In 2011 protests broke out in Russia motivated by claims by Russian journalists and political activists that elections were flawed. Vladimir Putin and the ruling United Russia Party were the main target as protesters complained that elections were rigged. The protests then expanded to focus on freedom for political prisoners, an annulment of the elections results, the resignation of the head of the election commission, an official investigation into voter fraud and registration of opposition parties, and new democratic legislation on parties and elections. These protests continued into 2013 and over 1,000 people were arrested.

By 2017 Russians were protesting again, this time over allegations of government corruption, which was deemed to be the root of Russia’s problems. The protests were led by Putin opponent and political activist Alexey Navalny. The protests went on into 2018 and by some reports are ongoing. The summer of 2018 saw a second series of protests, this time over pension reform. These protests which were coordinated with the help of opposition parties were responding to increases in the retirement age going from 60 to 65 for men, and 55 to 63 for women. The government responded by only compromising on women’s retirement age, moving it from 63 to 60, and as a result the protests have continued.

Civil society and social capital are usually considered as highly functional for the initiation and consolidation of democracy. Both civil society and social capital perform a number of vital functions such as enabling public participation in networks of voluntary organizations as well as contributing to the development of civic attitudes (such as trust and tolerance) and behaviour. (For more details on the links between democratization on the one hand, and civil society and social capital, on the other, see Chapter 11.)  However, one should not be overly optimistic about the role of civil society in democratization. As many analysts indicate, civil society and social capital are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for building and sustaining democracy (see, for instance, discussion in Chapter 11). Moreover, some forms of social capital and civic activism are not very conducive to democracy. For instance, some civic groups are formed due to strong ethnic or religious characteristics and hardly lead to emergence of pluralist and trusting attitudes. Some forms of civil society, for example protest movements which are often prone to violence and social disorder, are not conducive to emergence of a pluralistic, liberal society and participatory civic culture.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the consensus among scholars was that Russia, as the rest of the post-Soviet region, had lacked proper civil society groups and that the structural (socio-economic and institutional) context had not been very conducive to emergence of a democratizing civil society either. Do these recent cases of protest illustrate that things might be changing and Russia is finally experiencing the birth of a genuine participatory and pluralistic civil society? This, of course, is a very positive outlook at things regarding civil society in Russia. A single civic protest movement cannot possibly change Russian political culture and trigger more participatory and tolerant attitudes among the public. However, the very fact that such protest movement emerged from below, without any support from the state bodies or, indeed, international donor organizations, shows that this trend is a promising one. People did not like the government’s decision on deforestation and pro-actively decided to do their best to change this decision. There are some other examples of civic associations and movements in Russia, all of which have their own platforms, set of goals, and strategies. For instance, two such movements, Strategy 31, an alliance of human rights organizations and opposition activists, and Other Russia, an opposition movement led by Eduard Limonov, have organized a large number of protests in various locations in Russia in the past, but have since been dissolved. The impact of these movements and protests on changing the authoritarian status quo in Russia and encouraging democratization from below is hard to determine. But the fact that the groups are publicly trying to challenge the authorities from below means that they make the job of the current authoritarian regime a bit harder. Though it may seem unlikely that democratization will take place given how strong Putin’s grip on power is, Russia’s active civil society potentially can contribute to the bottom-up democratization of authoritarian Russia.

Critical thinking questions

• What is the relationship between civil society and democratic transition? Civil society and democratic consolidation?
• How do civil society and social capital contribute to consolidation of democracy?
• Why are some forms of civic activism and public participation harmful for consolidation of democracy/creation of democratic and participatory civic culture?
• How would you characterize civil society in Russia? What are its main weaknesses? How can these weaknesses be overcome?