Do institutions matter in democratizing societies? A considerable amount of literature in democratization studies provides an affirmative answer to this question: yes, institutions do matter and institutional design is considered to be one of the most important institutional reforms to be made in countries aspiring to become democracies. It seems that some institutions and governmental structures are more conducive to successful democratization than others: for instance, a parliamentary system of government is more desirable than a presidential one as the former allows for establishment of institutional checks and balances on the part of a national legislature that can hold the executive branch accountable. Presidential systems are more prone to excessive concentration of powers by presidents and creation of so-called ‘winner takes it all’ situations which can be potentially harmful for a democratizing state as they do not allow for power sharing and creating of compromises among diverse political groups. (See Chapter 15 on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies.)

Institutional design during the last two decades in the post-Soviet states provides some useful empirical insights into the relationship between institutional design and the outcomes of the democratization process. After gaining independence in the early 1990s the majority of the post-Soviet republics have adopted either pure presidential forms of government or mixed semi-presidential systems. Only some post-Soviet republics (mostly in the Baltic region) opted for more parliamentary systems with governments answerable to national parliaments rather than presidents. The reasons for such a pro-presidential institutional choice were both long-term structural and at the same time contingent on more short-term factors: for instance, due to high levels of political instability in the early 1990s peoples themselves preferred a strong, identifiable leader, whom they could have held accountable easier than, for instance, a coalition government consisting of a number of political parties in a parliamentary system. Another crucial factor was the top-down character of the post-Soviet transitions: the actual regime change and subsequent adoption of democratic institutions were largely elite-driven processes, organized by and around powerful individuals, rather than coherent and disciplined political groups or parties. Party systems were very weak at the time in these states and they were unable to attract sufficient number of members in order to successfully contest power in elections. Instead, powerful individuals, most of whom were former officials of the communist party of the USSR, were more successful in consolidating resources and securing support of both elites and population in order to get elected in the first presidential elections across the post-Soviet space.

Thus, the first Georgian president Eduard Shevarnadze was actively involved in the communist party of the USSR and was a communist party official. Once elected Shevarnadze undertook a number of institutional reforms to limit the power of national legislatures and boost the presidential powers. Years of political instability followed as Shevarnadze was not strong enough to sufficiently consolidate their powers at the expense of the national legislatures, resulting in the so-called ‘pluralism by default’ (Way 2002). However, the overall trend was similar across the most of the post-Soviet space: mixed semi-presidential systems became more presidential and more authoritarian with time. Shevarnadze followed similar tactics: promising the electorate quick and effective decisions in contrast to ‘cheap talk’ and ‘empty’ deliberations by parliamentarians, he also initiated a number of legislative reforms to boost the powers of the president in Georgia. So, by the end of the 1990s Georgia had reversed all democratic reforms initiated in the early 1990s and backslid to authoritarianism.  The country simultaneously faced instability and potential war with breakaway regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) declaring de facto independence with rampant smuggling and organized crime and one of the highest corruption levels in the world.

However, the potential for democratic change remained and, in fact, culminated in the Rose Revolution in Georgia.  As a result of this tumultuous event, Shevarnadze was ousted from Georgia, and a newly elected president, Mikheil Saakashvili pledged to adhere to democratic values and initiate institutional reforms to limit the powers of the president and make national parliaments stronger. President Saakashvili also initiated a number of constitutional amendments, which were supposed to transform the country’s ‘super-presidential’ system of government to a parliamentary one. However, in reality the new amendments reinstated the president’s power to appoint the prime minister  even if the candidacy of the latter did not secure the consent of the Georgian parliament. Many critics pointed out at the time that the post-Rose Revolution Georgia had lost its opportunity to install a truly parliamentary system of government in the country.

But Georgia has undergone crucial institutional changes. In addition to resolving the issues with its breakaway regions, and dramatically reducing corruption and smuggling, on  15  October 2010 the Georgian parliament overwhelmingly approved a series of constitutional changes that would shift primary political powers from the president to the prime minister. The authorities motivated the change by a necessity to transform the system of government from a presidential-parliamentary model to a parliamentary-presidential one, thus making the country’s political system more democratic. Critics, however, both in Georgia and abroad, criticized the change and interpreted it as President Saakashvili’s attempt to prolong his time in power by participating in the 2012 parliamentary elections, which his party— the United National Movement—was supposed to win. Thus, the amended constitution gave Saakashvili, whose presidential second and last term expired in 2013, a golden opportunity to stay in power in a new role: the role of prime minister.

Critics drew parallels between Saakashvili’s behaviour and the Russian President Putin’s strategy when he couldn’t simply step down as the president, but decided to remain in power as a very active prime minister. In reality, Saakashvili was no Putin—deciding to step down in power in after his party lost to the Georgian Dream Coalition led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili.  Saakashvili has remained active in Georgian politics but has not challenged the validity of elections. The bigger concern is the dominance of the Georgian Dream Coalition which won 115 out of 150 seats in the latest 2016 parliamentary election, though it only garnered 55 per cent of the vote. On 26 April 2018 it was announced that the current chairperson of the Georgian Dream Democratic party, Giorgi Kvirikashvili would resign so that Ivanishvili could return as chairperson.

Though Georgia has come a long way since it was a captured and failing state, it is clear that the post-Soviet presidents seem to like power too much to give it up readily. When their presidential terms come to an end, they also seem to be reluctant to share power with national parliaments and other political institutions. It may be argued that Georgia has found an efficient way to achieve these goals—through manipulation of constitutional rules and frequent institutional reforms that the ruling party, the Georgian Dream Party manages to push through constitutional amendments that combined with the financial backing of a reclusive billionaire patron, makes any challenges from the opposition very difficult.   

Critical thinking questions

• Why do institutions matter in democratizing states?
• What are the most important institutional choices to be made in democratizing states? Why?
• Why was the Georgian president able to change their country’s constitutions so easily and increase their presidential powers in the 1990s? What mechanisms of institutional checks and balances should be in place to avoid such scenarios in future?
• Is a semi-presidential form of government suitable for the context of a post-Soviet state? Explain your view.
• The post-Soviet presidents often motivate the necessity for institutional reforms as an attempt to make the system of government more efficient and to be able to arrive at quick policy decisions. What would be your response to such justifications?