Case study: Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a long and troubled history. The country is a crossroads between southeast Europe, northwest Asia, and the Middle East. Afghanistan is bordered by Iran to its west, Pakistan to its south and east, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China to its north. For centuries Afghanistan has been a vital trade route and a geostrategic buffer state between East and West. It possesses only limited economic and military resources and it suffers from endemic political instability: factionalism, lawlessness, and warlordism are commonplace.

            Since the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, this political instability has been a cause of domestic unrest with widespread protests and rioting, much of it directed against poor living conditions. Although social conditions changed in the two decades following the US invasion (including, prior to the reinstatement of the Taliban government in 2021, a movement towards religious tolerance and the emancipation of women), most of the population continues to live in poverty. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 were a distant event to the vast majority of the Afghan population. That would change because the Taliban government of Afghanistan was harbouring and nurturing Osama bin Laden and other members of al-Qaeda who took responsibility for the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

            The Taliban, a group of Sunni Islamic fundamentalists, had been in power in Afghanistan from 1996 until the US-led invasion in 2001. They were only recognized as legitimate by three states. Their devotion to a strict interpretation of Sharia law did much to impede any wider recognition, even from other Islamic states. Western intelligence agencies long suspected that Afghanistan, and northwest Pakistan, were training grounds for terrorists who were committed to a jihad against the West, particularly the United States.

The US-led Invasion

The United States moved swiftly after 11 September 2001 to curtail the threat posed by the Taliban and their al-Qaeda guests. President George W. Bush stated to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.’[1] This was a key aspect of what would become known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’. The same day, a five-point list of demands was delivered to the Taliban:

  1. Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land.
  2. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned.
  3. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.
  4. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities.
  5. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.[2]

The Taliban failed to respond constructively to these demands. Instead, they banked on a Western unwillingness to become involved in a land attack against Afghanistan. They apparently believed that the dismal Soviet experience following Moscow’s 1979 intervention in support of the communist regime in Kabul would serve as a deterrent to a US invasion.

            A US-led coalition of forces began the invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Termed ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ by the Bush administration, the coalition benefited from the participation of a large number of partner nations, with the United Kingdom the most prominent partner in the coalition. Enduring Freedom began with the deployment of a relatively small number of US and UK Special Forces to Afghanistan. They were tasked with overthrowing the Taliban regime with assistance from the Afghan Northern Alliance, a disparate grouping of anti-Taliban factions who controlled the north of the country. The elite character of Special Forces meant they could act as a ‘force multiplier’, which meant that only a relatively small number of coalition troops were required to bolster the capabilities of the Northern Alliance. Soon after coalition Special Forces units arrived, an aerial bombing campaign began. This initially concentrated upon the Taliban-controlled cities of Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad.

            Coalition air strikes were combined with the aerial delivery of humanitarian supplies. The bombing campaign used virtually all of the conventional capabilities possessed by American air power. Cruise missiles were used to strike fixed military sites, while precision-guided munitions were used to attack al-Qaeda and Taliban forces whenever they assembled for an attack. There were no reported US losses during the bombing campaign. Many al-Qaeda training camps were obliterated along with the Taliban’s centres of command, control, and communications. Even with precision-guided munitions, however, reports emerged of ‘collateral damage’. By January 2002, civilian deaths in Afghanistan probably exceeded the number of people killed in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon.[3]

            By mid-November 2001, the cities controlled by the Taliban had fallen and US-led coalition forces began concentrating their efforts on the Tora Bora Mountains to the east of Kabul. It was here that Osama bin Laden was previously thought to have based his centre of operations amidst a Taliban stronghold. Tora Bora contains a vast number of cave networks, dating back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Bin Laden ‘went to ground’, so to speak, making it difficult for the coalition’s reconnaissance capabilities to acquire real-time targets. The effectiveness of the coalition’s air power-based strategy was diminishing as the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies adjusted to NATO’s precision-guided onslaught. Al-Qaeda forces were consistently more effective in avoiding NATO airpower than the Taliban were.[4]

