Chapter 20 Self-test questions

. How did the use of coercive diplomacy change after the end of the Cold War?

It was used as a unilateral tool by the US.

It was used between the Great Powers.

The use of coercive diplomacy was reduced.

It was used as a collective tool through humanitarian intervention.

. What distinguishes coercive diplomacy from military force?

Compellence is another term for coercive diplomacy, but covering a narrower set of criteria; compellence covers those threats aimed at initiating adversary action. A threat to coerce a state to give up part of its territory would count as coercive diplomacy, as long as that threat proactively initiates action before reactive diplomacy is taken.

Coercive diplomacy constitutes the threats of limited force to induce adversary's incentive to comply with the coercer's demands. It is an influence strategy that is intended to obtain compliance: the use of force to defeat an opponent first does not count. It leaves an element of choice with the target to comply, or to continue.

Military force, or the threat of military force, utilizes fear to achieve strategic objectives. Coercive diplomacy is differentiated from this approach, because it does not use fear as a tool for coercing an adversary.

Coercive diplomacy is employed to use force but to limit its effects on the international community. Coercive diplomacy is an aggressive strategy that is intended to obtain compliance through defeat. It does not leave an element of choice with the target, the target either being forced to comply or engage in conflict. It seeks to control by imposing compliance by removing any opportunity for negotiation or concession.

. In what ways can a distinction be made between limited force and full-scale force?

The distinction between limited force and full-scale force is the second process of coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy only fails if the coercer fails to achieve its defined goals and fails to defeat its adversary in the second stage.

Generally the distinction between brute and limited force is negligible. Resort to air or sea power constitutes an equal coercive capacity to a conventional ground offensive. Military action always results from a failure of negotiations and from a shift from the diplomatic to the military sphere.

The distinction between limited force and brute force is important because the amount of force that is used to attain the coercer's interests defines the type of outcome that is achieved. If a positive policy outcome is achieved, then we can say that limited force has been employed.

The distinction between limited force and full-scale war is crucial because resort to brute force means that diplomacy has failed. The distinction is not based on the amount of force or the type, but on the purpose that the use of force seeks to accomplish and the element of choice left to the adversary. In essence, limited force is a bargaining tool.

. Why are we now facing a new strategic era defined by symmetric great power confrontations?

An increase in terrorism and insurgencies

All of these

The prospect of nuclear war

The world is becoming multipolar.

. According to George and Simons, what factors influence the outcomes of an act of coercive diplomacy?

Global strategic environment; type of provocation; image of war

Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; isolation of the adversary; clarity of objective; strength of motivation; and asymmetry of motivation

Sense of urgency; strong leadership; domestic support; international support; opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation; clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement

All of the above

. What is not a component of Jakobsen's Ideal Policy?

A threat of force to defeat the opponent

The use of force to defeat the opponent

An offer of inducements for compliance

An assurance to the adversary against future demands

. In what ways does the Ideal Policy framework provide an analytical framework for practitioners' success?

The Ideal Policy framework provides the analytical tools for understanding the contextual factors influencing the use of coercive diplomacy, for example why a policy-maker takes the decision to, or not to, implement the Ideal Policy.

The Ideal Policy framework focuses on the use of coercive diplomacy to counter aggression. The Ideal Policy explains and predicts outcomes with a minimum of success conditions on the basis of the coercer's actions only.

The Ideal Policy provides an expansive framework, firstly for the examination of a maximum number of probable causal conditions and secondly to make the conditions applicable to the contextual factors relating to the use of coercive diplomacy.

The Ideal Policy framework recognizes that to make non-compliance too costly, the coercer must threaten to defeat the adversary or to deny the target's objectives. The condition for success is pivotal on the coercer's threat of force.

. How can coercive diplomacy success be defined?

Isolation of the effect that the threat of force or the limited use of force, in a given case is dependent on the sufficiency of the 'stick' for success. The question to ask is whether the stick employed was sufficient to produce compliance.

Success is an independent function from the amount of coercion required to produce compliance. Ideally, coercion should be required to solve all disputes. If the threshold from persuasion to coercion is crossed, the degree of success is equated to the production of the intended outcome: to stop or undo an action.

In protracted diplomatic affairs involving a series of inconclusive exchanges which results in tactical/temporary successes followed by new acts of non-compliance, the production of the intended outcome (compliance and ceasing of actions) is regarded as a success from a policy goal perspective.

Coercive diplomacy successes resulting from the use of threats and sanctions (inducements may, but need not, be employed) are classified as cheap successes. Successes resulting from the use of limited force count as costly ones. Compliance can only be considered a success if the outcome is lasting.

. Why is coercive diplomacy hard? What are the inherent difficulties?

Perpetual, psychological, and emotional factors are precluded from the adversary's calculations. In no-win situations therefore the adversary might calculate that temporary compliance is the best strategic option to buy time.

Coercive diplomacy leaves too much room for compromise. Actors engaging in such behaviour are unlikely to perceive their vital interests as threatened and regard issues as zero-sum because they are aware that force will be used. As a consequence coercive diplomacy can lead to lengthy resolution discussions.

The success ultimately rests on perceptual, psychological, and emotional factors, giving rise to the risk that misperception or miscalculation will defeat even a well-executed strategy that otherwise meets all the requirements for success.

The political scope for offering inducements can become unlimited. The problem becomes particularly underlined when the risk of terrorism, WMD, or equal military capability comes into play. Inducements can appear to look like concessionary politics and blur the line of what constitutes a success defined as the fear of inescapable escalation.

. How does coercive diplomacy differ from deterrence?

Deterrence relies on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) by nuclear weapons whereas coercive diplomacy relies on conventional weapons.

Deterrence relies on military threats to coerce adversaries to refrain from doing something, whereas coercive diplomacy is an influence strategy that intends to obtain compliance from an adversary without resolve to brute force.

Coercive diplomacy involves the treat of the use of force whereas deterrence only relies on positive incentives (carrots).

Coercive diplomacy relies on military threats to coerce adversaries to refrain from doing something, whereas deterrence is an influence strategy that intends to obtain compliance from an adversary without resolve to brute force.

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