When a 26 year-old fruit seller named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire on 17 December  in the small central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, few could have foreseen the momentous ramifications. One man’s final act of desperation was the spark that set alight the kindling of years of frustration at Tunisia’s corrupt ruling elite. But the story of Tunisia’s ‘Jasmine Revolution’ is more complex than the almost cinematic media narrative would have it. The roots of change are to be found deeper in Tunisian history and in the nature of Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime.

Tunisia itself was seen as different to several of its Maghreb neighbours and, at least in hindsight, more ripe for potential democratic transformation. A small country, with an ethnically homogenous population and relatively well established, if weak, civil society.

Ben Ali’s reign was also best described as an electoral autocracy with a veil of democracy pulled over the authoritarian workings of the system. Ben Ali took power in 1987 when as Prime Minister he had then President Bourguiba declared mentally unfit. Ben Ali was elected President in 1989. He went on to win four further elections, with the most recent in 2009 having changed the constitution to allow him to serve a fourth term. Parliamentary elections were also conducted throughout this period with Ben Ali’s ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) dominating both the lower and upper house (created in 2005). Although some electoral competition was allowed throughout Ben Ali’s reign, the elections were not ranked as ‘free and fair’ by international observers. Media was tightly controlled and only uncritical coverage of the regime was permitted.

Under Ben Ali the security services expanded massively, Tunisia—a country with only 10 million people—had more police officers than France. Despite a lack of personal freedoms, the Tunisian economy has experienced steady growth over the past 20 years. This coupled with the effective neutering of civil society meant that the bloated police service had little to do but engage in petty corruption and harassment of the kind that pushed Mohamed Bouazizi over the edge (Al-Momani, 2011; Schraeder and Redissi, 2011).   

One reason suggested for the stability of the Tunisian regime under Ben Ali is the achievement of continuous economic growth and the integration of Tunisia into the global economy. With high levels of foreign direct investment and a booming tourism trade, the regime was able to invest in social infrastructure such as health, education, and other public services that surpassed those on offer to citizens of neighbouring states such as Algeria, which was racked with Civil War for much of this period.

However, despite the view from the outside of a relatively stable country, corruption and cronyism domestically and high levels of unemployment meant that protests against Ben Ali were not uncommon. A similar wave of protests was successfully quietened by the regime in 2007 through a combination of repression and the promise of jobs. Unemployment remained persistently high at 14 per cent with youth (15–24) unemployment estimated as at least double that figure. Inequality had been growing rapidly. Domestic anger was directed at Ben Ali and the family of his wife, Leila Trabelsi, with the prospect of the latter succeeding Ben Ali in four years proposed by some commentators as one of the straws that broke the back of Tunisian tolerance of their kleptocratic regime.

Tunisia is in its eighth year of transition since the January 2011 ‘Jasmine Revolution’ ended the authoritarian regime of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali.  Among all of the countries of the Arab Spring, Tunisia remains the only country thus far that has a chance of consolidating its democracy. (For more on the Arab Spring, see Chapter 23.)  In many ways, Tunisia has proved to be well on its way. Regular elections have been held several times that were free of fraud. In the first elections, the moderate Islamist Ennnahda party won a plurality of seats and formed a coalition with centrist parties. National elections that took place in 2014 saw the election of the secular Nida Tounes party, led by Béji Caïd Essebsi.   The Constituent Assembly finalized and adopted a new constitution in 2014 which has been hailed as exemplary, particularly for its view on human rights and women’s rights. The Constitution also created a mixed presidential system where executive power is shared with the legislature, who also selects a prime minister. The constitution also protects the rights of opposition parties in the parliament, reserving the leadership of the finance committee for an opposition party. This system was designed with the very purpose of preventing the rise of a strong-man, and single party dominance, two problems that characterized Tunisian politics in the past.

Though Tunisia has no history of democracy, there are several Tunisian traditions that are encouraging for its future. The first is that Tunisia has had a history of teaching secularism and tolerance in its schools. All of the curriculum was revamped to teach values that champion tolerance of different groups. Tunisians value finding rational solutions and compromising with others. The second is that unlike many other regimes in the Arab world, Tunisia has had some history of supporting women’s rights. Tunisia passed some of the most progressive legislation under Habib Bourguiba, and the new constitution (after much compromise and discussion with the Ennahda party and tremendous pressure from women’s civil society groups) is committed to safeguarding women’s rights as well.

Though Tunisia has progressed considerably since the Jasmine Revolution, problems still remain. Overwhelmingly the biggest problem is that many Tunisians are not satisfied with democracy. High expectations of what democracy would bring has been met with great disappointment. Corruption is still rampant, economic growth has stagnated, and unemployment levels remain high.  This has fuelled frustration among the Tunisian public, with some yearning for a return to the stability of authoritarianism. Immediately after Tunisia’s transition, Tunisia was hit with a series of political assassinations and terrorist attacks by religious extremists that were also a cause for concern. In contrast to the moderate Ennahda party, conservative Salafists have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era, openly supporting the creation of an Islamic state. In the past year, recent developments have taken place that are also alarming for democracy. Municipal elections have been postponed.  Power brokers from the old regime have been able to protect their interests through new legislation. The media also claims that it faces intimidation. Thus, there is cause for concern that many of Tunisia’s hard won gains could disappear.

References

Al-Momani, M., 2011. The Arab “Youth Quake”: Implications on Democratization and Stability. Middle East Law and Governance, 3(1-2), pp.159-170.

Schraeder, P.J. and Redissi, H., 2011. Ben Ali's fall. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), pp.5-19.

Critical thinking questions

• Are structural factors key to understanding the emergence of democratic change?
• How can we best explain the timing of the emergence of mass movements?
• What role, if any, should the international community play in the ‘Jasmine Revolution’?
• Does the Tunisian case challenge the arguments for cultural prerequisites for successful democratization?
• Is Tunisia’s democracy likely to consolidate in the next five years, or is it more likely to backslide?