Case study: The South Ossetian War

The South Ossetian War

South Ossetia has a population of approximately 53,000[1]; the majority of its inhabitants are Ossetians, but there also is a sizeable minority of Georgians within its borders. It sits in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains in southeast Europe. A major route between Europe and Asia, the Transcaucasian Highway, one of only two land routes between Russia and Georgia, cuts through South Ossetia. Georgia is also vital for the transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline a key supply line into Western Europe. As a result, Russia is anxious to prevent Georgia becoming too integrated into Europe to the detriment of its energy and security interests.

            South Ossetia’s ethnic diversity is demonstrated by the last Soviet census of the oblast in which South Ossetia was located.[2] Sixty-six per cent were Ossetians and 29 per cent Georgians, with Russians forming 2 per cent of the population. This is only part of the picture, because it included several Georgian and combined Ossetian-Georgian villages. These were especially concentrated in the Tskhinvali region and the eastern part of the oblast. Furthermore, there was a relatively high level of interface and intermarriage between Ossetians (both North and South) and Georgians throughout much of the Soviet era.[3]

Political Reform and the End of the Cold War

The political reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, between 1985 and 1991 helped free up nationalist feelings long suppressed within the Soviet state. In November 1989, with Georgia gaining increasing independence from the USSR, a request was made by South Ossetia to the Georgian Supreme Council for the region to be made an autonomous republic. The government of the Soviet Republic of Georgia attempted to quell these growing demands for autonomy through a series of constitutional measures, including the establishment of Georgian as the first language in South Ossetia.

The ethnic mix in Ossetia has produced divided loyalties between North and South Ossetia and led to considerable tensions between Russia and Georgia, which attempted to use military force to retain control over its disputed provinces. Between late 1990 and spring 1992, sporadic armed conflict occurred between Georgian forces and South Ossetian separatists. This coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union (the USSR formally dissolved on 25 December 1991). Russia and Georgia both laid claim to the Ossetian region. North Ossetia became part of the Russian Federation, while South Ossetia continued its struggles with Georgia.[4]

In 1991 South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia; it proceeded to establish the office of president and a parliament. South Ossetia lacked international recognition, except by a couple of other breakaway entities—even Russia did not formally recognize South Ossetian sovereign independence until after the Russia–Georgia conflict of 2008. An unsteady peace, the Sochi Agreement, was brokered between South Ossetia and Georgia. This involved a Joint Control Commission, with peacekeeping forces comprised of around 500 Russians, Georgians, and South Ossetians; the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was tasked with monitoring the situation. At the same time, a corridor was established separating Georgian and South Ossetian forces, which withdrew their armed forces from the conflict zones and dispersed their military units in an attempt to stabilize the military-political environment. In 1994, Georgia began a dialogue with NATO under the Partnership for Peace programme, which was intended to culminate in full NATO membership. This was widely interpreted within Russia as a move towards removing Russian influence from Georgia by bringing it into the Western political system.

            In November 1996, South Ossetia held its first presidential election, which was won by the former Chairman of their Parliament, Lyudvig Chibirov. The election was condemned by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze as being unlawful. During this period:

• the border between South Ossetia and Georgia remained quite permeable … with people moving back and forth relatively freely. Tskhinvali residents could go shopping in Gori, the closest city on the Georgian side; Georgians could visit relatives in South Ossetia. These contacts meant that tensions remained generally low, and in the 1990s the South Ossetian conflict was regarded as being ‘close to solution’.[5]

Shevardnadze and Chibirov met a number of times, leading to the solution of several political and economic problems.

