Chapter 11 Review Questions Answer Key

The United Nations and Multilateral Actors in Development
  1. The United Nations has evolved through three discernible phases. During its first phase, up to the late 1950s, it took many initiatives for economic and social well-being. It was the “mother church” of developmental optimism. At the same time, the UN served as a geo­strategic instrument for a few powerful countries. It provided legitimacy and foot soldiers in support of US foreign policy, such as for the war in Korea in the early 1950s and for the upheaval in the Congo in the early 1960s. As its chief source of funds and staffing and site of its headquarters in New York City, the US held deci­sive influence over the

    A second and more tumultuous phase began after 1960. UN membership had then grown from its original 51 to 99 member nations, thus tilting the one-state-one-vote balance in the General Assembly toward the non-Western world. New issues emerged and expanded the scope of UN agency work. Colonial rule had largely ended, but post-colonial transi­tions did not always follow the scripts written by the Western “First World” or the “Second World” of the communist bloc. New states often took independent positions as members of a “Third World” to chart their own ways forward.

    In the 1990s, a third and far more troubled phase began for the UN, ushered in by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the advance of an especially pred­atory and unaccountable kind of capitalism. Western nations supported the deployment of UN “blue helmet” forces to conflict zones such as in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Angola, and Somalia. Yet in pursuit of their own agendas, those big powers later began to bypass the United Nations. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Africa’s Sahel region, military “coalitions of the will­ing” under US leadership have ignored some basic in­ternational rules, including UN safeguards against the use of armed force. [p. 188]
  1. Established in 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency headquartered in Paris. UNESCO’s mandate is both practical (promotion of services in education, culture, and media, exchange of knowledge, etc.) and normative (promotion of freedom of expres­sion, of cultural rights, etc.). UNESCO has attracted con­troversy, resulting in budgetary problems. In 2011, the US stopped its funding after UN member states voted overwhelmingly to admit Palestine as a member; in 2019, the US and Israel cut all ties with UNESCO. It has drawn fire on other fronts. Given strongly felt cultural preferences and the fact that corporate profits are at stake in education and media policies, reconciling the organization’s practical and normative purposes is not easy, especially among the world’s governments, who are UNESCO’s “owners.” The advance of market funda­mentalist policies has frustrated its mandate to promote norms, such as acceptance of education as a human right. In 1990, at an intergovernmental conference held in Jomtien, Thailand, UNESCO achieved adoption of the “Education for All” declaration, holding that basic ed­ucation should be a public good. Yet some business in­terests and governments persist in framing knowledge and education as commodities to be bought and sold rather than as public entitlements available to every­one regardless of ability to pay. As with many other UN agencies in recent decades, UNESCO has sought “partnerships” with businesses and other private-sector actors. [p. 193]
  1. From its earliest years, the UN has faced crises of con­flict and humanitarian need and has gained widespread recognition for its responses. In 1948, the flight and ex­pulsion of many hundreds of thousands from Palestine led the UN to set up its Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In 1950, the UN General Assembly created the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to coordinate action and raise money to help refugees. The UN has set up a number of multilateral agencies. Foremost among them is the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Its main tasks are to assess needs, raise money from governments, develop humanitarian policy, and coordinate field operations involving UN agencies, Red Cross organizations, and NGO It has given rise to spe­cialized organizations, including a news service, The New Humanitarian, set up in 1995 in recognition of media powers to mobilize political and financial back­ing for humanitarian action. The UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) plans and directs UN efforts to bring stability and secu­rity to selected conflict-affected places. The UN “blue helmets” are now recruited mainly from non-Western countries; as of 2020, the five lead­ing sources were Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, and India. Some UN missions, such as in Côte d’Ivo­ire and postwar Mozambique, clearly contributed to peace; others, such as in Angola, Congo, and Rwanda, largely failed to do so. That mixed record has led to criticisms that UN interventions in the name of peace often neglect the socio-political causes of conflict and furthermore that they can put durable solutions out of reach because strategies follow narrow “militarized” or “securitized” lines, even if carried out in the name of human security. [pp. 194-6]
  1. United Nations agencies face a number of challenges. Many agencies suffer from technocratic ways of thinking, non-transparency, high overhead costs, and de­pressed morale. Affecting most is an incessant scram­ble for money, which leads them to defer to those who have it, ahead of those who need it. Crises or new de­velopment themes motivate donors to earmark their monies differently, thereby creating incentives for UN agencies to shift course or to add yet more ob­jectives and tasks. The result is “mission creep” and overlap: for example, at least 20 UN agencies work on issues of water supply. the effectiveness and legitimacy of UN agencies depends on who holds the purse strings, who sets the agendas, and who makes the rules. Even when the UN’s voting system favours lower-income countries because of their greater num­bers, the power of money is decisive. Top-level UN jobs are held disproportionately by Americans or citizens of other big powers, and UN votes are often influenced by big donors’ offers of aid or threats to withhold it. Agencies must increasingly compete with each other to gain funding from bilateral donors, who earmark monies according to their political and commercial preferences. Today, earmarked contributions for UN development efforts outweigh common pool contribu­tions four-to-one. Bilateralism increasingly overshad­ows multilateralism. In short, the United Nations will go on suffering deficits in coherence and effectiveness unless it can counter the power of rich nations and the interests they promote. The influence of large corporations threatens the integrity and competence of the United Nations. That influence—the “privati­zation of multilateral institutions”—has led to a weakening of capacities for public service. The UN’s own Inspection Unit evaluated the Global Compact’s first decade and found that direction was poor, regulation was weak, and means to verify results were lacking. Other as­sessments point to a similar conclusion: The Global Compact is largely toothless in improving the conduct of corporations, but it has helped them to improve their public image. Further, close ties with corporations appear to turn some UN agencies into mere contrac­tors in public-private projects, thereby weakening UN capacities to think and act critically. [pp. 197-8]
