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Table of Contents

  1. Acknowledgments
  2. Chapter one: Defining the constitution
  3. Chapter two: Parliamentary sovereignty
  4. Chapter three: The rule of law and the separation of powers
  5. Chapter four: The royal prerogative
  6. Chapter five: The House of Commons
  7. Chapter six: The House of Lords
  8. Chapter seven: The electoral system
  9. Chapter eight: Parliamentary privilege
  10. Chapter nine: Constitutional conventions
  11. Chapter ten: Local government
  12. Chapter eleven: Parliamentary sovereignty within the European Union
  13. Chapter twelve: The governance of Scotland and Wales
  14. Chapter thirteen: Substantive grounds of judicial review 1: illegality, irrationality and proportionality
  15. Chapter fourteen: Procedural grounds of judicial review
  16. Chapter fifteen: Challenging governmental decisions: the process
  17. Chapter sixteen: Locus standi
  18. Chapter seventeen: Human rights I: Traditional perspectives
  19. Chapter eighteen: Human rights II: Emergent principles
  20. Chapter nineteen: Human rights III: New substantive grounds of review
  21. Chapter twenty: Human rights IV: The Human Rights Act 1998
  22. Chapter twenty-one: Human rights V: The impact of The Human Rights Act 1998
  23. Chapter twenty-two: Human rights VI: Governmental powers of arrest and detention
    1. European Convention on Human Rights Art 5
    2. Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333
    3. R v Howell [1982] QB 416; [1981] 3 All ER 383
    4. Foulkes v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1998] 3 All ER 705
    5. DPP v Redmond-Bate (1999) 163 JP 789: [2000] HRLR 249
    6. Bibby v Chief Constable of Essex (2000) 164 JP 297; [2000] Po LR 107; The Times April 24 2000
    7. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ss 24-25; original versions
    8. Hough v Chief Constable of the Staffordshire Constabulary [2001] EWCA Civ 39
    9. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 24A
    10. Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573
    11. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 28
    12. Kenlin v Gardner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1966] 3 All ER 931
    13. Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 All ER 878
    14. McKee v Chief Constable for Northern Ireland [1984] 1 WLR 1358; [1985] 1 All ER 1
    15. Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 157
    16. O'Hara v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 32
    17. Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117
    18. A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68
  24. Chapter twenty-three: Leaving the European Union

Foulkes v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1998] 3 All ER 705

BELDAM LJ: In the early hours of the morning of 20 December 1994 four police officers were summoned to 35 Lenthall Street, Liverpool, by the plaintiff, Mr Trevor Foulkes. He, his son Karl, who is aged 18, and daughter Lindsay aged 19, were in the throes of a family dispute because his children were playing music loudly and would not leave the house when he told them to do so. It appears that Mrs Foulkes was also involved and that general abuse had been exchanged. The arrival of the four policemen enabled Mr Foulkes to douse the music and after a while the police officers escorted the son and daughter from the house and directed them to return to the daughter's flat which was not far away. As the daughter was leaving, she stubbed her cigarette at or on Mr Foulkes' jumper. Later that morning Mr Foulkes awoke to find that his children had returned for breakfast. A heated family discussion took place and Mr Foulkes rushed downstairs and told the children to leave immediately. Mrs Foulkes took the children's part and asked him to leave; she suggested he go for a walk or stay with one of his brothers or friends. Mrs Foulkes went out but the argument between Mr Foulkes and his children continued. He tried to use the telephone to summon the police but was prevented by his son and shortly before 9 am he left the house and went to a public telephone box. He again asked the police to attend. Pc McNamara and Pc Mulcahey were detailed to answer the call and on arrival found Mr Foulkes locked out of his house. Mrs Foulkes who had returned while he was making his telephone call had agreed with her son that the lock on the front door should be changed. Apparently a replacement lock was kept ready at hand and by this means Mr Foulkes was prevented from returning home. No 35 Lenthall Street, Walton, was jointly owned by Mr Foulkes and his wife, who had been married for 22 years. Their daughter Lindsay had a flat of her own but at the time it was without electricity.

Pc McNamara found Mr Foulkes sitting on the doorstep. He described him as slightly unkempt, very nervous and jittery and not completely coherent but his nervous disposition was very obvious. His hands were shaking but otherwise he seemed calm. To Pc McNamara, Mr Foulkes related that he had had arguments, that his son had locked him out of the house and that he wanted to get back in. Pc Mulcahey went inside the house and was there for several minutes, the door being closed behind him. Whilst Pc Mulcahey was speaking to Mrs Foulkes inside the house, Mr Foulkes gave Pc McNamara an account of the incident earlier that morning, telling him that the police had attended and in general terms the nature of the argument. When Pc Mulcahey returned, he told Mr Foulkes that his wife, daughter and son did not want him to go back into the house and that if he went back in there would be arguments. The officer suggested that Mr Foulkes should go and have a cup of tea or go to a relative until tempers had cooled but Mr Foulkes said more than once, 'It's my house. I called you. I want back into the house'. Several times the police officers suggested that he left the front of the house to cool down but Mr Foulkes refused to do so. Pc McNamara cautioned him and told him that he would be arrested to prevent any breach of the peace if he did not go away until tempers had cooled. Still Mr Foulkes refused to go so Pc McNamara arrested him because, in his words, he was: '... fearful that it was his [Mr Foulkes'] actions outside the property that was going to cause a breach of the peace.' Pc McNamara thought that if he left the area while Mr Foulkes remained outside the property, Mr Foulkes would persist in trying to get into the house:

'If he got into the house then an argument would ensue and violence would occur, whether the violence be upon him or upon the other members of the family at that time to me did not matter but a breach of the peace would occur due to his actions.'

Mr Foulkes was taken to Walton Police Station and was detained there.... He was kept in custody until the following morning when Mrs Foulkes withdrew the suggestion she had made in her statement that she wished her husband to be taken before a magistrate and to be bound over to keep the peace. Mr Foulkes was then released.

On 22 November 1995 he commenced proceedings against the Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police in the Liverpool County Court claiming that his arrest by Pc McNamara was illegal and that he had been falsely imprisoned. Further that, even if his arrest was lawful, the duration of his detention was unreasonable.

The plaintiff, as I shall now call Mr Foulkes, included a claim for malicious prosecution but he did not pursue it. He claimed damages, including exemplary damages. For the defendant chief constable, it was contended that the plaintiff's arrest was lawful, being effected by Pc McNamara on the ground that he reasonably apprehended that a breach of the peace was about to occur or was imminent if he did not arrest the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's claim was heard in the Liverpool County Court on 1 and 2 May 1997. The facts I have related were not substantially in dispute. Mr Assistant Recorder Elleray rejected the plaintiff's claim. It had been conceded before him that Pc McNamara honestly believed that a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned unless he arrested the plaintiff. Although the trial was with a jury, in the light of the concession that Pc McNamara honestly held the belief that arrest was necessary to prevent a breach of the peace, the only remaining question was whether there were reasonable grounds in law for the arrest and subsequent detention of the plaintiff. That was a matter for the judge to determine and after a careful and accurate review of the arguments which had been canvassed before him, the judge held that Pc McNamara did in this case have reasonable grounds for his honest belief. Accordingly he dismissed the plaintiff's claim and entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals.

Before setting out the reasons for the recorder's decision, I would pay tribute to his judgment as a clear and careful exposition of the principles he applied and the basis for his decision that there were reasonable grounds for Pc McNamara's actions. In summary, after extracting the relevant principles from the authorities which had been cited to him, the recorder set out the factors which had been urged by Mr Ley on the plaintiff's behalf that there were no such reasonable grounds and weighed them against the factors which he decided had informed Pc McNamara's belief that arrest was necessary. On the one hand the plaintiff had summoned the police to the scene. There was no evidence that the plaintiff had committed any damage or had been aggressive, nor that he was a violent man. The mere fact that Mrs Foulkes had expressed concern that if the plaintiff returned to the home there might be arguments did not mean that there would necessarily be violence or damage to property. Nor had Pc McNamara made inquiries about the circumstances in which the police had attended earlier that morning. On that occasion it was the children who had been asked to leave, not the plaintiff. Moreover Pc Mulcahey had apparently been of the view that any loud noise or shouting could amount to a breach of the peace. Further there was no evidence that any member of the public might have been affected by this domestic squabble.

The matters which on the other hand led the recorder to conclude that there were reasonable grounds in law for the plaintiff's arrest were that Mrs Foulkes and the two children had taken the drastic step of changing the locks to exclude him, that he appeared very nervous and agitated, that he told Pc McNamara that there had been arguments between himself and the children and that the arguments were to do with loud music. So Pc McNamara reasonably thought there must be more to it than that. When Mrs Foulkes appeared at the door of the house she made an aggressive remark and her daughter also appeared to be in an agitated state. Earlier that morning she had stubbed a cigarette on or at her father. Both Mrs Foulkes and the children were adamant that the plaintiff was not to go back in the house and Mrs Foulkes had indicated she was frightened there would be trouble. The plaintiff was refusing all the reasonable requests by the police that he should go for a cup of tea or to friends while tempers cooled. The recorder therefore concluded:

'Pc McNamara and his fellow officers were in a difficult situation, the making of Mr Foulkes and his family. He should and, in my view would reasonably, have been concerned that if the police simply left the scene and Mr Foulkes on his step or the pavement to his civil remedies, matters might have escalated out of hand. He should have feared that Mr Foulkes, with or without friends, would seek to break back into the house; and the adult children, if not Mrs Foulkes, might then physically resist his re-entry. On the spur of the moment, Pc McNamara had to consider whether the peace of the street was a concern or whether he could safely leave Mr Foulkes where he was. There should have passed through his mind, and may well have done, the possibility that if everything went wrong the likelihood was that any inaction by him would be the subject of criticism. In my judgment, the Foulkes' family disputes were that morning plainly out of hand. In the light of the matters known to Pc McNamara he had reasonable grounds for believing that Mr Foulkes might cause harm or damage to property, or might provoke it in his children and that there was an imminent chance of a breach of the peace.'