In 2001, however, Chibirov lost a bid for re-election to Eduard Kokoity (who, in turn, was re-elected in 2006). Meanwhile, the bloodless coup of November 2003, dubbed the ‘Rose Revolution’, led to Shevardnadze’s resignation. Mikhail Saakashvili became Georgia’s president. As a result, the relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia changed markedly. In no small part this was inflamed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was intent on reversing years of decline in Moscow’s power that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. In June 2004, the market at the Ergneti border crossing was closed in an attempt by the Saakashvili government to ‘restore Georgia’s territorial integrity’. This led to the intensification of the dormant conflict.[6] Closing the border was followed by the bombardment of Tskhinvali, the ostensible capital of South Ossetia, and a number of Georgian villages. While a bilateral agreement for the demilitarization of the border was brokered in November 2004, repeated skirmishes occurred between South Ossetian and Georgian forces. In the view of the South Ossetian leadership, this violence was fuelled by Saakashvili’s heavy emphasis on Georgian nationalism.[7]

            The violence and instability led to an exodus from South Ossetia, with ethnic Georgians leaving for Georgia, while Ossetians made their way to Russian territory—particularly North Ossetia. For Ossetians, this migration also had a symbolic value because accommodation with Russia was perceived as being the only way to reunite North and South Ossetia.[8] The declaration of independence by Kosovo in the spring of 2008 also fuelled South Ossetian nationalism. As Timothy L. Thomas notes, the Sochi Agreement was slowly breaking down:

• For several years the peacekeepers kept events under control. However, as time progressed, tensions continued to increase and some would say Russia’s impartiality began to evaporate to the favor of South Ossetia, leading to the second issue defining the conflict. The size of the South Ossetian and Georgian peacekeeping contingents dwindled but the Russian contingent of 500 or so peacekeepers remained intact. The number of random attacks did not decrease, however, and the situation finally reached the breaking point after a series of events in July 2008.[9]

           

Tensions Build

July 2008 saw hostilities break out again, including an attack on a pro-Georgian leader. Tskhinvali and surrounding villages were shelled again, leaving two dead and ten injured. After this, Putin’s temporary successor, President Dmitry Medvedev, stated his intention to ‘normalize’ relations with Georgia but no clear offer was made towards this end. Georgia’s Foreign Minister accused Russia instead of actually stoking tensions in the area and he claimed that Russian military aircraft were overflying South Ossetian airspace. He also demanded the removal of Russian peacekeepers.

            On 10 July, Moscow admitted flying military aircraft over South Ossetia the day before as a show of force to Georgia which, Russia claimed, was planning an invasion of South Ossetia. Russia also began to mobilize troops along its southern border, allegedly to counter Georgian hostility towards both its breakaway republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s representative to the OSCE called for Georgia to halt any provocative actions towards South Ossetia. The following day, Georgia responded by recalling its ambassador to Russia, and Georgia threatened to shoot down any Russian aircraft overflying Georgian territory. This led representatives from the European Union to call for restraint, so as to prevent the further escalation of tensions. Nevertheless, Georgia increased its diplomatic efforts and requested support from the international community in its confrontation with Russia.

As tensions mounted, the United States, along with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, began a military exercise entitled Immediate Response at the Vaziani military base outside the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.[10] This was a reflection of Russian activity, as earlier in the month Russia had conducted its own pre-planned military exercise, Caucasus Frontier 2008 (part of STABILNOST 2008). On 16 July, officials from South Ossetia accused Georgia of rebuffing mediation talks, but three days later declined a similar offer by the EU. On 21 July, the United Nations Security Council held a closed session regarding the deteriorating situation; the next day, Georgia and Russia traded angry words in the United Nations.

A week later, with Russian military exercises still going on in the region, South Ossetia accused Georgia of launching shells and firing on villages near Tskhinvali and at the Joint Peacekeeping Force tasked with monitoring the situation. In turn, Georgia alleged that South Ossetian forces had attacked the peacekeepers and were attempting to gain control of the Georgian-occupied Sarabuki Heights. By the end of July, South Ossetian forces began to fortify their positions. Georgia also indicated that it was prepared to change the status quo, indicating it believed the Joint Control Commission to be ‘outdated’ and that the Commission showed favouritism towards South Ossetia.[11]

Operation Clear Field

Between 2 and 4 August, six people were killed and over 20 injured during one of the most intense clashes in the region since the early 1990s, leading to an exodus of women and children to Russia. President Kokoity stated that South Ossetia was prepared to mobilize its armed forces and warned that it was ready to strike Georgian cities. Kokoity informed the British Ambassador to Georgia, Denis Keefe, that ‘[we] have indisputable evidence that a large-scale military operation will start here by September. This is Georgia’s plan currently being implemented by … Saakashvili's regime.’[12] On 7 August South Ossetia again accused Georgia of attacking Tskhinvali and called for Saakashvili immediately to halt hostilities. Georgia responded by launching Operation Clear Field, an attack against Tskhinvali; the Georgians argued that the town had been used to shell Georgian territory. The assault initially utilized Georgia’s considerable artillery, but escalated to occupation of the town by (US-trained) Georgian ground forces.

