.png){kind=icon}
All Against All: The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is geographically one of the largest and, with approximately 90 million citizens, most populous countries in Africa. It also is one of the world’s most troubled states, consumed by a long-running, multi-faceted civil war, crippling socioeconomic problems, and poor governance. These difficulties have kept the resource-rich country unstable and abysmally poor for decades, and riots against and clashes with the government continue. Examining the ongoing strife in the DRC offers insight into the problems facing many states in the Global South in the twenty-first century.
In his 1994 essay ‘The Coming Anarchy’, American journalist Robert Kaplan warned that political unrest, environmental degradation, corrupt government, and other problems threatened to drag a growing number of countries into anarchic violence from which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to recover.[1] Arguably, events in Africa and elsewhere in the years since ‘The Coming Anarchy’ was first published have added credibility to Kaplan’s thesis. Moreover, problems in the Global South are relevant to the overall world security environment and the interests of the great powers. Although the great powers have done relatively little to address the Congo crisis, they have become involved in countries facing similar problems—the most famous example of this being the American involvement in Somalia in 1992–93 that ultimately resulted in the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident, a battle in the streets of Mogadishu (Somalia’s capital) in which 19 US troops were killed.[2]
Prelude to the Congo Wars
Congo became independent in 1960, having been for most of the preceding 100 years a colony, first as the personal property of King Leopold II of Belgium, and later (after 1908) as a colonial possession of the Belgian state. Congo was harshly exploited for its mineral wealth during the period in which Leopold controlled it. The brutality of the colonial regime during this time became a major scandal throughout Europe.[3] After 1908, the treatment of the Congolese population improved markedly, with efforts by the Belgian government to provide education, health care, and other basic services, but this did not prevent the rise of Congolese nationalism and increasing demands for independence. The call for autonomy was part of a broader trend in colonies throughout the world; independence movements had begun to gain energy after the First World War, becoming extraordinarily powerful by the end of the Second World War. Over the ensuing two decades, the Western European colonial empires collapsed.
The movement for Congolese nationalism was, however, complicated, largely because of the variety of ethnic groups in the vast territory. Some Congolese favoured a unified state, while others wanted the colony to be broken in smaller units. Further complicating matters, European settlers in Katanga allied with local Congolese who favoured independence for that province. As Congo moved towards independence, tensions increased between various factions, resulting in civil strife, declarations of independence by Katanga and another region, South Kasai, and the creation of two rival national governments in different cities. The most famous event of this disorderly period was the execution of Marxist former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who served in office for less than three months before being dismissed by his rival, President Joseph Kasavubu. Lumumba was arrested and transferred to Katanga, where he was killed by a firing squad. The murky events surrounding his death, and particularly the degree to which Belgium and the United States were involved, are still controversial. (In regard to the United States, it is clear that the CIA at one point intended to poison Lumumba,[4] but the evidence appears to indicate that there was no significant American involvement in the events that actually did lead to his death.) Also of note, in 1960 the United Nations dispatched thousands of peacekeeping—or, more accurately, peacemaking—personnel to Congo, one of the largest and most important UN operations of this kind (at one point nearly 20,000 UN troops were operating in the country).
Over the next half decade, Congo continued to experience rebellion and disorder, but avoided falling apart completely even after the withdrawal of UN troops in mid-1964. In 1965, General Mobutu overthrew his longtime ally Kasavubu and declared himself to be the country’s new president. Mobutu proceeded to create a relatively stable, although spectacularly corrupt, dictatorship;[5] he changed Congo’s name to Zaire in 1971.
The First Congo War
The complex background of the First Congo War is tied intimately to ethnic tension and violence in other African countries, particularly Rwanda.[6] In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a very great number—perhaps even more than a million—members of the Tutsi ethnic group were massacred by Hutus, the majority ethnic group in Rwanda. However, the genocide set off a chain of events that eventually led to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi-dominated group, controlling Rwanda. As a result, approximately two million Hutus, fearing reprisals (which in fact did occur in many places), fled Rwanda. Many of them took refuge in eastern Zaire. However, the refugees included a substantial number of individuals who had participated in, or even organized, the genocide. Over time, the refugee camps effectively came under the control of officials of the former Hutu-dominated government and army of Rwanda, and Hutu fighters used the camps as bases from which to launch raids into Rwanda. The ultimate intent of the Rwandan Hutu leaders was to regain control of Rwanda itself from the RPF. (Further complicating matters, the refugee camps of eastern Zaire also were home to many Hutus from Burundi, a country, like Rwanda, which had experienced enormous violence between the Tutsi and Hutu.)
