In “Rights, Obligations, and World Hunger,” Onora O’Neill examines three ethical approaches to the problem of world hunger and famine: utilitarianism, a human rights approach, and her preferred approach: a theory of obligations inspired by Kant. Utilitarianism, which takes human happiness and well-being as the ultimate standard for assessing actions, may seem promising at first. However, O’Neill argues that utilitarianism suffers from a critical flaw: it lacks a precise method for measuring and predicting happiness. Moreover, utilitarianism attaches no special significance to human needs. A human rights approach, which views the problem of world hunger as a problem of justice, has flaws as well. First and foremost, there is no consensus regarding just what sorts of rights are basic to justice. In particular, there is disagreement about whether all human rights are “liberty” rights or whether they include “welfare” rights as well. O’Neill argues that it is better to understand justice in terms of obligations rather than rights because, thanks to the moral philosophy of Kant, it is possible to show what obligations human beings have.

According to Kant, we are obligated never to act in ways in which others cannot in principle act as well. Put a different way, we must live according to principles shareable by all. O’Neill points out that one obligation of justice that emerges from this theory of obligation is that of noncoercion, which, among other things, involves ensuring that we allow others the freedom to accept or refuse our offers and suggestions. This is of particular importance to the problem of hunger because it is easy to exploit the vulnerable position of the world’s poor by making them “offers they cannot refuse.” Such offers may have the appearance of commercial bargaining, and can be perfectly legal, but they are nonetheless coercive, and hence, unjust. The obligations approach, however, involves obligations beyond those of justice, in that it includes obligations, that cannot be done for all others and the performance of which cannot be claimed as anyone’s right. One of these so-called “imperfect” obligations is the moral requirement to help others become and remain autonomous agents. In the case of world hunger, this implies a commitment not only to providing material help in the form of emergency food aid, but also to development policies and institutional changes that will allow the world’s poor to gain control over their lives.

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