Chapter 46 Summary

According to Warren, only if we refute the claim that fetuses are human persons—and as such, members of the moral community—can we show abortion to be morally permissible. (Thomson’s argument from the violinist analogy fails because, except in the case of rape, it is not clear that the woman is in no way morally responsible for the predicament of having another’s life depend on her.) The traditional anti-abortion argument fails to distinguish between the moral sense of “human being,” which implies full membership in the moral community, and the genetic sense, which implies membership only in the human species and not the human moral community. Warren argues that moral humanity follows not from simple genetic humanity but from personhood, a concept with central characteristics that include sentience, emotionality, reason, the capacity to communicate, self-awareness, and moral agency. Although None of the above criteria are logically necessary, the more that are satisfied, the more confident we can be in applying the concept of personhood. An early fetus possesses None of the above six; it is therefore not necessary (and, given the intolerable cost that often comes with carrying unwanted pregnancies to term, not advisable) to grant it personal status and the claim to moral consideration that comes with it. Moreover, the rights of the fetus as a potential person cannot outweigh the moral rights of the actual person who wishes to have an abortion.