Williams J drew on Articles 8 and 12 ECHR to find that the marriage was void rather than a non-marriage. He also took into account a number of factors listed in the judgment, including that both parties had understood there would be a civil ceremony, and that the failure to complete this was entirely because of the respondent husband’s refusal to do so.

Mrs Bellinger was a transgender woman whose husband was aware of her background and supported her application. She applied for a declaration that her marriage was valid on the grounds that she was a female on the date that she married. Her appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed.

Recognising her as a female would mean giving a new meaning to the words male and female. It was not for the court to do this. It was up to Parliament to legislate on whether those who had undergone gender reassingment surgery could marry in their acquired gender. Note: following Goodwin and Bellinger, Parliament passed the Gender Recognition Act 2004.

A transgender woman complained to the ECtHR that she was still legally recognised as a man in relation to employment, pensions, social security, and who she could marry. It was held that her Article 8 (respect for private and family life) and Article 12 (right to marry and found a family) rights had been breached.

A test which relied on biological factors (as in Corbett v Corbett (1971)) should no longer be used to deny transgender people the right to legal recognition of their new gender.

In order to terminate their 19-year-old daughter’s relationship with a Muslim man, her parents, who were Hindus, arranged for her to marry a Hindu man whom their daughter had never met. She lived with her parents and was financially dependent upon them. They told her that unless she married him they would no longer support her. The marriage was never consummated and the wife applied for a decree of nullity based on duress. At first instance, the judge, using the test from Szechter, held that there was no threat to ‘life, limb or liberty’ and so no duress. On appeal this was overturned and her petition was granted. The threats and pressure by her parents clearly amounted to duress.

The test for duress is not whether there is a threat to life, limb, or liberty, but whether the threats or pressure overbear the will of the individual and destroy the reality of consent.