By 1996, Hutus frequently were clashing with members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group, who resided in eastern Zaire but were related to the Tutsi (they chiefly are the descendants of Tutsis who migrated to Zaire). Rwanda’s government became very actively involved in the conflict between the Hutu and Banyamulenge, both for reasons of ethnic solidarity and because it wished to eliminate the Hutu threat to the RPF. (In addition, both Uganda and Burundi opposed Mobutu and became involved in the events of the First Congo War.) However, the Mobutu government had long quietly supported the use of Zairian territory for operations against Rwanda, backing Hutus against the Tutsis and Banyamulenge. Although it may appear confusing that the government of Zaire effectively would support Hutu foreigners who were fighting individuals residing on Zairian territory, this illustrates the complex character of ethnic rivalries in the conflict—in this case, ethnic affiliations and alliances were far more important to all the parties involved than was ‘citizenship’ in the usual sense. Indeed, many of the Banyamulenges arguably were not even Zairian citizens; as a group, their citizenship had been revoked in 1981.[7] In October 1996, a Zairian official in the province of South Kivu declared that all Banyamulenges would be required to leave. Although it appears that a rebellion was planned before this edict,[8] in any case large-scale fighting was soon ongoing. In late October and November, as the situation degenerated, terrified Hutus began to flee Zaire in great numbers, returning to Rwanda or Burundi despite their fear of mistreatment in those countries.[9]
The Banyamulenge fighters, now well-armed by Rwanda (which also raided Hutu refugee camps in Zaire and clashed with Zairian armed forces), joined with other anti-government forces in a coalition, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire (ADFZ), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. For decades, Kabila had led an unsuccessful rebellion against Mobutu. Indeed, for a time in 1965 Che Guevara had served with Kabila, but, unsuccessful in his guerrilla operations and deeply unimpressed with Kabila’s character and leadership, soon became disillusioned with the rebellion and left Zaire. However, Kabila now commanded an imposing force and—perhaps more importantly—Mobutu’s control of Zaire had eroded in recent years. Soon, Kabila’s force, which included personnel from the Rwandan Army, was marching across the broad expanse of the country to the capital, Kinshasa.
It is clear that the civilian population of Zaire suffered enormously during the war. As the Zairian regime crumbled, already weak government services collapsed and the country descended into chaos and violence. The Zairian Army proved completely ineffective against the rebels but committed enormous violence against the civilian population. The rebels were as bad, if not worse, on their march westward. Rape, torture, murder, looting, and other crimes clearly occurred on a massive scale, but the great majority of these acts were never documented. Partly, this was because of the minimal on-the-ground coverage by Western media—the situation in Zaire was so dangerous that it made frontline reporting extraordinarily hazardous even by the standards of war correspondents.
International efforts to broker a ceasefire were ineffectual, and neither the great powers nor the United Nations backed peace initiatives with credible threats to use force. Mobutu, gravely ill with cancer, spent much of the war in France, a fact which surely helped to undermine public confidence in his regime’s prospects. Even when he returned to Zaire, however, he proved unable to rally his forces, and in May 1997 Mobutu fled the country and Kabila took control of the capital. Kabila quickly renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Second Congo War
Although some international figures expressed hope that the Kabila government would bring peace and better government to the DRC, many longtime observers of the country were more cynical. The latter promptly were shown to be correct, as Kabila’s regime proved to be as corrupt and thuggish as its predecessor. Indeed, the war in eastern Congo did not even end—the Rwandan Army and the Banyamulenge continued to fight against Hutu militiamen. Foreign forces opposing the Hutu casually ignored Congolese territorial sovereignty, operating at will on DRC territory. Kabila’s government had become irreconcilably alienated from its former supporters in Rwanda and Uganda, and these two states began to back a new movement that emerged in August 1998, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD, after its French name, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie), which was dedicated to the overthrow of Kabila. A multi-sided civil and international war followed, with soldiers from Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda fighting alongside various Congolese factions to dethrone Kabila. A motley collection of allies—including many Hutus, a strange turn of events given the massacre of Hutus by Kabila’s Tutsi forces in the First Congo War—supported the Congolese dictator.
