Kagan takes up a challenge raised by the Roman philosopher Lucretius. Lucretius thought we were wrong to be upset about the prospect of our own deaths. We think that death is bad, because after death we will no longer be able to enjoy the good things in life. But as Lucretius pointed out, there is also a period before our births during which we do not exist and cannot enjoy the good things in life. We don’t get upset about that period. Therefore, Lucretius said, we should not get upset about the period after our deaths. Kagan wants to explain why we do feel differently about the postdeath period than the prebirth period and see whether we are justified in this difference. He considers several possible answers, from Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman, and Derek Parfit. Kagan concludes that Parfit’s theory may provide an explanation for our asymmetrical attitudes toward postdeath and prebirth but not a justification.
Chapter 46 Chapter Summary
The Badness of Death, Shelly Kagan