The Scott Report

The backdrop to the Scott Report was the war between Iran and Iraq which lasted from 1980-88. In 1985, the UK government’s expressly stated policy was not to supply lethal defence equipment to either side. After the war ended in 1988, three junior ministers changed UK policy by relaxing the ban on the sale of defence exports to Iraq, but without informing parliament or the public or disclosing the revised guidelines in responses to parliamentary questions and letters from members of the Commons and the Lords (HL Deb, 26 February 1996, Vol 569 cc 1235-1238 (Lord Richard)).

HM Customs and Excise then discovered that a company called Matrix Churchill had been exporting machine tools to Iraq which had a dual use ie they could be used for making military equipment, and three of the company’s executives were charged with offences relating to breaching the arms embargo. Their trial began in 1992. The defendants argued that they had been acting with the government’s full knowledge and had also been supplying information to UK security services, but ministers signed Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificates to prevent sensitive documents from being disclosed in the trial—though the documents supported the defendants’ case. However, the judge refused to accept the PII certificates and most of the documents were disclosed. The trial subsequently collapsed after one of the ministers, Alan Clark MP, admitted that he had been 'economical with the actualité' in earlier evidence, and that he knew that the defendants were exporting machine tools which could be used to manufacture shells.

The ‘arms to Iraq’ Inquiry was announced to consider the export of defence equipment and dual-use goods to Iraq, and whether ministers and departments had operated in accordance with UK government policy. Lord Justice Scott was appointed as its chair. The five-volume Scott Report was published in 1996 (Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (1995–1996) HC 115). It was the Report’s recommendations on ministerial accountability that led to governmental and parliamentary soul-searching and reflection. Lord Justice Scott found that in failing to disclose the revised policy to parliament, government ministers had failed to discharge their obligations under the principle of ministerial accountability. He emphasised the need to provide full and accurate information to parliament and was critical of previous accepted practice of not revealing information on matters such as the supply of arms to individual countries in the interests of confidentiality (Scott Report [K8.16]). In response, the government indicated that the parliamentary convention that the government did not answer questions about exports of arms and defence-related goods would be reviewed and it would consider Lord Justice Scott's wider views about ministerial accountability and responsibility (HL Deb, 26 February 1996, Vol 569 col 1230 (Lord Fraser of Carmyllie)).

The Scott Report led to more open and transparent government in terms of ministerial accountability. In 1992, John Major, then Prime Minister, published the Questions of Procedure for Ministers, a guidance document which had previously been classified but which required ministers to inform parliament as fully as possible about the government’s policies, decisions and actions (HL Deb, 26 February 1996, Vol 569 cc 1230-1231). The Public Service Committee reviewed ministerial accountability and responsibility (Public Service Committee, Ministerial Accountability and Responsibility, 2^nd Report of Session 1995–96, HC 313–I) which led to a series of reports on ministerial accountability and parliamentary questions by the Public Administration Select Committee, enabling issues and concerns to be discussed and publicised. The House of Commons passed a resolution in 1997 on ministerial accountability, setting out the paramount importance of ministers giving accurate and truthful information to parliament and being as open as possible with parliament, and these principles were later enshrined in the Ministerial Code.

Further reading

Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Ministerial Accountability’ (1997) 50(1) Parliamentary Affairs 71

Adam Tomkins, The Constitution After Scott: Government Unwrapped (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998)