Chapter 39 Chapter Summary

For the sake of argument, Judith Jarvis Thomson concedes a premise that she does not herself believe, namely, that the fetus is a human person from the moment of conception. Contrary to a widely held view, it does not follow from this premise that abortion is always or almost always morally impermissible. If we grant the fetus the status of human personhood, then we must also grant that it has a right to life; but Thomson denies that this entails the further right of the fetus to use another person’s body to preserve its own life. Just as you would have the right to unplug a famous violinist who has been attached to your kidneys to prevent him from dying from a serious illness, a woman is morally entitled in many cases to deny the fetus use of her body, even if this decision will result in the fetus’s death. To sustain the life of another in this way is to be a Good Samaritan, but the Good Samaritan goes above and beyond the call of duty, making great personal sacrifices for the sake of others to whom the Samaritan has no prior obligation. What is required of us is merely to be “Minimally Decent Samaritans,” and carrying a fetus to term often (but not always) goes beyond this moral standard.