On 8 August, Saakashvili declared that there was now a ‘state of war’ in the region. As this declaration was made, Russian forces began moving into South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel, which runs through the North Caucasus mountain range. Local resistance also began to emerge in Georgia’s other breakaway enclave, Abkhazia, with the Georgian-controlled Kodori Valley area attacked and Russian forces moved into Abkhazia. Russian troops then advanced from South Ossetia towards Gori, a city on the major Georgian highway and railway line, and thus a critical point for the Georgian Army’s supply routes and movement in the region. Russian warships also took positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast, while Russian aircraft bombed Gori and targets near Tbilisi, including a military airport.

The attack by Russia coincided with the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing, meaning that international media attention was largely focused elsewhere. The George W. Bush administration responded cautiously to the conflict, though it did issue a statement declaring the Russian military build-up to be disproportionate. The Russians essentially ignored this protest, and continued to bomb military targets outside of Tbilisi. On the following day, 9 August, Russia shifted more troops and armour into Abkhazia, and delivered an ultimatum to Georgia to disarm 1,500 troops stationed in Zugdidi.

This was summarily rejected by Georgia. Meanwhile, Russian ground forces were moving beyond Abkhazia, and into Zugdidi and Senaki. This again earned a rebuke from US President George W. Bush, who stated that Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the threat to Georgia’s democratically elected government was ‘unacceptable in the 21st century’ and ‘substantially damaged Russia’s standing in the world … These actions jeopardize Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe.’[13] Nevertheless, earlier in the day then-Prime Minister Putin said Russia would take things to their ‘logical conclusion’.[14]

By 10 August, Russia had moved over 9,000 paratroopers into Abkhazia, violating the force-strength limit of 3,000 stated in the 1994 peace agreements and continued to relocate troops and armour across the border, including T-72 tanks and multiple rocket launchers. At the same time, 2,000 Georgian troops were brought home from Iraq, a move expedited by the United States. On 11 August, Russian ground forces occupied areas around the port of Poti; three days later, they entered the town. They also sank several Georgian military vessels moored in the harbour and confiscated any military equipment they found. The use of cluster bombs in the attack upon Gori led to a number of civilian casualties; an exodus of around 56,000 civilians followed. By 13 August, with both Gori and Tskhinvali now lost, the Georgian Army was in full retreat.[15] Those who remained in Gori found themselves blockaded by Russian forces, which denied them access to humanitarian aid at the same time as South Ossetians raided and looted the city.[16]

The conflict also contained a cyber dimension indicative of the particular character of cyberspace and of its relation to physical geography. Georgian websites had suffered distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks as early as July 19, but the main attacks coincided with the commencement of hostilities on August 8. These attacks originated in Russia, but were otherwise unattributable, and succeeded in disabling a number of Georgian official and news websites. As all connections from Georgia to the World Wide Web physically passed through either Russia or Turkey at the time, the Georgian government and other websites turned to neutral hardware in other countries—including the United States and Estonia—to host their websites for the duration of hostilities. Ultimately, the cyber dimension only negligibly influenced the outcome of the conflict.[17]

War Aims and the Peace Settlement

On 12 August, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had announced an end to hostilities against Georgia even though combat continued. Medvedev, after meeting French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was acting on behalf of the European Union, said Russia would end its campaign under a six-point deal, which was first put forward on 16 August. The six principles were:

1. renunciation of violence between all protagonists;
2. an immediate cessation of hostilities;
3. unfettered access to humanitarian aid;
4. withdrawal of Georgian forces to their peacetime bases;
5. Russian military forces would return to the positions they held prior to the start of hostilities, with an international monitoring mechanism; and
6. international discussions to achieve lasting security for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[18]

Sarkozy negotiated the agreement jointly with Medvedev and Saakashvili, the latter now in a frail position after a heavy military defeat against massively superior forces. France also drew up a draft resolution to take to the UN Security Council, based on this six-point plan, to facilitate the end of the conflict.

