Fifteen years ago Central European democracies appeared to be on the road to consolidation.  Elections were being regularly held that were deemed free and fair. Many Central European countries were being admitted to the European Union, and as a consequence of this were receiving an injection of vital funds to help build state institutions. By the early 2010s, policy centres were warning that countries in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, among others, could be taking a populist turn. Now in 2018 we see that this right wing populist turn has brought with it serious challenges to democracy.

The most notable backsliding has taken place in Hungary and Poland. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who won a third straight term in an election and has been in power since 2010, has been openly hostile to democracy. In Hungary the legislative branch, which used to be separate from the executive branch is now controlled by Orbán. From 2010 to 2014, 88 bills were introduced and voted on, and from 2011 and 2013, 32 cardinal laws that cover the most crucial aspects of Hungarian life were passed through the weak parliament. Any future parliament that would want to change these laws would require a two-thirds majority.

Poland under the rule of the Law and Justice Party has used its electoral mandate to make sweeping reforms of the judiciary. The National Council of the Judiciary which was once a self-governing body is now under the full control of the parliament. All final judgments can face an extraordinary review. New laws also give the justice minister the power to appoint, dismiss, and even discipline presidents of other courts. Furthermore 40 per cent of the Supreme Court judges are forced into early retirement to make room for judges that are friendlier to the ruling party.

Hungary has also notably weakened the constitutional court. The ruling coalition dismissed the president of the Supreme Court before his mandate expired, and created a new institution, the National Judicial Office. To ensure that this new court was much less likely to challenge the regime, Hungary lowered the judicial retirement age from 70 to 62 which forced hundreds of judges out of the courts (a measure that was subsequently overturned by the European Court of Justice). 

Poland has also received attention for its ruling Law and Justice Party’s attempts to hastily draft legislation to increase government influence over the country’s media. The party also retains control over state funded radio and television. Laws were passed to limit media access to the parliament and the government has tried to silence and discredit journalists. By the summer of 2016, over 150 journalists and news anchors had resigned or been dismissed. 

In Hungary, media freedom and media access more closely represent authoritarian regimes.  There are newspapers, television channels, and radio stations that are both independent and critical of the government, but they face many obstacles, such as securing broadcast frequencies and selling advertising. Government agencies as well as private firms that wish to maintain good relations with the government refrain from advertising with the independent media. 

Hungary’s ruling party Fidesz put its own people in charge of all the state-run television channels and radio stations, purging prior staff to make the media the mouthpiece of the government. The state media use material provided by the government news agency, which also offers their news free of charge to the privately owned media. Although they are permitted to use other sources, doing so is costly. Like in Russia, self-censorship is becoming widespread (see Chapter 22). 

Hungary has gone after non-governmental organizations (NGOs), requiring them to register as foreign agents. The government claimed that it was doing this in the name of transparency, but NGOs have felt stigmatized as a result. Many NGOs receive their funding from abroad and are finding themselves financially squeezed by the measure. In particular NGOs and activists that support migration could face restraining orders which prevent them from approaching Hungary’s borders. 

But it is not just Hungary and Poland that are experiencing democratic decline. Even Central European countries that were considered to be consolidated democracies are experiencing democratic decay. The Czech Republic, which split from Slovakia in the Velvet divorce in 1993, was one of the countries that most fiercely resisted Soviet rule, with democratic leadership from founding fathers such as Tomáš Masaryk and Václav Havel. The last two elections, however, have yielded results that have brought in leadership that is not committed to the rule of law and basic human rights. In January 2018 Czech voters re-elected populist president Miloš Zeman.  Zeman has made controversial statements, such as joking about murdering opposition journalists and describing Islam as a ‘religion of hate’.   Cameras have caught Zeman’s staff and supporters assaulting journalists and destroying their equipment.  Checks and balances are also eroding with an anti-establishment party led by Andrej Babiš winning 30 per cent of the votes in the parliament. Babiš has argued in favour of dismantling the Senate and regional elected councils as a way of getting rid of gridlock. 

On the plus side none of these countries have political prisoners or cases of journalists disappearing in the night. Dissidents are free to run in elections and activists can organize protests. There are also enough independent media outlets that can challenge the government. The issue is that all of these regimes have seen the rise of populist parties that have used their popularity to legitimize undermining democratic institutions, something that may be hard to reverse once the process got in motion. The transition from communism to both capitalism and democracy has been difficult in many ways. The former Czechoslovakia is the only country that has had some genuine experience with democracy prior to the establishment of communist rule.  Poland and Hungary mostly had experience with authoritarianism, and the political cultures were authoritarian. Thus, just removing the communist repressive apparatus has not enough to enable western institutions and values to flourish.

Critical thinking questions

• What are the key elements of democratic consolidation? Why?
• What explains why democracy was never fully consolidated in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic?
• Is the backsliding that is taking place in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic likely to improve?
• In what ways are all regimes still democratic?