During the first weeks of the war, it appeared probable that Kabila would be overthrown quickly, as violence exploded throughout the country and rebel troops moved towards Kinshasa. However, a number of African leaders who felt, for varying reasons, that their interests were threatened rushed to assist Kabila; he received help from numerous states, including Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean and Angolan contribution of troops was particularly significant.[10]
As the war continued, the RCD began to experience considerable internal strife, with Uganda and Rwanda backing different factions within the organization. Relatedly, Uganda—which controlled much of the northern portion of the DRC—created a new province named Ituri, whose governor was to be a member of the Hema ethnic group. These actions concerned the Lendu, another ethnic group resident in Ituri with whom the Hema had many longstanding grievances. This tension resulted in the outbreak of a conflict in Ituri that was connected to the larger Congo War but still distinct.
In July 1999, six countries—Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, but the RCD did not accede to the Agreement. In any case, the Agreement did little to halt the ongoing warfare.[11] Moreover, the tensions between Rwanda and Uganda caused fighting to break out, on DRC soil, between the armies of the two countries. In November, the United Nations authorized the deployment of slightly over 5,500 peacekeeping troops, organized as the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, an acronym derived from its name in French). Nevertheless, military operations by various forces continued.
Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards in January 2001, apparently as part of an unsuccessful coup attempt; he was succeeded by his son, Joseph. In the first months in which the younger Kabila was in power, many hoped that a final settlement would be reached that would end the war, but this did not occur quickly. However, the RCD did seem to lose momentum, and some of its members even defected to the government. Several major accords were signed in 2002, including the Sun City Agreement in April, which set the structure for a new, democratic government for the DRC, and peace agreements between the DRC and Rwanda (in July) and the DRC and Uganda (in September). In December, the government and the various factions within Congo signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, which was intended to end the civil war. In July 2003, a transitional government, headed by Joseph Kabila, took power.
The Congo Wars in Perspective
As noted earlier, the Congo Wars demonstrate many of the characteristics which mark warfare in some of the world’s economically least developed and politically most troubled regions. In the least developed countries, government institutions tend to be very weak, and the state is unable successfully to maintain a monopoly on violence. This creates opportunities for ‘strategic entrepreneurs’, such as rebels and local warlords, as they can easily establish zones in which they, rather than the state, exercise effective control. On maps, the DRC is a clearly defined territorial entity, but throughout the time that it has been independent the central government has been unable to control the entire country. Relatedly, the DRC’s borders are porous and its population diverse; many ethnic conflicts are international in character because major groups such as the Tutsi and Hutu live in several countries. The genocide in Rwanda was an indirect catalyst for the Congo Wars, as its events ultimately resulted in the creation of massive Hutu refugee camps that were central to subsequent events in the DRC.
The Wars’ heavy toll on human life is also characteristic of warfare in the world’s most troubled states. The number of deaths in the First Congo War was very substantial, but the Second Congo War’s toll was far more appalling: it is likely that somewhere in the range of four million people were killed, but the figure could be far larger. Even the lower estimate marks the conflict as one of the costliest twentieth-century wars, particularly for the period after 1945. Moreover, the Congo Wars were fought with crude weapons: tanks, aircraft, artillery, and other heavy equipment played only a small role; most of the killing was done with rifles, machetes, and similar weaponry, or by illness or starvation. Indeed, the bulk of fatal casualties—most of whom were civilian—died from the hunger and disease that accompanied the conflicts.
Sadly, civilian suffering is common in conflicts such as the Congo Wars. War crimes occur in all conflicts, even when the forces involved are highly disciplined armies which undertake good faith efforts to prevent atrocities and punish them when they occur. In the Congo Wars, leaders in the various armies treated war crimes casually (and no doubt sometimes actively encouraged them). The result was both predictable and tragic—crimes against civilians, particularly rape and looting, occurred on a massive scale.[12] Most of these atrocities were not, and never will be, punished. Moreover, various parties in the Congo Wars looted the country’s very great resource wealth, with both government and rebel leaders taking advantage of the opportunity to pocket profits from diamond mining and other resource extraction activities.