            Medvedev initially stated that the Russian withdrawal would begin on 18 August, but later announced that Russian ground forces would remain inside the buffer zone established between Georgia and South Ossetia. This led NATO to suspend normal relations with Russia, as it violated the six-point plan, and both the EU and the United States also condemned this move. Russian troops remained in some parts of Georgia for the next two months and plans were made for Russian forces to remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia under bilateral agreements. Russia then negotiated with both regions to establish military bases on their territory. These moves were to guard against a resurgence of Georgian ambitions and mark a statement of intent by Russia that it once again was a force to be reckoned with regionally and internationally.[19]

            Why Georgia thought it could succeed with military action is difficult to gauge. Did Saakashvili and his advisors believe that Russia would not intervene or that they could paint their intervention as merely restoring order to one of their provinces? With only one major road linking Russia to South Ossetia, perhaps the Georgian military believed they could take and hold this bottleneck while intimidating the South Ossetians with a show of force. If this was the case, then Saakashvili and his military advisors did not anticipate Moscow’s resolve and ability to mobilize its armed forces in the Caucasus. Moreover, they appeared to gamble that Russia would not want to be seen as meddling in a dispute between Georgia and South Ossetia. Russia, however, had created the conditions for a Georgian attack on South Ossetia and had pre-planned its response.[20]

            Russian action went far beyond restoring order or protecting civilians. This indicates that Moscow’s war aims were far wider than simply dealing with the problems of South Ossetia. The invasion and occupation of parts of Georgia, along with the destruction and confiscation of the Georgian Army’s already limited war-fighting capacity, demonstrated Russia’s intent to crush any ambitions that Georgia might still hold for military reunification. It also demonstrated the willingness of a resurgent Russia to dismiss the efforts of the international community to broker a peace agreement until its war aims had been fulfilled. Moscow was now using military force to demonstrate its renewed assertiveness and a readiness to take action to protect its perceived sphere of interest. The invasion of Georgia was also an attempt to show NATO, and the international community, that it would not remain passive against the expansion of NATO and the spread of American power into the Caucasus. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of the disputed provinces, their humanitarian plight has been largely neglected and the resolution of their political situation is still a distant aspiration. Aside from the political consequences of the conflict, the human costs were considerable, with casualties estimated to have been in the hundreds. There are also accusations that widespread abuses of human rights were committed by all parties.[21]

            The short- and longer-term economic, political, and humanitarian consequences of the war have been disappointing to both belligerents. Russia was hurt economically by the war, as foreign capital fled and stocks decreased in value, throwing the feasibility of its economic plans into doubt for the short-term. Georgia also suffered economically; its military lost considerable quantities of equipment and much national infrastructure was also damaged or destroyed.[22] The war marked, at least temporarily, the termination of Georgia’s hopes of joining NATO. It also represented the failure of the United States’ Caucasus policy, abandoned in the subsequent ‘reset’ with Russia under the Obama administration. Russia, however, failed to oust Saakashvili, despite considerable invective rhetoric towards him during and after the war. It similarly failed to garner much international support for the recognition of either/both South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence, even from otherwise friendly states such as Belarus. This leaves both breakaway republics in a legal grey zone: de jure part of Georgia, de facto independent, and increasingly dependent upon Russian largesse.[23] Georgian minorities from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were expelled during and after the war. Their status remains in limbo, as they are not permitted to return to their homes in either region.[24] Tensions over the disputed territories and staunch Russian opposition to a possible Georgian accession to NATO continue to prevent the full normalization of relations.[25]

Conclusion

Prior to the events leading up to armed conflict, Russia had adopted a policy of ‘creeping annexation’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, issuing passports and opening diplomatic ties to both regions, even though the regions were bound to Georgia under international law. Moscow strongly believes that Georgian membership of NATO would be counter to Russia’s national interests. By using force, Moscow put a marker down to the international community and other former Soviet Republics, notably Ukraine and the Baltic States, of its willingness to use force to protect its interests. The crisis also demonstrates the divisions within the international community in regard to how a resurgent Russia should be dealt with, and the disinclination of most states to confront Moscow.

