In determining whether a publication had a defamatory meaning, ‘right-thinking people’ would be presumed to condone rather than condemn informing police of illegal activity.

A computer-generated photo appeared to portray television stars in a pornographic scenario, but the text of the attached article contradicted any defamatory implication.

In determining the effect of a publication, it must be assumed that the reasonable reader will read it in context. Here, taking the picture and article as a whole, there was no defamatory meaning.

The defendant reported that a Metropolitan Police detective was under investigation for allegedly taking bribes from Russian exiles in return for information about extradition proceedings. The Reynolds defence was accepted at first instance, but failed in the Court of Appeal, due to concerns about the defendant’s efforts at verification.

The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the use of the defence. The clearest statement of the ratio can be read in the speech of Lord Mance, who confirmed the importance of the careful balancing exercise between protection of reputation and freedom of expression undertaken in such cases. The courts have a role in supporting responsible journalism.

The defendant was an ISP and the case concerned the application of the defence of innocent dissemination in the Defamation Act

An ISP is not a publisher and so is entitled to use the s 1 defence. Here, however, in the two weeks since notification of the defamatory nature of the posting, the defendant had not removed it. Therefore reasonable care had not been demonstrated and the s 1 defence was lost.

A fictitious newspaper article was defamatory of a churchwarden called Artemus Jones; a barrister of the same name sued in defamation.

It was possible that a jury could conclude that reasonable people would think that the article referred to the plaintiff. On this relatively strict test, the plaintiff successfully established that the article was defamatory of him.

The defendant published an article claiming that the claimant’s company was on a list of those suspected of making financial contributions to terrorism.

The ‘Reynolds defence’ was described as that of ‘responsible journalism’. The House of Lords was of the opinion that the defence should be applied more generously. Despite the allegation that the defendant had neglected to check carefully the background of the story, the defence was applied.

Following a successful defamation claim after a story that he was an enthusiast for fad diets, a jury awarded Elton John damages of £350,000.

On appeal this was reduced to £75,000. The Court of Appeal held that judges should give strong guidance to juries about the appropriate level of damages, and that parallels with personal injuries damages would be appropriate.

An article was defamatory of the ‘Young Russian’ political party which had 24 members in Britain. The plaintiff claimed that it referred to him.

In the case of ‘group definition’ an individual within that group can only bring a successful defamation action if something in the publication referring to him or the group is so small that reference to each member can be assumed.

Allegations of domestic abuse were made against the claimant in newspaper articles reporting on matrimonial and criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court upheld a stringent interpretation of the s 1 (2013 Act) ‘hurdle’ of serious harm which must be proved by the claimant. The true impact of the words must be established, rather than a mere inference.

A news report of a Camberwell bigamist was the subject of a defamation action by an innocent man of the same name, also living in Camberwell.

The lack of detail distinguishing the plaintiff from the true subject of the story meant that the defendant was liable in defamation. The Defamation Act 1996, s 2 can now provide the defence of offer of amends in such situations.

The former Prime Minister of Ireland sued in respect of a newspaper report that he had lied to Parliament. He was successful but was only awarded one penny in damages.

The case is important because it sets out the legal principles of qualified privilege as applied to publications in the public interest. Here, his failure to print the claimant’s version of the story meant that the defendant lost the ‘Reynolds defence’. See now the Defamation Act 2013, s 4.

A husband accidentally opened and read a letter which had been addressed to his wife, and which was defamatory of her.

On the facts, it was foreseeable that it might be read by the subject’s husband and so was treated as having been published to a third party.

An amateur golfer was portrayed in a photograph in a way which implied that he was advertising chocolate.

When the additional facts were pleaded of the golfer’s amateur status in order to explain defamatory meaning, the ordinary reader would assume that he had compromised his position. This is an example of a true or legal innuendo.

The defendant was the director of a company who told both fellow directors and the plaintiff’s wife about allegations of the plaintiff’s bad behaviour.

The defence of common law qualified privilege requires a reciprocal relationship and in this case the defence was lost because there was held to be no ‘duty’ to pass the information to the plaintiff’s wife.