One argument is that the privileged access of business to the corridors of power largely disappeared in the 1980s. Michael Bliss argues that other powerful vested interests are able to compete with business. David Vogel suggests that business is more affected by broad political and economic trends than it is able to affect them. Further, the strength of business influences ebbs and flows. It is strongest when the public is worried about the economy and weakest when the economy is performing well. Vogel also argues that it is successful now in the halls of power because of its ability to organize and mobilize. This was not always the case. At one time, consumer, environmental, and other public interest groups were able to work the levers of power in Washington much more effectively. Presently, business demonstrates exceptional organization prowess, but divisions within the business community serve to check its effectiveness.

James Q. Wilson also argues that “entrepreneurial politics” limits business influence. Some groups and politicians are particularly astute and can identify issues around which popular support can be mobilized in opposition to business interests.

Finally, the argument is made that on some issues, business is very influential, but on other issues, state actors are quite capable of resisting pressures from highly organized, well-heeled business interests. (pp. 363–365)

One criticism is that the interest group system is much less open and competitive than was thought by the early pluralists. Another is that it is not accurate to equate the outcome of struggles between special interest groups with the public interest. In this regard, the neo-pluralist, Charles Lindblom, spoke of the “privileged position of business.” A third is that it is not accurate to say that the struggles among groups over issues are open and transparent. In fact, some issues do not make it to the public agenda. The ability to keep issues from public debate is an exercise of power not accounted for by pluralists. (p. 367)

The major obstacles are a political culture that is not favourable to the interventionist planning associated with corporatism; a parliamentary democracy that does not look favourably on a decision-making process involving only business and labour associations; the fragmentation of the business and labour communities; and, as a result of federalism, a divided state. (pp. 368–369)

(1) electoral influence, that is, the ability to swing a significant bloc of votes; (2) capacity to affect the economy negatively, that is, the ability to “down tools” or in some way inflict economic damage (A strike would be an example here. Taking investments out of a jurisdiction would be another example); (3) group cohesion, that is, the ability to convey to decision-makers with whom the association speaks one voice and genuinely represents the views of the membership. (pp. 376–378)

According to the “multiple crack hypothesis,” the presence of two levels of government, each of which has a range of taxing, spending, and regulatory powers, provides advocacy groups, lobbyists, and citizens, to seek from one government what they cannot get from the other. (pp. 379–380)

Federalism induces organizations to form a federal structure, thus dividing up its resources and likely inhibiting the capacity of the association to speak with one voice. Also, jurisdiction is a key issue and when the two levels of government get focused on a policy area, interest groups are often frozen out of the policy process. (pp. 379–380)

A successful influence strategy is expensive because lobbying often requires hiring a professional government relations firm, which can be costly. Also, if the campaign is aimed at influencing public opinion, advertising, polling, and public relations are all expensive. Thirdly, if the interest group goes the legal route, the legal process can be immensely expensive. (pp. 380–382)

Consultant lobbyists, corporate in-house lobbyists, and organization in-house lobbyists. (pp. 384–385)

Consulting, government, business, political advisor, senior bureaucrat (pp. 383–384)

They are able to offer expertise in public opinion analysis. This was added to Hill & Knowlton’s marketing skills, policy analysis capability, and ability to personally access government officials. (pp. 386–387)

They also use public opinion and judicial action. (pp. 380–381)

Business interest groups use advocacy advertising quite extensively. It is a way for businesses to overcome the anti-business bias of the media and to bridge the “credibility gap” that has developed between business and the public. (p. 382)