Vitrano responds to the accounts of meaningful lives offered by Taylor and Wolf, arguing that each is partially but not entirely satisfactory. First, she discusses Wolf’s notion of objective value. Wolf assumes some degree of shared intuitions about the worth of various activities, but this is unjustified. Some people may find training for a marathon valuable and fulfilling, while others may find it wearisome and pointless. Because the objective value requirement is problematic, we could drop it, adopting Taylor’s theory that one’s life is meaningful if you find it satisfying in the long run.
But, Vitrano asks, why call such a life meaningful instead of simply enjoyable, pleasant, or happy? After all, a life lived without any concern for the interests of others is devoid of moral value and, she argues, is therefore unworthy of being considered sufficiently meaningful. She concludes that a meaningful life is one lived morally while achieving happiness. To avoid an arbitrary elitism about what constitutes happiness, Vitrano suggests we allow individuals to define for themselves the vision of fulfillment or satisfaction they prefer.