            Through a UN Security Council mandate, NATO also gained authorization to fight this counterinsurgency campaign with an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with responsibility for humanitarian assistance and rebuilding civilian infrastructure. The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 called for the establishment of an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA). This was to be comprised of 30 members, headed by a chairman. The Bonn Agreement also called for a six-month mandate followed by a two-year Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) that was to organize elections. United Nations Security Resolution 1386, adopted that same month, promoted nation-building through the establishment of ISAF and the implementation of the rule of law and rights for women.[5]

            Given the tight timescale in which Operation Enduring Freedom was put together, there was little time available to decide on clear entry and exit strategies. As a result, the United States and its coalition partners were always likely to be storing up future problems. Some observers have also wondered whether the occupation of Afghanistan was really founded upon jus ad bellum (the conditions under which a state can morally justify the decision to resort to war according to the ‘Just War’ tradition). As Paul Wolfowitz, the then-US Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated in November 2001:

  • In fact, one of the lessons of Afghanistan’s history, which we’ve tried to apply in this campaign, is if you're a foreigner, try not to go in. If you go in, don’t stay too long, because they don't tend to like any foreigners who stay too long.[6]

Initially, there was support for ISAF but enthusiasm for the endeavour waned. Foreign troops deployed to Afghanistan were increasingly viewed as forces of occupation.

The Karzai Government and the Occupation 2002–04

In December 2001, Hamid Karzai, a pro-Western politician, became the head of a new Afghan government. He held this position as head of the transitional administration until the presidential elections of October 2004. The Karzai government, however, had little control outside of the capital because the Taliban and a large number of disparate warlords still held great influence over large sections of the countryside. The region’s warlords operated largely without any rule of law. In October 2003, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1510, which provided a mandate for ISAF to move into the provinces and to begin a process of state rebuilding. ISAF’s mission emphasized ‘the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of all armed factions, and of security sector reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan National Army and Police’.[7]

            The United States was initially at the forefront of ISAF, with other coalition states taking responsibility for the operations at six-month intervals until NATO assumed full command in August 2003. As Mark Sedra noted in March 2003, there had been 400 rocket attacks in the previous ten months, a number of terrorist attacks, factional clashes, the assassination of a Cabinet member of the AIA, and the attempted assassination of Hamid Karzai. In a revealing examination of nation-building in Afghanistan he goes on to explain:

  • Efforts to strengthen the national government, build effective security forces and stimulate economic development have failed to stem the tide of insecurity. In particular, programs to rebuild a national army and police force have been slow and ineffective. As of March, only 1,700 troops had graduated from the US-supported army training program and the bulk of the country’s 50,000 police officers remain untrained and loyal to regional warlords rather than the central government.

    Unable to enforce its writ outside the capital, the ATA has had to rely on the good will of warlords and the strength of coalition military forces to maintain a semblance of legitimacy and control. Unfortunately, personal ambition rather than largesse has driven the actions of the warlords and the military strategy adopted by coalition forces has been motivated more by short-term military expediency in the ongoing war on terror than the long-term interests of Afghan security and stability.[8]

            By 2003 the Taliban began to regroup, operating out of the ‘lawless’ border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially around the Khyber Pass and into the North-West Frontier, where they began conducting a renewed jihad against what they perceived to be forces of occupation. In the run-up to the 2004 election, violence intensified. The Afghan army, which numbered only 13,700 of a planned 70,000, was caught off guard by this increase in violence.

            The election of Karzai, often derided merely as the ‘Mayor of Kabul’, did not make any immediate difference to day-to-day life. Violence continued with many suicide attacks, widespread riots, and demonstrations, much of it directed against the United States and President Bush. Similarly, during the campaign for the September 2005 parliamentary elections, which were intended to dilute the hold of the warlords and instil greater political accountability, violence increased.