The Second Congo War also was notable for the way in which it has been treated by the world’s most powerful states. Although various countries, including the United States, attempted to use their diplomatic resources to broker an end to the conflict, powerful countries never treated it as a key international crisis. Most major states did not commit their own troops to MONUC, nor did they seriously consider unilateral military action. This guarded attitude reflected a key reality: from the perspective of countries such as the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, the DRC and its region is strategically marginal. The war did not threaten the critical national interests of any of these states, so they had no major incentive to spend ‘diplomatic capital’, much less risk the lives of their own soldiers, to bring about its resolution.
Moreover, because international media coverage of the war was minimal, the major democratic countries did not experience what often is called the ‘CNN effect’, wherein media attention to a foreign crisis, and its attendant suffering, creates public pressure for leaders to resolve the situation. The small quantity of international coverage of the Congo Wars ensured that most citizens of the major democracies remained largely unaware of the conflict.
Conclusion: Unending Crisis
Although the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement formally ended the Second Congo War, violence continues in parts of the country, particularly in the east, where ethnic killing still occurs. The Ituri conflict remains active, although, for a time, an unstable peace (backed by the United Nations) was more or less maintained in that province. In late 2017–18, however, Hema-Lendu land disputes re-emerged, resulting in dozens of deaths and causing an estimated 350,000 people to flee, some across the border to Uganda.[13] The ethnic violence transitioned into Lendu militia attacks on the DRC military, and then became more ‘indiscriminate’.[14] The DRC government announced a ‘state of siege’ in Ituri and North Kivu provinces effective 6 May 2021, and repeatedly extended it throughout the remainder of 2021. Nevertheless, the security situation worsened: a report by the UN peacekeeping mission (renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, or MONUSCO, in 2010) to the UN Security Council indicated that factions of the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), a loose coalition of Lendu militia groups, had killed 96 civilians between 19 June 2021 and 6 September 2021.[15] A semi-yearly update further reported that between 15 March 2021 and 1 September 2021, 273 civilians had been killed and an estimated 249 civilians wounded in the course of 57 attacks in Ituri Province allegedly perpetrated by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan insurgent group with ties to North Kivu.[16] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that the number of internally displaced persons within Ituri province had reached 1.7 million.[17]
Other areas, such as the provinces of North and South Kivu, are also experiencing considerable conflict—and the simmering tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi—the catalyst for the First Congo War—certainly have not been resolved. The violence in the Kivu provinces has persisted despite efforts by the DRC government, its allies, and MONUC/MONUSCO to defeat the rebellion. A peace effort was made in 2008, but its slow implementation led to renewed fighting that the capture of the rebel leader Laurent Nkunda could halt only temporarily. Fighting died down through 2009 and 2010, but was rekindled in April 2012 with the mutiny of soldiers who had formerly been rebels, aided and abetted by Rwandan support. Despite the intervention of UN forces in 2013, violence resurged in 2015. UN officials reported that between 15 March 2021 and 1 September 2021, ADF fighters were alleged to have committed 76 attacks that killed more than 264 people, including 27 DRC troops and a UN peacekeeper. Other armed groups were blamed for further violence in both North and South Kivu.[18]
Meanwhile, conflict broke out in the once peaceful Kasai region in December 2016 after a traditional chief, Kamwina Nsapu, called on his followers to rise up against the state. Though Kamwina Nsapu was killed shortly thereafter, violence continued between his fighters (many of whom are child soldiers) and an alliance of government forces and the Bana Mura militia, with the UN asserting that both sides have participated in war crimes.[19] Ultimately, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 1.4 million people were internally displaced within the DRC and 35,000 fled to Angola. Beginning in August 2020, renewed violence between Luba and Kuba ethnic groups displaced tens of thousands of civilians.[20]
