The Body Problem Multiple Choice

. Montero's view of the mind–body problem is that

Physicalism is correct.

Dualism is correct.

The problem can't be solved until the body problem is solved.

The problem is not as important as the body problem.

. Philosophers commonly try to define "physical" by deferring to the work of particle physicists, but this is problematic according to Montero because

Current physics is probably wrong in places and certainly incomplete.

Most philosophers believe things like tables and chairs are just as physical as quarks and leptons.

Current physics doesn't work on questions pertaining to the mind.

Both a and b.

. We could define "physical" by saying that the physical world is composed of only one kind of basic particle. If there is a mental substance, as a substance dualist believes, it must be made of a different kind of stuff. Why does Montero think that this doesn't work as a definition of "physical"?

Physicalists don't believe in a mental substance or "ghost in the machine."

Physicists might discover that there is more than one kind of basic particle making up matter.

Few physicalists think that quarks and leptons are nonphysical.

All of the above.

. Hempel's dilemma is a problem for defining "physical" in terms of physics. What are the two horns of the dilemma?

If you use current physics, the theory is false; if you use future physics, the theory is vague.

If you use current physics, the theory is incomplete; if you use future physics, it is dualistic.

If you use current physics, the theory is true; if you use future physics, it is false.

If you use current physics, the theory is false; if you use future physics, it is awkward.

. Montero argues that if a future "complete physics" is defined as a physics that explains everything about the world, then

It must explain the mind as well, giving support to physicalism.

It must explain the mind as well, making physicalism true by definition.

It must explain mental substance, which means dualism might be true.

It must explain ghosts, which means that idealism might be true.

. Montero's conclusion to the body problem is that

We should use our common sense about what "physical" means.

We should let the physicists define what "physical" means.

We should recognize that physicalism is true by definition.

We should recognize that we do not understand what "physical" means.

. Montero thinks that a better question to ask about the mind might be

Are mental properties ultimately physical?

Are mental properties ultimately nonphysical?

Are mental properties ultimately nonmental?

Are physical properties ultimately mental?

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