  1. The United Nations was conceived in the closing months of World War II. The triumphant great powers— Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States— negotiated the creation of a new body, the United Nations Organization, to replace its weak predecessor, the League of Nations (1919–46). The UN’s design was open to all sovereign countries, thereby excluding colonies of the West, such as in Africa. Determining UN mandates, locations, funding etc. were strategic preferences of the great powers, especially the United States, the only state with the overwhelming power to bring about a global project at that time. Yet while the US may have wanted to call all the shots, it could not act alone. To shape the postwar order according to its interests, it needed the consent and active cooperation of other states. It there­fore agreed that France and China, together with Britain and the Soviet Union, would be per­manent members of the UN Security Council, the only body legally empowered to make decisions on urgent issues of international conflict and insecurity. Created in the name of peace and security, the UN rapidly took on additional mandates to promote de­velopment. Up to the late 1950s, it took many initiatives for economic and social well-being. It was the “mother church” of developmental optimism. At the same time, the UN served as a geo­strategic instrument for a few powerful countries. It provided legitimacy and foot soldiers in support of US foreign policy, such as for the war in Korea in the early 1950s and for the upheaval in the Congo in the early 1960s. As its chief source of funds and staffing and site of its headquarters in New York City, the US held deci­sive influence over the [pp. 187-8]
  1. Having recognized the formal sovereignty of states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Western powers have sought to stay connected with their former colonies or dependencies, that is, to retain a sphere of influence. They set up organizations to promote policies, cultural ties, and development efforts. The Organization of American States (OAS) originated from US efforts in the 1880s to advance its commercial interests in Latin America. The Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), headquartered in Paris, comprises 54 full member governments where the French language plays at least some role in national identity. The Commonwealth of Nations, known before 1950 as the British Commonwealth, consists of 54 countries, all but two of them (Mozambique and Rwanda) ex-colonies of Great Britain. A number of Middle Eastern and Arab-aligned countries such as Sudan, though eligible, have declined to join. [pp. 200-1]
  1. The G20 (Group of Twenty) is a major forum focused chiefly on transnational economic matters. In 1999, facing threats of non-payment of debt governments of the major G7 powers convened their finance ministers and heads of central banks with those of key non-Western countries, notably China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia and seven others plus the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Today, in addition to finance officials, heads of state attend G20 meetings, where, in the lobbies and back rooms they can mingle with representatives of global corporations such as the WEF (World Economic Forum) and the International Chamber of Commerce. Civil society bodies are unwelcome at G20 meetings, but citizen activists regularly mount protest vigils outside the gates. With no formal secretariat or rules of transparency and accountability, the G20 represents a trend toward plurilateral—that is, based on selected sub-groups, thus exclusionary—forms of global governance. Under such arrangements, membership rules and their enforcement are kept vague and thus not open to public oversight or democratic challenge. [p. 199]
  1. In 1995, building on earlier trade agreements, Western countries created the World Trade Organization (WTO), a multilateral body outside the UN. Legitimated as an inclusive body responding to all its member governments (164, plus 24 observer governments as of 2020), the WTO has tended to respond first to powerful Western economic interests, especially corporations, with particular attention to agriculture, intellectual property, and investment. Among other things, it allows corporations to bring suits against governments. It was strongly welcomed at first by the US, but in 2001 China joined the WTO. There it has successfully pursued its commercial interests—so successfully that the US and the EU have lost interest in this kind of multilateralism and have shifted their trade policy preferences toward bilateral deals, thereby sidelining the WTO. [pp. 199-200]
  1. The Council of Europe (COE) is less well known. In 1949, long before the European Union, governments of 10 West European countries signed a treaty creating the COE, with a mandate to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law throughout Europe. Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, the COE now has 47 members, including lower-income countries, such as Armenia and North Macedonia, formerly in the Soviet sphere of influence. The COE, as a multilateral source of law and policy, is a beacon and a watchdog. It sets standards for domestic legislation to combat discrimination and social exclusion under terms of the European Convention on Human Rights (in force since 1953) as adjudicated since 1959 by the European Court of Human Rights. The COE’s committees, conferences, and research units regularly draw attention to gaps between claimed adherence to and actual compliance with human rights norms. This includes socio-economic rights, notably those affirmed in the 1961 European Social Charter, an important but neglected multilateral treaty ratified by more than 40 states. The COE also helps to realize socio-economic rights concretely through its Development Bank, Europe’s oldest multilateral financial institution and the only one with a mandate to promote social solidarity. [p. 200]
  1. Wishing to form a coherent front in trade talks with rich countries, non-Western countries attending the UNCTAD in 1964 created the Group of 77 or G77, which as of 2020 has 135 members, including China. Operating as an informal caucus, G77 representatives gather annually at the UN General Assembly meeting and sometimes at UNCTAD assemblies. In 1974, it proposed a New International Economic Order (NIEO), an initiative led by oil-exporting Iran, Venezuela, Mexico, and Algeria. Aiming to boost national economic growth, the G77 called on rich nations to open access to technologies, lower trade barriers, and provide more aid. These were hardly radical demands; indeed, they posed little threat to the global status quo. Yet Western powers rejected them. The NIEO evaporated around 1980. Thereafter, Western donors switched the story-line. They played down the economic growth of nations (the NIEO aim) and lectured non-Western governments on the importance of meeting the “basic needs” of individuals. Brushing aside G77 objections to outside interference, Western donors attached harsh conditions to their aid. Non-Western countries subsequently pushed back on fronts of ideas and knowledge, however, with the creation of two Geneva-based think tanks: The South Centre, supported by some 51 non-Western governments, and the non-governmental International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. [p. 201]
  1. Governments across the world have sought to improve their prospects, especially of their larger businesses, through economic pacts, or regional trading arrangements (RTAs). Sometimes called developmental regionalism, this strategy has gained adherents as an alternative to strategies of openness towards the rich countries of the North—strategies that have exposed many to predatory globalization.