ISAF and the Search for Stability 2005–14

ISAF’s remit gradually extended throughout Afghanistan. It became engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. By 2006, ISAF took command of 25 Provisional Reconstruction Teams that included 30,000 soldiers. ISAF’s increasing presence indicated that despite initial attempts at pacifying the country and embedding democracy and democratic institutions, large numbers of ground forces were essential to quell the violence and lawlessness before nation-building could take root.

            Western money and forces continued to flow into Afghanistan during 2007. These forces rebuilt infrastructure and helped to recruit, train, and retain the civil servants, especially police and army personnel. Despite these efforts, violence continued. Offensive actions against a growing Taliban insurgency killed a number of civilians. The upper house of the Afghan parliament called for an end to ISAF operations against the Taliban so that they could explore diplomatic alternatives to military action. During 2008, coalition forces suffered the greatest number of casualties since the 2001 invasion.

            By 2009 reconstruction was hampered by the need to tackle militants. US President Barack Obama promised in early 2009 to deploy an additional 21,000 US troops to tackle these ongoing problems in a new ‘surge’ to ‘stabilize a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has not received the strategic attention, direction and resources it urgently requires’.[9] In October 2009, it was reported that a further 13,000 troops were being deployed, which would bring the total number to 68,000 (more than twice as many as when the Bush Administration left office).[10] As General Stanley McChrystal, the US Commander of ISAF, warned in a report submitted to the US Department of Defense, without these increases the operation ‘will likely result in failure’.[11] The UK also considered increasing its troop deployments to Afghanistan as did other NATO members.[12]

            ISAF concluded combat operations in 2014, but this was a deadline imposed from without by national and coalition politics rather than an indication of success. This stands in direct contrast to Paul Wolfowitz’s view of short-term engagement and illustrates the problems of achieving lasting political success in a country all too used to resisting foreign occupation. The counterinsurgency campaign was supported by the democratically elected government of Hamid Karzai, succeeded in September 2014 by Ashraf Ghani, and the Afghan armed forces, which had only grown over the course of the war, although the methods they employed received periodic criticism. Coalition forces had to deal with counterinsurgency operations under difficult conditions in a country that shares few Western values. This made the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ difficult if not impossible to win. The recurrent incidents of Afghan soldiers or police turning and firing on ISAF soldiers indicate the difficulties involved not just in countering the insurgency, but also in expanding the Afghan security forces and spreading Western values. The West was also chronically stuck in a persisting dilemma between requiring the support of local warlords, and trying to circumscribe their power to allow the elected Karzai government actually to govern Afghanistan.

            The experiences of coalition troops also raised doubts about the political and strategic direction of the military campaign.[13] Some commentators believed that when McChrystal was relieved of his command position in 2010, he was not attempting to usurp policy and strategy, but instead was hoping to instigate the creation of proper policy and strategy.[14] The low-intensity conflict meant that there were no decisive battles but only sporadic, although intense, close combat ground engagements (sometimes combined with air strikes). The pattern of asymmetric warfare conducted against coalition forces was hardly surprising given the relatively weak military force deployed by the insurgents. This pattern of irregular warfare worked against the Soviets between 1979 and 1989 and during the subsequent civil war (1996–2001). It was suited to the geography and terrain of the region with its mountains and cave networks. It also aggravated any potential lack of policy and strategy in the intervening countries.

            Throughout the war, coalition forces also needed to improve their ability to distinguish insurgents from civilians while protecting their soldiers from friendly fire in what were hostile, fluid, and time-critical environments. Technology and real-time intelligence could only play a limited role in winning this kind of irregular conflict. Nevertheless, coalition forces did not suffer widespread casualties, although the grim milestone of 2,000 American dead was passed in September 2012.

