Elections in Iraq have been beset by violence and irregularities. During the last decade the Iraqi population has had a number of opportunities to exercise the right to vote and elect their representatives to the national legislature, a unicameral Council of Representatives: the country has had six parliamentary elections and two referendums since 2000. However, despite the rise in quantity of elections, the quality of electoral competition and the overall electoral process continues to suffer from many drawbacks. By no means can Iraq be regarded as an electoral democracy because its main institutional attribute—free and fair elections—is largely absent. The main concerns surrounding Iraqi elections range from vote rigging to increasing cases of sectarian and insurgent violence prior to elections and on the election day itself.

If one is to evaluate the democratic quality of parliamentary elections in Iraq, it is necessary to take into account the context of the Iraqi state today and its historical legacies. The Iraqi case represents a typical example of an externally triggered regime change, in which President Saddam Hussein was forced from power in April 2003 as a result of US-led coalition forces' taking control of Baghdad. (See Chapter 7 for theories on the international dimension of regime change and Chapter 23 for empirical overview of authoritarian features and transition trends in the Middle East.)  External forces under the US leadership established a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the main responsibility of which was to administer the country until it was ready to hold its first free and fair parliamentary elections. In June 2004 the US handed the authority over to an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. In January 2005 the Iraqi people were given an opportunity for the first time in their lives to meaningfully elect parliamentary representatives into a Transitional National Assembly. An estimated eight million Iraqis voted in these elections and the Shia United Iraqi Alliance won the majority of the assembly seats. The process of state-building reached another important milestone: a new Iraqi constitution was approved by national referendum in October 2005. Subsequently, the first elections under the new constitution were held in December 2005 for the national legislature, the Council of Representatives. However, despite these measures of strengthening the Iraqi political regime and the statehood, the political process remains highly unstable due to deep divisions between the Sunni political elite and the Shia-dominated government, and due to chaotic violence which is still rampant in Iraq since the end of Saddam Hussein's reign.

Parliamentary elections thus far have not seen the construction of strong political parties.  The March 2010 elections saw an explosion of new parties with a very narrow vote margin between parties which formed large coalitions. The same could be said of the 2014 elections, which took place at a time when Iraq was facing some of the worst sectarian violence in its history. The most recent 2018 elections come after the Iraqi government was finally able to defeat the so-called Islamic State group in 2017. In contrast to years past, parties running in the 2018 elections have emphasized cross-sectarian and unified national identity. Parties in Iraq still differ mostly by sectarian identities rather than by ideological goals. Many are controlled by one family or individual and are grouped by patronage, and many of them still maintain militias and business networks. Parties do not reveal the amount of their donations or their sources and there are no rules regarding campaign funding.

Though the parties today are more unified, the electoral landscape is splintered by intra-sectarian divisions fragmenting Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. The top vote-getting parties are technically new parties, but they are dominated by the same players who have commanded the political scene since the 2005 election. A total of 87 parties competed against one another for 329 seats, with females being guaranteed 25 per cent of the seats. According to those Iraqis surveyed, the most important issues are security, employment, and the economy.

The results of the May 2018 elections saw the top three vote-getting parties being led by Shiites.  The Forward Party, led by Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr won a plurality with 54 seats, Conquest Alliance gained 47 seats, and current Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s newly created Victory Coalition Party gained 42 seats. The Kurdistan Democratic Party won 25 seats and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition lost 67 seats, winning only 25 seats. After the High Electoral Commission announced the results, there were widespread claims of fraud in the electronic counting system. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling that there should be a full manual recount on 21 June 2018. There were also concerns that Sunnis in particular, were disengaging from the voting process. Overall, voter turnout had decreased by 17 per cent, with only 44.5 per cent of the population voting. There were reports that many Sunnis are concerned that their interests are not being met and that their vote does not make a difference.

Given these low levels of confidence in the system it is critical for the Iraqi elite to promote compromises that helps foster a national identity where everyone feels as though their needs are being met to some extent. Actor constellations at the elite level and elite pacts are widely considered decisive for democratization processes. (See Chapter 2 on theories of democratization, specifically the section on 'Elite pacts, mass mobilization and democratization'.) The longevity and stability of Iraq's fledgling democracy depend directly on the elites’ abilities to negotiate and, crucially, to compromise with his political competitors in order to form a coalition government.

Critical thinking questions

• How can one characterize a fledgling democracy? Can we describe Iraq as a fledgling democracy?
• How can we explain the authoritarian persistence in the Arab world? Discuss in relation to the case of Iraq.
• Why are elite pacts decisive for democratization?
• What are the prospects for democratization in Iraq? Assess also the role of international factors.
• Why can externally triggered democratization lead to a spread of electoral democracy, but not necessarily of effective democracy?
• Why is Iraq not an electoral democracy? What are the chances of the country becoming an electoral democracy in future? Discuss by looking at various indicators and causes of electoral democracy as a distinctive regime type.