Accordingly he held that Pc McNamara not only had an honest belief that a breach of the peace would be committed if he did not arrest Mr Foulkes but that he had reasonable grounds for that belief.....

The main argument advanced by Mr Ley in the appeal is that the matters identified by the recorder did not justify arrest. He submitted that where a person is behaving lawfully and no breach of the peace takes place in the presence of a constable, the mere fact that the constable fears that a person acting lawfully in trying to re-enter his home may provoke violence on the part of others is an insufficient basis for arrest on the ground of apprehended breach of the peace.

This argument evoked echoes of the argument put forward in Timothy v Simpson (1835) 1 Cr M & R 757, 149 ER 1285, that a fight between two persons could not support the arrest of both for breach of the peace. Holding that the arrestor did not have to decide on the merits of the dispute, Parke B said (1 Cr M & R 757 at 763, 149 ER 1285 at 1288):

'If no one could be restrained of his liberty, in cases of mutual conflict, except the party who did the first wrong, and the bystanders acted at their peril in this respect, there would be very little chance of the public peace being preserved by the interference of private individuals, nor indeed of peace officers, whose power of interposition on their own view appears not to differ [at common law] from that of any of the King's other subjects.'

Mr Ley relied on the oft-cited cases of Beatty v Gillbanks (1882) 9 QBD 308, [1881-5] All ER Rep 559 and Wise v Dunning [1902] 1 KB 167, [1900-3] All ER Rep 727. He submitted that it was not a reasonable consequence of the arrested person's lawful behaviour that another should commit a breach of the peace. In exceptional cases insulting or abusive conduct or behaviour could give rise to retaliation and justify arrest. There was no evidence in the present case of any such conduct on the part of the plaintiff. A police officer arresting on this ground must be satisfied that a breach of the peace as defined by Watkins LJ in R v Howell [1981] 3 All ER 383 at 388, [1982] QB 416 at 426 was likely to occur. He said:

'We entertain no doubt that a constable has a power of arrest where there is reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of a breach of the peace; so for that matter has the ordinary citizen ... We hold that there is power of arrest for breach of the peace where (1) a breach of the peace is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest, or (2) the arrestor reasonably believes that such a breach will be committed in the immediate future by the person arrested although he has not yet committed any breach, or (3) where a breach has been committed and it is reasonably believed that a renewal of it is threatened.'

In a later passage he added ([1981] 3 All ER 383 at 389, [1982] QB 416 at 427):

'... there is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a riot, an unlawful assembly or other disturbance. It is for this breach of the peace when done in his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without warrant.'

Mr Ley submitted that the circumstances referred to by Watkins LJ amounted to an exhaustive exegesis of the power of arrest for breach of the peace....

I would accept Mr Ley's submission that the common law power of a police constable to arrest where no actual breach of the peace has taken place but where he apprehends that such a breach may be caused by apparently lawful conduct is exceptional. Many of the instances in which such a power has been upheld in the past are, as a result of the enactment of the Public Order Act 1986, unlikely to give rise to difficulty since for offences under that Act, and particularly under ss 4 and 5, statutory powers of arrest without warrant are conferred on a constable.

In the circumstances of this case, although I am prepared to accept that a constable may exceptionally have power to arrest a person whose behaviour is lawful but provocative, it is a power which ought to be exercised by him only in the clearest of circumstances and when he is satisfied on reasonable grounds that a breach of the peace is imminent.

In Albert v Lavin [1981] 3 All ER 878 at 880, [1982] AC 546 at 565 Lord Diplock referred to a well-established principle:

'... every citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears to be about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking or threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him against his will.'

In my view, the words used by Lord Diplock and in the other authorities show that where no breach of the peace has taken place in his presence but a constable exercises his power of arrest because he fears a further breach, such apprehended breach must be about to occur or be imminent. In the present case Pc McNamara acted with the best of intentions. He had tried persuasion but the plaintiff refused to be persuaded or to accept the sensible guidance he had been given but in my judgment that was not a sufficient basis to conclude that a breach of the peace was about to occur or was imminent. There must, I consider, be a sufficiently real and present threat to the peace to justify the extreme step of depriving of his liberty a citizen who is not at the time acting unlawfully. The factors identified by the recorder in the present case do not in my judgment measure up to a sufficiently serious or imminent threat to the peace to justify arrest. Accordingly I would hold that Pc McNamara, though acting honestly and from the best of motives, did not in fact have reasonable grounds for the arrest.....