Chapter 31 Chapter Summary

Longino observes that since sexual mores have been distinguished from morality, some have concluded that pornography, no matter how offensive, must be tolerated as a matter of a legitimate freedom of expression. She argues instead that pornography is harmful to people, harmful things are immoral, so pornography is immoral. Longino defines pornography as material endorsing sexual behavior that is degrading or abusing. She then argues that pornography is harmful because it (i) is implicated in the commission of violent crimes against women; (ii) is a means of disseminating vicious lies about women; and (iii) supports sexist attitudes and reinforces the oppression and exploitation of women. Also, because it is harmful, it is immoral.

Longino considers and rejects the suggestion that pornography may be protected under the law as a matter of privacy, freedom of speech, or as a fundamental liberty. Pornography is not protected as a matter of privacy, she argues, because its sale is public. Further, freedom of expression is not sufficient to justify the distribution of pornography. That right is not unqualified. Because pornography impinges on others’ rights, the right to freedom of expression cannot be invoked as justification. Longino ultimately claims that, neither as a matter of principle nor as necessary to maximizing liberty, can it be supposed that there is an intrinsic or fundamental right to manufacture and distribute pornographic material.