In “Reparations and the Problem of Agency,” Chandran Kukathas claims that making reparations for past wrongs is only defensible if two conditions are met. The first condition is that we must be able to identify the agent who is entitled to compensation for the injustice committed. The second condition is that we must be able to identify the agent who is liable to pay the cost of restitution. Because of the difficulty of meeting these two conditions, Kukathas argues that making reparations is, except in special cases, morally unjustified.
Kukathas discusses several reasons why the first condition is difficult to satisfy. For one, Kukathas claims that it is easy to reach a point at which too many individuals can identify as the descendant of a victim of past injustice. And if we focus on groups rather than individuals, the problem of mixed histories—where groups have been both victims and perpetuators of past injustice—becomes a complicating factor, as does the problem of determining group membership, given that many people are of mixed descent. Kukathas also discusses several reasons why the second condition is difficult to satisfy. For example, Kukathas claims it is often difficult to determine who was responsible for past injustices in the first place given the large number of different parties across many different countries that were involved. And even if we could identify those who were responsible, holding their descendants liable for making reparation is problematic due to intermarriage and the complex mixture of inheritances that constitutes people’s identities.