There should be no occupation order as it would result in greater harm to the son than the wife and daughter. The husband would be considered intentionally homeless so the council would not accommodate him long-term and the son’s education would suffer. The case was unusual on the facts.

There was no direct correspondence between the husband and the wife, but the wife had communicated with journalists and unflattering stories were published about the husband.

The behaviour did not amount to molestation.

It was significant that s 42 dealt with domestic violence. Here the parties were divorced and the husband was essentially seeking a gagging order.

The parties cohabited for 25 years and had an adult son and a 7-year-old daughter. The parties had a tempestuous relationship and the woman and daughter eventually left the jointly owned home after various minor incidents of violence. They were rehoused in temporary local authority accommodation. The woman applied for an occupation order under s 33 as an entitled person.

Applying the two-part significant harm test—was the applicant or a relevant child likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the respondent’s conduct if no order were made?

If ‘yes’, an order must be made, unless the harm to the respondent or the child is likely to be as great (balance of harm).

If not, the court had a broad discretion, based on all the circumstances of the case, including the s 33(6) items.

Significant harm was not established; a discretionary order was refused. These were draconian orders overriding property rights and should be restricted to exceptional cases.

There was a dispute between two brothers and their families, who did not live together.

This fell within Part IV FLA: the family relationship overlaid and magnified the dispute. A non-molestation order was refused on the facts.

The parties had their own homes but spent a number of nights a week together and talked of marriage. The man sold his house and put the money into a joint account.

Most of the money was spent on the woman’s house (which would have become the matrimonial home). After a period of renting the man moved in with the woman.

The parties had a sexual relationship; there was evidence they lived in the same household; there was substantial evidence of a joint account, and the sale proceeds of the man’s house were paid into it and spent on the woman’s property.

Statutes should be given a purposive construction where domestic violence is concerned. The parties were held to be cohabitants, so that they were associated persons.

The appellant conducted a vendetta against a former employer and made many unfounded allegations about him to official bodies in relation to fraud and tax evasion.

At first instance it was held that the behaviour was harassment but the defence in s 1(3)(a) applied—that the behaviour was directed at the prevention of crime and the test for the defence was subjective.

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision stating that the test was wholly objective. An injunction was ordered to prevent Willoughby from contacting others or collecting information about Hayes.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the injunction but disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning.

A test of rationality should be applied. This applies a minimum objective standard, a requirement of good faith and a logical connection between evidence and reasons for the decision.

The husband had previously been violent to the wife and after they separated he harassed her in various ways, for example by handing her threatening letters and intercepting her on her way to the station.

This was molestation, which did not necessarily imply violence or threats of violence. It applies to any conduct which can properly be regarded as such a degree of harassment as to call for the intervention of the court.

Although not a domestic abuse case, the principle is relevant to all ex parte hearings.

An ex parte order did not deprive the respondent of the right to a fair trial. She could apply to the court to have the order set aside. In addition, the ex parte application had been followed by a full hearing with both parties present.

The wife had petitioned for divorce. While the parties were together, the husband had been physically abusive and had ‘pestered’ her. However, the application for a non-molestation order was based on early morning and late night calls to the wife’s house and calling at her workplace. The husband admitted that he knew the wife was frightened of him and that being pestered in these circumstances must have had an impact on her health.

This behaviour did amount to molestation.