The test for duty of care was restated by Lord Wilberforce in terms which created a strong presumption in favour of finding a duty. The two-stage test required establishing (1) ‘proximity or neighbourhood’ (founded upon foreseeability); plus (2) the absence of any policy considerations which would negative the finding of a duty. This expansive test is no longer in use: see Caparo.

In a negligence action against a firm of auditors for financial loss suffered due to the negligent compilation of company accounts, it was held that the defendant did not owe a duty of care to the investors.

Lord Bridge established the three-stage test for duty of care in novel situations, requiring (1) foreseeable damage; (2) proximity between the parties; and (3) that the existence of a duty would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’. This is the current approach.

Customs and Excise had obtained ‘freezing orders’ on the bank accounts of two companies. The defendants had negligently contravened these orders and allowed funds to be withdrawn from the accounts.

The House of Lords held that the ‘three-stage test’ was insufficient in this factual situation and ‘assumption of responsibility’ had also to be considered. The order against the defendants had been compulsory and so they could in no way be said to have voluntarily assumed responsibility. No duty of care in negligence could be attributed.

Mrs Donoghue sued the manufacturers of ginger beer for damage she suffered when a snail was found in her bottle. It was held that the defendant had owed her a duty of care according to Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbour principle’.

The ‘neighbour principle’, based upon foreseeability, was the first general principle for determining duty of care in negligence. The so-called ‘narrow ratio’ from Donoghue established the liability of manufacturers to those injured by their products.

A blind pedestrian was injured when he fell on an obstacle which would not have posed a danger to those who could see. A duty of care had been owed to him.

The court considered statistics on the frequency of blind pedestrians and concluded that they were common enough that they should have been within the contemplation of the defendant. Haley illustrates that the duty must be owed to this claimant.

It was claimed on behalf of a victim of a serial killer that the police had owed her a duty of care and that their failure to conduct criminal investigations adequately had been the cause of her death. The House of Lords held that no such duty existed.

The foundation for this decision lay in the application of the Anns two-stage test. The plaintiff in Hill failed both owing to the absence of proximity between the defendant and the deceased victim and also due to a number of persuasive policy reasons.

A group of young offenders on an outing escaped and caused damage to the plaintiff’s yacht. It was held that the Home Office, whose employees should have been controlling the youths, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.

The ‘neighbour principle’ was applied to extend duty of care to create liability for damage caused, not directly, but by a third party over whom the defendant had been expected to exercise control.

A marine classification society certified as seaworthy a ship which later sank. There was held to be no duty of care owed to the owners of lost cargo.

The three-stage test from Caparo was applied. The House of Lords was satisfied that foreseeability and proximity existed but that it would not be fair, just, and reasonable for the classification society to owe a duty of care.

A passer-by was injured on the street during an arrest by the police of a suspected drug dealer. The Supreme Court unanimously found that a duty of care had been owed by the police.

The concept of ‘police immunity’ was questioned. It was reiterated that the Caparo three-stage test should only be applied to novel cases.