            At ISAF’s height there were more than 90,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan supplied by 50 nations, the majority of which were under NATO command. However, during his command McChrystal also stated that NATO forces were ‘poorly configured’ for counterinsurgency and ‘inexperienced in local languages and culture’. In addition, he warned that the Afghan government demonstrates ‘weakness of [its] state institutions’ combined with the ‘malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF’s own errors’.[15] This was not likely to have been helped by the ongoing controversy surrounding the re-election of Hamid Karzai in August 2009.[16]

            Given the geographic scope of the conflict, even the increased numbers deployed during the surge proved inadequate. When necessary, insurgents had fled across the border into the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier provinces of Pakistan, particularly North Waziristan and South Waziristan. When NATO-led forces pursued them, this sometimes led to engagements with Pakistani troops, inciting adverse political reactions from America’s regional ally in the war against al-Qaeda. These US-led incursions into Pakistan were a considerable and persistent source of friction between Washington and Islamabad, which occasionally rebounded negatively on ISAF logistical arrangements, much of which flowed through the port of Karachi. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan itself also tended to destabilize all of South Asia. Although diplomatic pressure was placed on Pakistan to deal with cross-border militancy, Islamabad’s ability to counter the insurgents remained limited throughout the conflict, although in later years Pakistani efforts benefited from an increased military presence.

            There were also problems with conducting out-of-area operations, particularly in such a distant theatre. There had been a capabilities gap between those in situ and those that were required or called for by ground troops for military operations. With the need to train and equip the fledgling Afghan National Army, there was an increasing need to fill this capabilities gap if Afghanistan was to be pacified. This led to giving operational responsibilities to Afghan troops perhaps before they were ready to undertake them.

            The opium-producing fields of Afghanistan were still awash with poppies destined to be processed into heroin for consumption in Europe and North America and the region remained unstable. Nevertheless, there were some notable successes. One of the stated objectives for the invasion was to capture or kill Osama bin Laden; this was finally accomplished in May 2011 when a Navy SEAL team infiltrated Abbottabad, Pakistan, and killed him. The Taliban were removed swiftly from power and a democratic government put in place in a country with little experience of democracy, although the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index consistently labelled it an authoritarian regime.[17] The region was no longer a safe haven for terrorists, who appeared particularly vulnerable to strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles, although significant counterinsurgency operations were still ongoing. Despite the relative lack of success, Western forces withdrew all combat troops by the end of 2014, although reconstruction and development assistance, as well as monies to cover training, equipment, and other security costs, were pledged through 2015. Many contributors had already begun withdrawing large contingents of troops by 2012, including Belgium, Norway, and Spain. Canada also withdrew all combat troops and transitioned to a training role at that time. The Afghan National Army took over the relevant sectors as Western forces departed. In their first year of truly independent operational responsibility, the Afghan security forces performed reasonably well and certainly better than their similarly Western-trained counterparts in Iraq.

Resolute Support Mission (2015–21) and Taliban Resiliency

As NATO prepared to end ISAF in 2014, both Afghan and international officials worried that insurgents might claw back hard-won gains in Afghanistan. These concerns were particularly acute for US officials, who were keenly attuned to the successful Islamic State (IS) campaigns in Iraq. To avoid a vacuum, NATO established the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) on 1 January 2015 to replace ISAF and support the Afghan national security forces. RSM operated on a ‘hub and spokes’ model, with a hub in Kabul/Bagram and one spoke in each of the four cardinal directions (at Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman). After the Afghan government launched its four-year security roadmap in 2017, RSM provided training and advice to advance the roadmap’s key objectives: ‘leadership development, fighting capabilities (with an emphasis on the Afghan special operations forces and the air force), unity of command and fighting corruption.’[18] By September 2018, RSM troops numbered approximately 16,200, and were drawn from 39 states; of these, the largest contributing states were the United States, Germany, Italy, Georgia, Romania, the UK, and Turkey.[19]

