**Chapter Summary**

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Chapter 4: Making Moral Judgments

This chapter introduces two reasoning processes for arriving at moral judgments. Its opening story poses a moral dilemma involving several conflicting values. To begin untangling this dilemma, §II distinguishes the moral, legal, and prudential values involved, and emphasizes that moral values override other kinds of values. This leads in the following section to a precise characterization of moral claims as normative, as truth claims, as universalizable, and overriding. §IV illustrates and analyzes the standard pattern of moral thinking we call moral reasoning*.* This pattern is: *moral principle* + *descriptive claim(s)* → *moral* *judgment.* A similar pattern can likewise be followed to infer from foundational moral principles to less general derived moral principles: *foundational moral principle + descriptive claim(s) → derived moral principle.* But it doesn’t seem that this is the only pattern people follow in their moral thinking. In contrast to moral reasoning’s universalism, the last section introduces moral particularism and the view that moral thinking sometimes makes no appeal to moral principles at all. We call this sort of moral thinking moral reflection*.*