As I record this a controversy involving the rules
of Canadian parliamentary government, in our electoral system
has managed the near unthinkable.
It replaced the Covid pandemic at the top of the headlines
in Canada's media for a couple of weeks.
The circumstances were as follows.
The opposition Conservative Party proposed the creation
of a parliamentary committee to examine
the government's spending during the Covid pandemic,
and other matters that the Conservatives believed involve
unethical actions by the Liberal government.
Prime Minister Trudeau responded by threatening to make the vote
in the House of Commons on whether to create this committee,
a vote of confidence in the government,
meaning that if his government were to lose this vote
it would be required to resign, and the Prime Minister
would request that the Governor-General call a new election.
But wait a minute.
Isn't the next federal election supposed to take place
on October the 16th, 2023?
This appears to be what is required
by Section 56 of the Canada Elections Act.
And indeed, at the website of Elections Canada,
October 16th, 2023 is indicated as the date for the next federal election.
The fixed election date provision, specified in Canadian law since 2007,
may cause Canadians to imagine
that as in such countries with electoral systems as diverse as those of France,
Norway and the United States,
our country's constitution requires
that national elections be held on a specific date,
after a term of a specific number of years.
This is a true fixed-date electoral system.
It is not what exists in Canada.
The four-year term of office, and the election dates required pursuant to Section 56
pursuant to Section 56 of the Canada Elections Act
do not change the rules of the Canadian constitution.
These rules state that no government
may last longer than five years before a new election must take place.
That's Section 4 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
And that the Governor-General may dissolve Parliament
and require that a new election be held
at any time during the five-year maximum term of a government.
That's Section 50.
Section 50, Constitution Act, 1867.
This constitutional provision allowing for the holding of an election
before the date specified in the Canada Elections Act is, in fact,
acknowledged in Section 56 of that law.
It states that, quote,
" Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor-General,
including the power to dissolve Parliament
at the Governor-General’s discretion."
Unquote.
And in reality, according to the unwritten rules of the constitution,
it is the Prime Minister, and not the Governor-General,
who determines whether and when a new election will be held.
The idea that Canada has fixed dates for federal elections
was shown to be incorrect just a year after the fixed date provision
became part of the Canada Elections Act.
The Conservative minority government that had been elected in 2006 resigned,
and a new election was held in 2008.
Then, only three years later,
the Conservative minority government elected in 2008 resigned,
and a new election was held in 2011.
The fixed election date timetable was respected for the next two elections
held in 2015, and 2019,
both of which were preceded by majority governments.
And so, it appears that Canada may have fixed-date elections
when one party controls a majority in the House of Commons,
but four-year terms are unlikely during periods of minority government.
In fact, this has long been the case.
So why was the Canada Elections Act changed?
To include the "fixed-date" provision when, in fact,
almost nothing has changed?
Well, not quite nothing.
A majority government that decides
to ignore the four-year cycle envisaged by the law,
and either send Canadians to the poll earlier,
or continue longer than four years would have some explaining to do.
It may be, however, that no more than a rather small fraction of the population
would be particularly exercised by such a decision.
Fixed-date provisions have been adopted by parliamentary democracies
across the world in response to various complaints about governments
being able to call elections at a time of their choosing.
Foremost among these complaints is the charge of electoral opportunism,
that is, the belief that being able to choose the timing of an election
gives the governing party an advantage over its rivals.
It is also argued that fixed dates for elections
permit better planning by parties,
when it comes to the activities necessary in preparing for an election,
including raising money and selecting candidates,
and would also facilitate planning by election officials.
Fixed date elections are expected to loosen party discipline
because members of the government caucus
would no longer be kept in line by the threat
that an election might suddenly be called.
Some advocates of a rigid fixed-date election requirement
argue that it would eliminate what they see as the anachronistic discretion that,
at least according to the letter of Canada's constitution,
belongs to the Governor-General, when it comes to the timing of elections.
At the same time, however, there are criticisms of fixed date elections.
Perhaps the one most frequently heard
is that they are inconsistent with parliamentary government,
and the notion of responsible government.
If the government loses the confidence of the House of Commons,
it ought to be able to resign, and trigger a new election.
It would not always be the case that some other party, or parties
would be able to form a government capable of winning votes in the House,
and if a new election could not be held for a set number of years,
this could result in legislative stalemate.
Moreover, some argue that exceptional circumstances can arise
which justify the calling of an early election.
Now, with the exception of Norway,
virtually all parliamentary democracies that have adopted fixed-date elections
have maintained the ability for an election to be called
earlier than the term specified in the law.
But have such electoral system reforms made a difference?
In a recent study by Canadian political scientists
Stephen White and Christopher Alcantara,
the authors conclude that the literature does not point in a single direction.
Regarding the important electoral opportunism argument, they write,
"There seems to be no firm consensus in the literature
as to whether the election timing power provides
an electoral advantage to First Ministers, and their incumbent parties.
Some studies suggest that the election timing power is highly advantageous,
providing incumbents with a powerful tool
for increasing their re-election chances,
and circumventing the ability of voters
to properly hold governments and leaders accountable for their actions."
Based on their examination of federal and provincial elections in Canada
since fixed-date reforms were passed, they conclude quote,
"Our evidence indicates that the introduction
of partially fixed election dates in Canadian provinces
has constrained the behaviour of incumbent governments
and eliminated a distinctive incumbent advantage."
White and Alcantara also point to earlier work done
by André Blais and his colleagues suggesting that parties in power
may be punished by the electorate
when they deviate from the fixed election dates.
As to whether fixed-date elections hold the promise
of reducing party discipline in the legislature, well,
not everyone believes that this would be a good thing.
Nor is it clear from the experience so far in Canada,
or in other jurisdictions where fixed election dates have been adopted,
that party discipline has become weaker.
The factors that cause members of a party caucus to vote in a uniform manner,
and to take direction from their leaders are multiple.
In Norway, party discipline is high,
notwithstanding that the constitution does not allow for early elections.
So, what are we to make of the adoption of fixed-date elections in Canada?
And should anyone be indignant
if a prime minister threatens to call a snap election?