            Concerns about a Taliban resurgence were not unfounded. Beginning in 2015, the Taliban seized control of parts of Helmand Province. The loss of Sangin district was especially troubling for the UK, as nearly a quarter of British troops killed during the UK’s combat mission died defending it.[20] Taliban attacks occurred in other parts of Afghanistan as well, including Kunduz, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Uruzgan provinces. Meanwhile, the Afghan government also faced threats from IS-affiliated militants operating near the Pakistani border. US officials have alleged that Russia and Iran used the arrival of these militants as an excuse to provide assistance to the Taliban.[21] The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan’s 30 July 2018 report to Congress found that 13.8 per cent of districts in Afghanistan were under insurgent control or influence, with approximately twice as many contested, although at the time US officials were not concerned that insurgents would successfully overthrow the Afghan government.[22] To respond to the rising insurgent threat, in August 2017 US President Donald Trump decided to supplement continued airstrikes and the work of US military advisers on the ground with the deployment of several thousand more troops to support RSM. By late 2017, there were an estimated 15,000 US troops deployed in Afghanistan, including both those assigned to RSM and those fighting IS-linked groups under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.[23]

            Over the course of 2018–20, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad engaged in nine rounds of negotiations with representatives from the Taliban, the Afghan government, the governments of neighbouring and regional states, and international organizations over terms for finally ending US military involvement in Afghanistan.[24] The peace talks occurred during a time of considerable violence; in 2019, US military aircraft released the largest number of bombs and missiles—7,423—since recordkeeping began in 2006. Meanwhile, the Taliban and other groups instigated 8,204 attacks during the final three months of 2019, with over a third resulting in casualties.[25] On 29 February 2020, the United States and the Taliban announced an ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’. Under the agreement, the two sides announced that the United States would reduce its forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 troops within 135 days, and promised the withdrawal of all remaining US, allied, and Coalition forces by 1 May 2021. In return, the Taliban promised that it would not harbour groups seeking to attack the United States or its allies and agreed to begin negotiations with the Afghan government.[26] In November 2021, shortly after Joe Biden was elected as the next US President, the outgoing Trump administration announced a further reduction of US troops in Afghanistan to 2,500 by 15 January 2021.[27]

            On 14 April 2021, US President Joe Biden announced his intention to continue the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, now scheduled to begin on 1 May 2021 and end by 11 September 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. In his remarks, Biden asserted, ‘It is time to end America’s longest war….We cannot continue the cycle of extending or expanding our military presence in Afghanistan hoping to create the ideal conditions for our withdrawal, expecting a different result’.[28] ‘Recognising that there is no military solution to the challenges Afghanistan faces’, NATO likewise announced that it would begin the drawdown of RSM forces by 1 May 2021 (the mission was formally terminated in September 2021).[29]

 

            The following months brought steady progress in Taliban control over Afghanistan. In early May, Afghan forces faced heavy fighting in southern Helmand province, as well as at least six other provinces. By early June, fighting had spread to three-quarters of Afghan provinces, and by late June the Taliban had successfully gained control of 50 of the country’s 370 districts.[30] On 2 July, the United States withdrew from Bagram Air Base, without notifying their Afghan counterparts.[31] Meanwhile, the Taliban’s successful military campaign continued, despite public assurances by President Biden that Taliban control of Afghanistan was not ‘inevitable’.[32] By late July, the Taliban controlled approximately half of the districts in Afghanistan and soon began to seize provincial capitals. The Taliban took control of Kandahar, in the south, on 13 August, Mazar-i-Sharif, in the north, on 14 August, and Jalalabad, in the east, on 15 August.[33] On 15 August, as Taliban fighters took control of Kabul, the United States evacuated its diplomats from the US embassy to the airport by helicopter.[34] With the Taliban controlling access to Kabul International Airport as well as border crossings, dramatic scenes played out as thousands of desperate Afghans tried to gain entry to the airport before evacuation flights ceased. A terrorist attack on the crowds by Islamic State-Khorasan Province on 26 August, forewarned of hours earlier by the United States, took the lives of at least 60 Afghans and 13 US troops.[35] The final US troops departed Afghanistan late on the night of 29 August, leaving Afghanistan in the hands of the Taliban.[36]

           

Conclusion

In the wake of 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration was under pressure to move quickly and decisively to respond to the al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan was proof to their domestic constituency, the international community, and to terrorists that the United States was prepared to act decisively with force to protect its national security. The Taliban were toppled swiftly, but with little time to prepare a clear entry and exit strategy for coalition forces. Despite years of foreign military intervention, the country remained unstable, and lawlessness and warlordism still played a considerable part in Afghan society.

