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1. Why and how do realists disagree on how to read the ‘rise of China’?
2. Which realist perspective do you find more plausible on the question and why?
Two aspects of structural realism are fundamental to determining the stability of the international system, and thus a reading of the ‘rise of China’ as either a threat or maintenance to its stability. The first lies in the division of structural realism into the offensive vs. defensive structural camps (p. 2-3, 6-8, 19-20). The main line of division lies, as you will remember from reading chapter 4, in a differentiated understanding of the necessary amount of (tangible material) and (latent economic) power that states must obtain to assure their survival within the anarchical international system. Different interpretations of China’s rise as an international actor might therefore arise when read through these frameworks. The second aspect of a structural realist framework that might determine (your) readings of China’s rise, lies in the different views that structural realists hold on polarity and the question whether uni- bi- or multi-polarity constitutes a more stable international order (p. 12-14, 20-21). Reading China’s rise as a contemporary shift from a unipolar international order to a bipolar international order thus presses on this issue and is likely to take on different accounts according to the particular strand of structural realism you consider to be most persuasive. This may lead you to consider some of the following questions: If China constitutes a rising international actor of particularly economic dimension, then how might this figure within the larger framework of a defensive vs. offensive structural realist? Similarly, if China’s rise posits it as an emergent hegemonic power, thus disturbing the unipolar international order that has marked the international order since the end of the Cold War, does this enhance or threaten stability within the international system?