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1. How does the ECtHR distinguish a manifestation of a belief from an action motivated by a belief?
Manifestations are intimately linked to the belief, a direct expression of the belief. Motivated actions are not direct expressions; they do not, one might say, undermine a person’s sense of their religious identity.
2. For what kinds of purpose is it legitimate to restrict a person’s manifestation of belief?
These are only and exclusively for those purposes listed in Article 8(2). Of course what these purposes include is a matter of interpretation (see, in particular, SAS v France).
3. In what circumstances, if any, will a court evaluate the nature, quality, and credibility of beliefs for the purpose of Article 9?
Although courts are reluctant to do this, such an evaluation could be part of a proportionality assessment of the justifications for limiting a manifestation of belief. In Campbell v UK a case centred on Article 2 of the First Protocol the Court referred to ‘views which attained a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ and to ‘convictions as are worthy of respect in a “democratic society”.
4. Contrast Article 9 with the right of parents under Article 2 of the First Protocol to have their religious and philosophical convictions respected by the state in supplying education.
Article 2 is focused on the particular issue of education. Like Article 9, Article 2 guarantees a right subject to reasonable restrictions. In particular parental rights should not be so strong as to overwhelm the duty on a state to provide a pluralist education.
5. Does Article 9 provide a right to conscientious objection?
At one time any right to conscientious objection was weak. This was to prevent internal inconsistency with Article 4(3)(b), which recognises various forms of compulsory social service as not being a breach of the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. But, more recently, a clear tendency towards recognising a right to conscientious objection in international law has emerged. In Bayatyan v Armenia a Grand Chamber disconnected Article 9 from Article 4 and held that conscientious objection could be protected by Article 9 and that the disproportionate punishment of an objector might be an unjustified interference with this right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
6. Identify three cases in which the ECtHR has considered issues of the compatibility of bans on religious dress or symbols with Article 9 (see also Exam question 1, below).
In SAS v France the ECtHR upheld France’s criminal law ban on the wearing of niqab and burqa in public places; it did so on the grounds that France could, legitimately, pursue the purpose of social solidity.
In Leyla Sahin v Turkey the ECtHR upheld the ban on head scarfs in Turkish universities. In the context the ban was justified under the terms of Article 9(2).
In Eweida v UK the ECtHR considered a number of situations in which employees had been disadvantaged because of insisting on manifesting their beliefs either by wearing refusal or by the conscientious refusal of duty. The ECtHR applied a wide margin of appreciation and in all but one case found the restrictions were proportionate.