Although the size of MONUSCO stood at over 17,000 personnel in September 2021[21], there is little reason to be optimistic that genuine peace will come to the DRC at any time in the foreseeable future. In 2013, the UN authorized an intervention brigade to undertake targeted offensive operations against armed groups in the east, with the discretion to act without the Congolese national army if deemed necessary. It has been employed a number of times, including against the March 23 Movement around Goma during summer of 2013. MONUSCO continues to be stretched thin, as their resources are required wherever attacks seem likely to happen or have happened, as after the June 2014 fighting in South Kivu. In July 2017, MONUSCO announced the closure of five bases in North Kivu in order to maintain ‘flexibility and mobility’. That December, Islamist militants attacked another remote MONUSCO base in North Kivu, killing 15 peacekeepers and injuring dozens.[22] As of September 2021, MONUSCO reported 227 fatalities over the course of its mission.[23]
The long-term prospects for democracy in the DRC are dim, as it is among the most corrupt and economically troubled states in the world. The DRC held an internationally supervised national election in July 2006, but it was soon followed by a renewed outbreak of violence.[24] For many years, Joseph Kabila was bent on remaining in power. Legislation was passed by the lower house, but not the upper house, that would have kept him in office until a national census was conducted, which would have ensured that he remained in office past the scheduled 2016 elections, in which he was constitutionally prohibited from participating. However, major protests in 2015 forced the Congolese legislature to excise the provision keeping Kabila in power past the 2016 elections. Instead, elections were pushed off repeatedly and were eventually scheduled for 23 December 2018 (although later held on 30 December 2018). When Kabila’s second term expired in December 2016, he simply held on to power, and his government countered the resulting public protests with sometimes fatal results. As the 2018 elections neared, Kabila declared that he would not run again and threw his support behind his former interior minister, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary.[25] Ultimately, Shadary lost in a three-way election to Félix Tshisekedi, who was inaugurated as president in January 2019 after a failed court challenge by the third major candidate, Martin Fayulu, over allegations of massive electoral fraud.[26] As in similarly troubled states, it is difficult to imagine how immense systemic problems might realistically be resolved.
In 2021, the DRC was in crisis. The UN estimated that internal violence had displaced some 5.01 million people between October 2017 and September 2019, mainly in Kasai, Tanganyika, Ituri, and North and South Kivu provinces.[27] As of October 2021, 998,511 refugees and asylum seekers were living elsewhere in Africa.[28] Meanwhile, the violence and disruption were threatening civilians’ access to food on a massive scale: the World Food Programme estimated that approximately 27 million people—about 30 per cent of the population—were severely food insecure, including 3.4 million children who were ‘acutely malnourished’.[29] The DRC experienced three Ebola outbreaks between August 2018 and May 2021, the largest of which killed 2,299 people; containment was made more difficult by the dangers posed by local militias and the vast number of internally displaced people.[30] Thus, the stage was set for further internal instability and conflict.
Questions
1) Should the Democratic Republic of Congo be characterized as a ‘failed state’? If so, why? If not, why not?
2) Should the UN intervene militarily to end civil wars in deeply troubled countries such as the DRC?
3) How does the Second Congo War illustrate the problem of ethnic conflicts ‘spilling over’ borders?
4) Is the history of UN involvement in the DRC one of failure? If so, why? If not, why not?
5) Is it possible for international aid donors to encourage effective long-term reform of the government of the DRC? If so, how? If not, why not?
Websites
https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/
https://monusco.unmissions.org/en
https://allafrica.com/congo_kinshasa/
http://www.globalissues.org/article/87/the-democratic-republic-of-congo
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1076399.stm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/congo
[1] See Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War World (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), pp. 3–58.
[2] See Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Signet, 2001).
[3] See Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: Mariner, 1999).
[4] Madeline G. Kalb, ‘The CIA and Lumumba’, New York Times, 2 August 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/08/02/magazine/the-cia-and-lumumba.html, accessed 26 November 2021.
[5] See Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobuto’s Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
[6] The history of the Congo Wars is described in Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford, 2008).
[7] Associated Press, ‘Zaire Fights Displaced Tutsi Suspected of Attacks’, New York Times, 11 October 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/11/world/zaire-fights-displaced-tutsi-suspected-of-attacks.html, accessed 26 November 2021.
[8] Kevin C. Dunn, ‘A Survival Guide to Kinshasa’, in John F. Clark, ed., The African Stakes of the Congo War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 56.
