: genetic, gestational, and social and psychological. CG combined all three, and this was an important and significant factor that should have been examined by the court at first instance. The children should live with CG.
A 14-year-old Jehovah’s Witness had been badly burned and required life-saving treatment, possibly involving blood transfusion. She refused to consent. It was held that although mature, she was not Gillick competent as she did not understand the potential consequences of her action. Treatment was ordered.
Where a seemingly mature child refuses to consent to medical treatment, a court will overrule their wishes if it is in their best interests to do so.
Four cases were heard together. In each of them fathers had been refused contact with their children as there had been issues of domestic abuse between the parents. The court issued guidelines in such cases.
- There is no presumption against contact.
- The judiciary need a heightened awareness of the effect on children of being exposed to domestic abuse.
- Past and present conduct of both parties should be considered.
- The effect on the child and the residential parent should be assessed.
- The motivation of the parent seeking contact is relevant.