A decade later, some saw the events in South Ossetia, and the deterioration in Georgian–Russian relations in general, as marking the re-emergence of great power politics, if not the beginning of a Second Cold War. The possibility of a Second Cold War rests on the extent to which Russia is prepared to defend what it perceives to be its sphere of influence, and also to what extent it is able to do so, whether through direct military action or through other measures such as cutting off energy supplies to its neighbours and the West. In retrospect, Russian aggression in South Ossetia seems to have been a precursor to its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014.

Georgia now realizes that any designs it has regarding South Ossetia are not going to be achieved through military force. Domestically, the Saakashvili government survived the political fall-out from its actions in South Ossetia and the Russian invasion, but in 2012 Saakashvili was democratically voted out of office, at least in part a consequence of the war. Internationally, negotiations for NATO membership have continued but there is no fixed date for accession. Although Russia has recognized the unilateral declarations of independence by South Ossetia (and Abkhazia), the international community has not, and the OSCE has expressed reservations regarding Russia’s involvement in the region.[26] In late 2014 and early 2015, Russia drafted a ‘Treaty of Alliance and Integration’ with South Ossetia, effectively annexing the breakaway region despite NATO pronouncements that the agreement violated international law. A similar, but not as wide-ranging, treaty had previously been signed between Russia and Abkhazia.[27] Russia has been accused of creeping annexation of Georgia, simply by moving the barbed wire and guard posts along the border forward into Georgian territory. Such moves left a portion of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline under Russian control, and threatened Georgia’s sovereignty over its own main lateral highway.[28]

South Ossetia has been, and to some extent continues to be, the unfortunate victim of a ‘power politics’ battle between Georgia, which looks to become integrated into the Western political and economic system, and Russia, which took military action to protect its political and strategic interests. Russia staged the conditions for Georgian military intervention in South Ossetia and when Georgia reacted Russia moved decisively. To an extent, this represents a return to a classical realist method of dealing with state versus state problems. In an increasingly globalized and interdependent world, however, there are limits to the extent to which even great powers such as Russia will use military force to achieve political ends.[29]

Questions

1. To what extent was the conflict over South Ossetia orchestrated by Russia?
2. Why did Georgia begin military action against South Ossetia and what did it hope to gain?
3. Why did Russia intervene in South Ossetia?
4. Are we witnessing the beginnings of a ‘Second Cold War’ between NATO and Russia?
5. What could be the long-term results of the conflict between Georgia and Russia for the Caucasus region specifically and for Russian foreign policy generally?

Websites

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/2008/georgia_russia_conflict/default.stm

http://russiangeorgianwar.blogspot.co.uk/

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/576/

https://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ENDC_Occasional_Papers_4_final.pdf

[1] ‘South Ossetia’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Ossetia#ref889972, accessed 24 November 2021.

[2] Because of its unique status within Georgia there is no data concerning the ethnic demographics of South Ossetia since 1989. National Statistics Office of Georgia (GEOSTAT), ‘2014 General Population Census’, 28 April 2016, http://census.ge/files/results/Census_release_ENG.pdf, accessed 24 November 2021.

[3] Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, ‘Living with Non-Recognition: State- and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-States’, Europe Asia Studies, 60(3) (May 2008), pp. 487–8.

[4] Russians made up 23 per cent of the population of North Ossetia, while Ossetians made up almost 63 per cent, according to the 2002 census. ‘4.2 National Composition for Regions of the Russia Federation’, https://web.archive.org/web/20211111074715/http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=87, accessed 24 November 2021.

[5] Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, ‘Living with Non-Recognition’, p. 492.