[9] See James C. McKinley, Jr, ‘Refugees are Caught in Central African Crossfire’, New York Times, 31 October 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/31/world/refugees-are-caught-in-central-african-crossfire.html, accessed 26 November 2021.
[10] On the role of Angola and Zimbabwe in particular, see, respectively, Thomas Turner, ‘Angola’s Role in the Congo War’ and Martin R. Rupiya, ‘A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe’s Involvement in the Second Congo War’, in Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo War, pp. 75–92 and pp. 93–105.
[11] See Ian Fisher, ‘Shaky Congo Peace Grows More So’, New York Times, 12 November 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/12/world/shaky-congo-peace-pact-grows-more-so.html, accessed 26 November 2021.
[12] For a description of civilian suffering because of the warfare, see Bryan Mealer, All Things Must Fight to Live: Stories of War and Deliverance in Congo (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008).
[13] ‘UN Warns Situation in DR Congo Reaching “Breaking Point”’, Deutsche Welle, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/un-warns-situation-in-dr-congo-reaching-breaking-point/a-42808193 and UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Team Hears Accounts of Barbaric Violence in Eastern Congo’s Ituri Region’, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2018/7/5b485e2a4/unhcr-team-hears-accounts-barbaric-violence-eastern-congos-ituri-region.html, both accessed 26 November 2021.
[14] International Crisis Group, ‘DR Congo: Ending the Cycle of Violence in Ituri’, Report No. 292/Africa, 15 July 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/292-republique-democratique-du-congo-en-finir-avec-la-violence-cyclique-en-ituri, accessed 26 November 2021.
[15] ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General’ [English], United Nations Security Council, S/2021/807, 17 September 2021, pp. 2–3, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3941889?ln=en, accessed 26 November 2021.
[16] ‘Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region: Report of the Secretary-General’ [English], United Nations Security Council, S/2021/836, 30 September 2021, pp. 2–3, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3943097?ln=en, accessed 26 November 2021.
[17] ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2021), p. 3.
[18] Ibid., pp. 4–5; ‘Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region’ (2021), p. 3.
[19] ‘DR Congo’s Kasai Crisis: War Crimes Committed By Both Sides’, BBC News, 26 June 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44613147, accessed 26 November 2021.
[20] UNHCR, ‘Violent Attacks Displace Thousands in DR Congo’s Kasai Region’, 16 April 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2021/4/607941e04/violent-attacks-displace-thousands-dr-congos-kasai-region.html, accessed 26 November 2021.
[21] United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘MONUSCO Fact Sheet’, September 2021, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco, accessed 26 November 2021.
[22] Jason Burke, ‘Islamist Attack Kills at Least 15 UN Peacekeepers and Five Soldiers in DRC’, The Guardian, 8 December 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/08/peacekeepers-killed-in-attack-on-un-base-in-dr-congo, accessed 26 November 2021.
[23] United Nations Peacekeeping (2021).
[24] See Jeffrey Gettleman and Anjan Sundaram, ‘UN Brokers Ceasefire as Congo Vote Turns Violent’, New York Times, 23 August 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/23/world/africa/un-brokers-ceasefire-as-congo-vote-turns-violent.html, accessed 26 November 2021.
[25] ‘The President Calls it Quits: Joseph Kabila Says He Will Not Run Again in Congo’, The Economist, 9 August 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/08/09/joseph-kabila-says-he-will-not-run-again-in-congo, accessed 26 November 2021.
[26] ‘Historic Day as Tshisekedi is Sworn in as DR Congo President’, BBC News, 24 January 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46987439, accessed 27 November 2021.
[27] UNHCR, ‘DR Congo Emergency’, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/dr-congo-emergency.html, accessed 27 November 2021.
[28] UNHCR, ‘Operational Data Portal: Refugee Situations: DRC Situation’, 31 October 2021, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc, accessed 27 November 2021.
[29] World Food Programme, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, https://www.wfp.org/countries/democratic-republic-congo, accessed 27 November 2021.
[30] United Nations, ‘Latest Deadly Ebola Virus Outbreak in DR Congo Declared Over’, UN News, 3 May 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091162, accessed 27 November 2021.