    There are numerous RTAs across Asia. The oldest of these is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967 by the leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Initially fearful of communist advances in Asia, ASEAN has since admitted Vietnam along with Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. In 2016, pillars for collective security and socio-cultural relations were added to the original economic pillar to form an overarching ASEAN Community. Meanwhile, bigger powers, notably China, are pushing their own multilateral structures in Asia. On the horizon is the world’s largest trading bloc, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, composed of the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. In 2013, China launched two large transnational programs: The Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to build major east-west transport systems, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, whose founding members include many west European as well as Asian states. Organized and led by China, these initiatives pose challenges to the United States, whose dominance over existing global development institutions has never faced such competition. In Latin America, a major bloc is the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), or Southern Common Market, founded in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In late 2011, regional leaders formally established a supranational bloc, Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribe (CELAC), or Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, composed of 32 sovereign states. CELAC seeks to promote regional integration and to counter US hegemony; it thus serves as a counterweight to the OAS.

    Africa is home to a number of regional organizations, many of them dormant. Large differences in economic capabilities and uneasy political relationships among government leaders, as well as the influence of old ties and newer bilateral deals with richer countries, notably China, have set limits to multilateralism within Africa.

    Results thus far have been modest at best in terms of promoting equitable development. New trade arrangements may have boosted output, but that growth has usually been uneven, since stronger economies tend to reap larger shares of benefits. Nevertheless, multilateralism informed by principles of mutual advantage, especially within dynamic regions such as Latin America, can inspire regionally focused and therefore potentially equitable objectives in development. [p. 202]
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