Although the fall of the Taliban was widely welcomed by most Afghans, the extended occupation of the country by IASF was resented. Civilian casualties caused by air strikes and counterinsurgency operations also bred understandable resentment and domestic reconstruction was slow in coming despite significant foreign investment. Furthermore, the solution to the problems in post-intervention Afghanistan was perhaps not located in simply pouring more aid and troops into the country. Rory Stewart, a former British soldier and diplomat, argued during the intervention:

  • [A] troop increase is likely to inflame Afghan nationalism because Afghans are more anti-foreign than we acknowledge and the support for our presence in the insurgency areas is declining. The Taliban, which was a largely discredited and backward movement, gains support by portraying itself as fighting for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign military occupation.[37]

This demonstrates the limits of using military means to achieve political ends (in this case, stability) and shows that getting Afghans to buy into the Western model of domestic reconstruction and nation-building required the international community to address more fundamental issues.[38] Given the social and cultural problems ISAF faced in implementing this agenda, there was no obvious exit strategy for coalition forces beyond the arbitrary deadline which had been set by domestic Western politics.

As Helene Cooper of the New York Times suggests:

  • Afghanistan has, after all, stymied would-be conquerors since Alexander the Great. It’s always the same story; the invaders—British, Soviets—control the cities, but not the countryside. And eventually, the invaders don’t even control the cities, and are sent packing.[39]

If the trajectory of Afghanistan’s past is a guide to its future, it will be hard to circumvent its return to non-Western values. With instability in Pakistan and the Taliban victory in 2021, it is possible that Afghanistan will become a ‘failed state’ despite significant foreign investment.

Questions

  1. What were the salient obstacles to ISAF success during the intervention in Afghanistan? How did they change over time (if they did) and could they have been solved through military means?
  2. How did the definite commitment to a 2014 deadline for withdrawal affect the conduct of war and Taliban strategy?
  3. How did the objectives of ISAF differ from those of RSM?
  4. Did the West take enough account of the non-Western values of Afghanistan during its prolonged intervention?
  5. Given the Taliban victory in 2021, how successful was the intervention in Afghanistan? What constitutes ‘success’? How can one measure whether these outcomes were achieved?

Websites

http://www.areu.org.af/?Lang=en-US
http://carnegieendowment.org/regions/235

https://www.brookings.edu/topic/afghanistan/

https://www.cfr.org/asia/afghanistan

https://www.rand.org/topics/afghanistan.html

[1] George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 20 September 2001, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

[2] Ibid.

[3] ‘Afghanistan’s Civilian Deaths Mount’, BBC News, 3 January 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1740538.stm, accessed 26 November 2021.

[4] Stephen D. Biddle. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

[5] UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1386 (2001)’, 20 December 2001, S/RES/1386 (2001), http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf, accessed 26 November 2021.

[6] Paul Wolfowitz, on CBS TV, ‘Face the Nation’, 18 November 2001, quoted in Adam Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival, 51(1) (February–March 2009), p. 29.

[7] UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1510 (2003)’, 13 October 2003, S/RES/1510 (2003), http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf, accessed 26 November 2021.

[8] Mark Sedra, ‘The Day After: Lessons from Afghanistan’, 27 March 2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20151019100654/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EC27Ak02.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

[9] Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Statement by the President on Afghanistan’, 17 February 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-afghanistan, accessed 26 November 2021.

[10] Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Number of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Overlooks Thousands of Support Troops’, Washington Post, 13 October 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/12/AR2009101203142.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

[11] Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure’, New York Times, 20 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/world/asia/21afghan.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

[12] ‘UK Considers Afghan Troops Boost’, BBC News, 1 October 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8283989.stm and David Brunnstrom, ‘NATO Mulls Troop Increase in Afghanistan’, Reuters, 15 October 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE59E1IF20091015, both accessed 26 November 2021.

