If one was to evaluate the record of presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine throughout the past several decades, the picture would be mixed at best. In the early 1990s Ukraine embarked quite swiftly on a journey of democratization and economic liberalization, but by the mid-1990s most of these processes had run aground. By the late 1990s Ukraine contained all features of the so called 'hybrid regime'— a regime that combines nominal democratic procedures such as regular elections and elected government officials, with authoritarian features such as excessive centralization of power by the executive and a clampdown on opposition forces. Interestingly, in such regimes, even though democratic institutions may be highly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their opponents tend to take at least one such institution, the elections, quite seriously. Each electoral cycle in post-communist Ukraine, during which both autocratic incumbents and challengers had to compete for power, represented a certain degree of uncertainty and could potentially have changed the balance of power in favour of the challengers. Indeed, most of the first post-communist elections in Ukraine were bitterly fought as they often created uncertainty and were considered by political elites as the main means of gaining and preserving power. In the 1994 parliamentary elections the incumbent president, Leonid Kravchuk, lost to challenger, Leonid Kuchma. Subsequently, Kuchma himself faced strong electoral challenges from the leftist opposition parties and won only 35 per cent of the vote in the 1999 parliamentary elections and 56 per cent in the second round.

However, things got much worse by the late 1990s and early 2000s when president Kuchma managed to consolidate his power by increasing the incumbent capacity to control the state and achieving more unity among the ruling elites. By the end of the 1990s Ukraine had developed a certain form of competitive authoritarianism with strengthened control of the executive over the parliament and systematic electoral manipulation and intimidation of the opposition. Using a more optimistic categorization, one could count Ukraine of this period amongst a group of electoral democracies—political regimes that fulfil a minimal criterion of democracy (competitive and multi-party elections) but fail to fulfil more substantive criteria such as the rule of law, separation of powers, civil society, constitutionalism, and civil and political rights. (See Chapter 22 for more information on this type of political regime and democratization trends in the post-Soviet space.)  By 2004 massive corruption and electoral fraud was the trigger for the Orange Revolution, when large-scale demonstrations took place in the country. The revolution culminated in a court-ordered second election, which resulted in the election of a new president, Viktor Yushchenko and the ousting of Kuchma.

By December 2004, new constitutional amendments were adopted that shifted many powers from the president to the parliament, transforming the country’s form of government to a more parliamentary one. Since the Orange Revolution, most Western observers and experts claimed that the second round of the 2004 presidential elections and the 2006 parliamentary elections were free and fair. These elections resulted in the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition. Viktor Yushchenko received a majority of the votes for the presidency, while Viktor Yanukovych became the prime minister in 2006 after parliamentary election saw the opposition party, Party of Regions win a majority.  Ukraine did not democratize however, but remained as a semi-democracy. In spite of the move to a more parliamentary system, Ukrainian parties remained weak. Parties never developed clear ideologies and were built around personalities and geo-strategic orientations. Yushchenko resorted to authoritarian measures when deemed necessary such as the unconstitutional dissolution of the parliament. 

The 2010 presidential elections were generally regarded as free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Yushchenko transferred power to Yanukovych. Though this represented a peaceful transition, the Yanukovych presidency brought about more authoritarization. Yanukovych consolidated his power by formal and informal means such as using the judiciary and security apparatus to selectively target the opposition, most notably popular politician Yulia Tymoshenko. The 2012 parliamentary election were mired in accusations of fraud. Bribes were allegedly used to influence the elections commissions and opposition parties.

By the fall of 2013, there were growing concerns with Ukraine’s corruption, abuse of power, and violation of human rights. In this backdrop, after the government decided to suspend the signing of a free trade and association agreement with the European Union, protests broke out in November 2013 which escalated into violence. This led to the Maidan massacre where hundreds were killed. To deal with the protests, laws were adopted which aimed to limit mass protests, further evidence that Ukraine was becoming more and more authoritarian. It became clear that Yanukovych was losing legitimacy. Under growing pressure, Yanukovych fled to Russia.

By May 2014 new elections were held that were characterized as free and fair. Petro Poroshenko won the presidency, and Maidan parties (pro European parties) won the parliamentary elections in October of that year.  But not long after the Poroshenko government took over, there were again causes for concern.  Yanukovych and his government ministers were prosecuted and military force and far right units were used to quell a separatist movement in Donbas, in Eastern Ukraine.  Russian media and the Yanukovych government presented the Euromaidan government as a fascist coup that was supported by the US.  In the face of Russian encroachment, Poroshenko has arguably displayed little inclination to push the country further towards democracy.

The difficult situation in Ukraine continues. Pro-Russian separatist groups took over parts of Donetsk and Luhank oblasts in Ukraine’s Donbas region, while the Crimean Peninsula remains under Russian control. Since the start of hostilities in April 2014, more than 10,000 people have been killed and 25,000 have been injured. Ukraine continues to face an impasse politically. There is little hope that there will be an agreement to the situation in Donbas, while the Poroshenko government is given more justification to tighten its rule in order to deal with constant threats to stability. Ukraine has shown that there is a vibrant civil society and that citizens are eager to participate, but geo-politics and an authoritarian past have proven stubborn obstacles to democratization.

Critical thinking questions

• What does the Ukrainian experience in post-communist elections tell us about the role of elections as a democratic institution?
• Why did so many types of democratic and undemocratic regime emerge in post-Communist Europe? Consider structural and agency factors in electoral democracies, hybrid regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes, etc.
• What are the prospects for consolidation of democracy in Ukraine? In your opinion, will Ukraine ever be able to democratize if the situation in Donbas remains unresolved?
• Assess the merits and shortcomings of presidential and parliamentary forms of government. What form of government is most suitable for the Ukrainian political system? How can one limit the powers of the president in semi-presidential forms of government? In your opinion, are strong political parties necessary for an effective parliamentary system of government? Looking at post-communist Europe, how can this be achieved?