.png){kind=icon}
1. The WTO’s mandate is to ensure that international trade rules allow for the efficient conduct of business, yet this often conflicts with national environmental and labour standards. Is it possible to redesign the WTO so that it successfully balances these goals and, if so, how?
One of the greatest impediments to the smooth procedural unfolding of intergovernmental institutions such as the WTO is that they are premised on the maintenance of its member states’ sovereignty. This is not only reflected in that membership in international organizations itself has come to be viewed as one of the most crucial aspects of state sovereignty (see Andrew Linklater on this point). Further, the maintenance of state sovereignty means that the leverage that international organizations hold in pushing member states to implement policies collectively remains limited. This is not to say, however, that there are no institutional designs that are able to foster this. In relation to the WTO, scholars have considered the possibility for such institutional redesigning with particular focus in the following areas: issue linkage to provided decision-makers with leverage against recalcitrant domestic groups and enhance larger economic collective interests (p. 16); increased application of legal procedures, where procedural justice plays an important role in effective trade negotiations(p. 23-24).
2. Using the WTO case study as a template, how would neoliberalism analyse cooperation in an issue area such as environmental protection or human rights?
In tackling this question think back to the two core tenets of neoliberalism: the centrality of interdependence (p. 5-6), mediated through institutions (p. 10-18). How might related notions of bargaining defection and autonomy play out in matters of environmental protection or human rights within the WTO. If you can, it may be useful to add specific examples of such negotiation procedures.
3. The United States was seminal to the creation of the WTO and yet it also frequently criticized it and disrupted its dispute settlement mechanism? What might account for this discrepancy in behaviour and how might institutional redesign address it?
The first part to this question is closely related the first case study question above. Again, sovereignty is a key factor here. Nonetheless, the US’ role as global hegemon, makes its position in relation to international organizations particular. Think about other neoliberal assumptions, such as the notion of maximum utility as a key intentional element in states’ cooperation through institutions (p. 8, 10, 21). What might the US as world hegemon have to gain or lose in its participation in the WTO?