[13] Discussions with the previous author at a lecture given to the Defence Studies Course, Chilworth Manor, University of Southampton, 10–11 March 2009.

[14] See, for example, Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War’, Survival, 52(5) (September 2010), pp. 157–82.

[15] Schmitt and Shanker (2009).

[16] ‘Karzai Questions Vote Fraud Panel’, BBC News, 13 October 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8304592.stm, accessed 27 November 2021.

[17] Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index’, https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/, accessed 26 November 2021.

[18] NATO, ‘Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures’, September 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_2018-09-RSM-Placemat.pdf, accessed 26 November 2021.

[19] Ibid.

[20] ‘Afghan Taliban Capture Crucial Town of Sangin’, BBC, 23 March 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39365330, accessed 26 November 2021.

[21] Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service Report, 13 December 2017.

[22] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), ‘Quarterly Report to the United States Congress’, 30 July 2018, pp. 67–8, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-07-30qr.pdf, accessed 26 November 2021.

[23] Ibid, p. 29.

[24] Center for Preventive Action, ‘What to Know About the Afghan Peace Negotiations’, 11 September 2020, https://www.cfr.org/article/what-know-about-afghan-peace-negotiations, accessed 26 November 2021.

[25] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘Taliban’s Continued Attacks Show Limits of U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan’, 2 February 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/world/asia/afghanistan-violence-taliban.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

[26] US Department of State, ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’, 29 February 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf, accessed 26 November 2021.

[27] US Department of Defense, ‘Acting Secretary Miller Announcement on Afghanistan and Iraq Troop Levels’, 17 November 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2418226/acting-secretary-miller-announcement-on-afghanistan-and-iraq-troop-levels/, accessed 26 November 2021.

[28] Joe Biden, quoted in Aamer Madhani and Matthew Lee, ‘Watch: Biden to Pull Troops from Afghanistan, End Longest War’, PBS News Hour, 14 April 2021, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-biden-speaks-about-pulling-troops-out-of-afghanistan, accessed 26 November 2021.

[29] NATO, ‘Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015–2021)’, 13 September 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm, accessed 26 November 2021.

[30] ‘Timeline: The Taliban’s Rapid Advance Across Afghanistan’, Reuters, 15 August 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/timeline-talibans-rapid-advance-across-afghanistan-2021-08-15/, accessed 26 November 2021.

[31] Kathy Gannon, ‘US Left Afghan Airfield at Night, Didn’t Tell New Commander’, AP, 6 July 2021, https://apnews.com/article/bagram-afghanistan-airfield-us-troops-f3614828364f567593251aaaa167e623, accessed 26 November 2021.

[32] The White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan’, 8 July 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/, accessed 26 November 2021.

[33] ‘Timeline’ (2021).

[34] ‘Taliban Enter Afghan capital as US Diplomats Evacuate by Chopper’, Reuters, 15 August 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-troops-arrive-afghan-capital-assist-evacuations-2021-08-14/, 26 November 2021.

[35] Sayed Ziarmal Hashemi, Rahim Faiez, Lolita C. Baldor, and Joseph Krauss, ‘Kabul Airport Attack Kills 60 Afghans, 13 US Troops’, AP, 26 August 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-france-evacuations-kabul-9e457201e5bbe75a4eb1901fedeee7a1, accessed 26 November 2021.

[36] Adam Nossiter and Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. War in Afghanistan Ends as Final Evacuation Flights Depart’, 30 August 2021 (updated 5 October 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/world/asia/afghanistan-us-occupation-ends.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

[37] Quoted in Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, p. 45.

[38] See, for example, Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009), particularly pp. 227–51.

[39] Helene Cooper, ‘Fearing Another Quagmire in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 24 January 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/weekinreview/25cooper.html, accessed 26 November 2021.

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