[6] Shaun Walker, ‘South Ossetia Looks North’, IISS Press Coverage, 26 July 2006; International Crisis Group, ‘Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia,’ Report No. 159, 26 November 2004, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/georgia-avoiding-war-south-ossetia, accessed 24 November 2021.

[7] Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, ‘Living with Non-Recognition’, p. 492 and ‘How the Rose Revolution Happened’, BBC News, 10 May 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4532539.stm, accessed 24 November 2021.

[8] Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, ‘Living with Non-Recognition’, pp. 503–4.

[9] Timothy L. Thomas, ‘The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22(1) (January 2009), p. 38.

[10] U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs, ‘U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ukraine Conduct Exercise in Georgia’, 26 August 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20161216184832/http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/20520/us-georgia-azerbaijan-armenia-ukraine-conduct, accessed 24 November 2021.

[11] ‘South Ossetia Says Georgia Plans Military Intervention This Month’, 6 August 2008, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/europa/caucasus/ossetia30.html, accessed 24 November 2021.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Peter Finn, ‘Russia Opens a New Front in Georgia’, Washington Post, 12 August 2008.

[14] ‘Bush to Russia: Reverse ‘Unacceptable’ Course in Georgia’, CNN, 11 August 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/11/us.georgia/index.html, accessed 24 November 2021.

[15] Nico Hines, ‘Russia Accused of Dropping Cluster Bombs on Georgian Civilians’, The Times, 15 August 2008.

[16] The occupation of Gori lasted until 22 August.

[17] John Markoff, ‘Georgia Takes a Beating in the Cyberwar with Russia’, New York Times, 11 August 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/georgia-takes-a-beating-in-the-cyberwar-with-russia/, accessed 24 November 2021; Noah Shachtman, ‘Estonia, Google Help “Cyberlocked” Georgia’, 11 August 2008, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/08/civilge-the-geo/, accessed 24 November 2021.

[18] ‘Background: Six-point Peace Plan for the Georgia-Russia Conflict’, Deutsche Presse Agentur, 15 August 2008, https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/background-six-point-peace-plan-georgia-russia-conflict, 24 November 2021.

[19] Svante Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, Policy Paper (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008), https://silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2008_08_PP_CornellPopjanevskiNillson_Russia-Georgia.pdf, accessed 24 November 2021.

[20] Ibid.

[21] ‘S Ossetia “War Crimes” Condemned’, BBC News, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7847285.stm, accessed 24 November 2021.

[22] Andrew Schneider, ‘Market Forces Will Limit Russian Expansionism’, Kiplinger, 3 September 2008.

[23] Brian Whitmore, ‘One Year After “Independence”, Abkhazia And South Ossetia in Legal Gray Zone’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 26 August 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Year_After_Independence_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia_In_Legal_Gray_Zone/1808101.html, accessed 24 November 2021.

[24] International Crisis Group, ‘George-Russia: Learn to Live like Neighbours’, Briefing No. 65, 8 August 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/georgia-russia-learn-live-neighbours, accessed 24 November 2021.

[25] Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Russia Warns of “Horrible” Conflict if Georgia Joins NATO’, AP, 7 August 2018, https://www.apnews.com/21036352495b4b4fa9802bd2d7c5ac86/Russia-warns-of-'horrible'-conflict-if-Georgia-joins-NATO, accessed 24 November 2021.

[26] ‘US Backs Georgia’s Nato Ambitions’, BBC News, 23 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8165617.stm; ‘OSCE Chairman Condemns Russia’s Recognition of South Ossetia, Abkhazia Independence’, 26 August 2008, https://www.osce.org/cio/50011, both accessed 24 November 2021; OSCE, ‘2009 Annual Security Review Conference: Chairperson’s Report’, 23 July 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20091219152355/http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2009/07/39016_en.pdf, accessed 24 November 2021.

[27] Mala Otarashvili, ‘Russia’s Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 20 February 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/02/russias-quiet-annexation-of-south-ossetia/, 24 November 2021.

[28] ‘EU Warning Over Russia “Land Grab” in South Ossetia Border Row’, BBC News, 16 July 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33549462, accessed 24 November 2021.

[29] This is indicated by their decision not to topple the Saakashvili government and occupy Georgia.