Internationale Handelsgesellchaft mbH v Einfuhr- & Vorratsstelle fur Getreide & Futtermittel (Solange I)  2 CMLR; (German Federal Constitutional Court)
 The Verwaltungsgericht takes the view that the rules of Community law which it questions are incompatible with the Constitution even in the interpretation given them by the European Court....
 European Community law, says the referring court, can be examined for its compatibility with the Constitution; it is not entitled to precedence over all national law. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has jurisdiction to review the matter. While the regulations issued by the organs of the Community are norms of an autonomous legal system, to which, on its wording, Article 100(1) of the Constitution does not apply, the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht results first of all from the consideration that there must be a national tribunal for judicial review of constitutionality (Normenkontrolle) if one regards the examination of Community law against the structural principles of national constitutional law as admissible. The ruling of the European Court, says the referring court, does not pose any obstacle to an examination of the provisions in question by the Bundesverfassungsgericht....
 An essential preliminary for this ruling is the closer, though not yet conclusive, determination of the relationship between the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany and European Community law, which has come into being on the basis of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter referred to as 'Community law'). The present case demands only the clarification of the relationship between the guarantees of fundamental rights in the Constitution and the rules of secondary Community law of the EEC, the execution of which is in the hands of administrative authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany. For there is at the moment nothing to support the view that rules of the Treaty establishing the EEC, that is, primary Community law, could be in conflict with provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. It can equally remain open whether the same considerations apply to the relationship between the law of the Constitution outside its catalogue of fundamental rights, and Community law, as apply, according to the following reasoning, to the relationship between the guarantees of fundamental rights in the Constitution and secondary Community law.
 This Court - in this respect in agreement with the law developed by the European Court of Justice - adheres to its settled view that Community law is neither a component part of the national legal system nor international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from an autonomous legal source; for the Community is not a State, in particular not a federal State, but 'a sui generis community in the process of progressive integration', an 'inter-State institution' within the meaning of Article 24 (1) of the Constitution.
 It follows from this that, in principle, the two legal spheres stand independent of and side by side one another in their validity. and that, in particular, the competent Community organs, including the European Court of Justice, have to rule on the binding force, construction and observance of Community law, and the competent national organs on the binding force, construction and observance of the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The European Court of Justice cannot with binding effect rule on whether a rule of Community law is compatible with the Constitution, nor can the Bundesverfassungsgericht rule on whether, and with what implications, a rule of secondary Community law is compatible with primary Community law. This does not lead to any difficulties as long as the two systems of law do not come into conflict with one another in their substance. There therefore grows forth from the special relationship which has arisen between the Community and its members by the establishment of the Community first and foremost the duty for the competent organs, in particular for the two courts charged with reviewing law-the European Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht - to concern themselves in their decisions with the concordance of the two systems of law. Only in so far as this is unsuccessful can there arise the conflict which demands the drawing of conclusions from the relationship of principle between the two legal spheres set out above.
 For, in this case, it is not enough simply to speak of the 'precedence' of Community law over national constitutional law, in order to justify the conclusion that Community law must always prevail over national constitutional law because, otherwise, the Community would be put in question. Community law is just as little put in question when, exceptionally, Community law is not permitted to prevail over entrenched (zwingende) constitutional law, as international law is put in question by Article 25 of the Constitution when it provides that the general rules of international law only take precedence over simple federal law, and as another (foreign) system of law is put in question when it is ousted by the public policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The binding of the Federal Republic of Germany (and of all member-States) by the Treaty, is not according to the meaning and spirit of the Treaties, one-sided, but also binds the Community which they established to carry out its part in order to resolve the conflict here assumed, that is to seek a system which is compatible with an entrenched precept of the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Invoking such a conflict is therefore not in itself a violation of the Treaty, but sets in motion inside the European organs the Treaty mechanism which resolves the conflict on a political level.
 Article 24 of the Constitution deals with the transfer of sovereign rights to inter-State institutions. This cannot be taken literally. Like every constitutional provision of a similar fundamental nature, Article 24 of the Constitution must be understood and construed in the overall context of the whole Constitution. That is, it does not open the way to amending the basic structure of Constitution, which forms the basis of its identity, without a formal amendment to the Constitution, that is, it does not open any such way through the legislation of the inter-State institution. Certainly, the competent Community organs can make law which the competent German constitutional organs could not make under the law of the Constitution and which is nonetheless valid and is to be applied directly in the Federal Republic of Germany. But Article 24 of the Constitution limits this possibility in that it nullifies any amendment of the Treaty which would destroy the identity of the valid constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany by encroaching on the structures which go to make it up. And the same would apply to rules of secondary Community law made on the basis of a corresponding interpretation of the valid Treaty and in the same way affecting the structures essential to the Constitution. Article 24 does not the actually give authority to transfer sovereign rights, but opens up national legal system (within the limitations indicated) in such a way that the Federal Republic of Germany's exclusive claim to rule is taken back in the sphere of validity of the Constitution and room is given, within the State's sphere of rule, to the direct effect and applicability of law from another source.
 The part of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights is an inalienable essential feature of the valid Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany and one which forms part of the constitutional structure of the Constitution. Article 24 of the Constitution does not without reservation allow it to be subjected to qualifications. In this, the present state of integration of the Community is of crucial importance. The Community still lacks a democratically legitimated parliament directly elected by general suffrage which possesses legislative powers and to which the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully responsible on a political level; it still lacks in particular a codified catalogue of fundamental rights, the substance of which is reliably and unambiguously fixed for the future in the same way as the substance of the Constitution and therefore allows a comparison and a decision as to whether, at the time in question, the Community law standard with regard to fundamental rights generally binding in the Community is adequate in the long term measured by the standard of the Constitution with regard to fundamental rights (without prejudice to possible amendments) in such a way that there is no exceeding the limitation indicated, set by Article 24 of the Constitution. As long as this legal certainty, which is not guaranteed merely by the decisions of the European Court of Justice, favourable though these have been to fundamental rights, is not achieved in the course of the further integration of the Community, the reservation derived from Article 24 of the Constitution applies. What is involved is, therefore, a legal difficulty arising exclusively from the Community's continuing integration process, which is still in flux and which will end with the present transitional phase.
 Provisionally, therefore, in the hypothetical case of a conflict between Community law and a part of national constitutional law or, more precisely, of the guarantees of fundamental rights in the Constitution, there arises the question of which system of law takes precedence, that is, ousts the other. In this conflict of norms, the guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution prevails as long as the competent organs of the Community have not removed the conflict of norms in accordance with the Treaty mechanism.