Huemer observes that, despite the severely negative impact of restrictions on immigration into countries like the United States, popular discourse and public policy in such countries typically grants that the state has the right to limit immigration for a variety of reasons. These reasons surround the state’s supposed obligation to give priority to the interests of its own citizens over those of noncitizens, whether the concern is over potential fiscal strains, economic competition, or disruptive cultural influence arising from incoming foreigners. Such arguments purport to show either that immigration restrictions do not violate migrant’s rights or that such violations are morally justified.
Huemer rejects these arguments, arguing instead that restrictions on entry violate the rights of migrants not to be coercively harmed. He offers a range of hypothetical cases drawing upon everyday moral intuitions to show that neither economic nor cultural state interests can justify restrictions on immigration for ordinary, noncriminal migrants. Since defenders of restrictions cannot show their policies to be compatible with human rights, they must be rejected as unjust.